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Social enterprises are nonprofit, for-profit or hybrid organizations that use 
business methods to create social change (Dees 2007; Light 2005; Martin and Osberg 
2007; Neck, Brush, and Allen 2009;). If it succeeds, the social enterprise model could 
prove to be a viable pathway to greater social justice in an era of decreasing funding for 
government services and nonprofits (Emerson and Twersky 1996; Harding 2004; Murphy 
and Coombs 2009; Wilson 2008). However, skeptics worry that the perils of 
privatization, bottom-line thinking, and deceptive marketing potentially embodied by the 
“business methods” that social enterprises employ may undermine the potential of this 
new approach to solving social problems (Bateman and Chang 2012; Farmer 2009; Nega 
and Schneider 2014). The three articles that make up this dissertation examined the ways 
social entrepreneurs perceived and managed tensions between social mission and market 
institutional logics. Their ability (or lack thereof) to reconcile these contradictory 
imperatives could contribute to whether social enterprises ultimately succeed or fail as 
vehicles for positive social change. 
Social Entrepreneurs at the Crossroads: Four Approaches to Responding to Dual 
Institutional Logics suggests that the widely accepted characterization of social 
entrepreneurs as compassionate individuals motivated to address intractable social 
problems innovatively (Alvord, Brown and Letts 2004; Lehner and Germak 2014; Mair 
and Marti 2006; Miller, Grimes, McMullen and Vogus 2012) is simplistic. From in-depth 
interviews with twenty (inter)nationally recognized social entrepreneurs I derived four 
distinct categories: Disillusioned Dreamers, Social Capitalists, Do-Somethings, and 
Bridgebuilders. Half of these respondents did not perceive tensions between logics; 
another quarter did not wrestle with the tensions they perceived. Only the Bridgebuilders 
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perceived tensions and then persisted in focusing on both logics and sets of actors to 
harness synergies. As a result, only Bridgebuilders offer a truly hybrid model for social 
mission work within the current economic context, whereas the others hew toward a 
single dominant logic.  
One Size Does Not Fit All: Legal Form and US WISEs focuses on work 
integration social enterprises (WISEs), organizations that address the chronic 
unemployment of marginalized populations. The data demonstrated that contrary to the 
expectation that WISEs would exemplify “contested” organizations (Besharov and Smith 
2014), eight of the ten WISEs studied did not experience significant conflict between 
social mission and market logics. Rather, WISEs generally had one logic that dominated 
their operations: a market logic in for-profit WISEs and a social mission logic in 
nonprofit WISEs. Workers’ employability emerged as an important variable, with for-
profit WISEs creating jobs for more employable populations and nonprofits offering job 
training and “wraparound” services to harder-to-employ populations. Only two WISEs 
experienced substantial tensions, when social entrepreneurs attempted to prioritize a job 
training/services mission within a for-profit form. This data demonstrates that a job 
creation approach aligns best with a for-profit WISE form and a job training/services 
approach to a nonprofit WISE form. However, neither form has succeeded in creating a 
system-transforming model that successfully combines revenue generation with a robust 
training/services/job creation mission. This suggests that breaking traditional nonprofit 
and for-profit patterns to deliver substantial market and social mission outcomes within a 
single organization is a significant challenge. 
Stakeholder Resistance to Social Enterprise Hybridity examines how social 
entrepreneurs perceive the support of key stakeholders in their attempts to balance 
competing social mission and market logics. Despite evidence of social interest in ethical 
capitalism, this data suggests that well-resourced stakeholders push social entrepreneurs 
to prioritize price, revenue generation, and measurement. This includes both traditional 
organizational stakeholders and hybrid-specific stakeholders. Customers and clients 
demanded low prices and high value. Donors demanded quantification and impact 
measurement. Investors expected market rate financial return. Finally, social enterprise 
gatekeeper organizations (fellowship granting bodies) were focused on the market logic 
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characteristics of sustainability, scale, and entrepreneurial ability, pushing the field 
toward market logic modes of operating. Social entrepreneurs generally responded by 
acquiescing to pressure to emphasize a market logic in their interactions. Counter to 
current literature that suggests social entrepreneurs should problem-solve to avoid single 
logic dominance, social entrepreneurs generally allowed price, business strategy, 
competition and measurement to shape their interactions with stakeholders. Given the 
importance of stakeholder buy-in for organizational legitimacy, the field of social 
enterprise needs to find a way to create and capture stakeholder support for dual logics 
rather than depending on individual social entrepreneurs to withstand the push toward 
marketization. 
 Overall, despite persistent efforts at creative solutions to social problems by some 
individuals, the research shows a strong undertow for social enterprises to adopt business 
logics and business models. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social enterprises use business methods to create social change (Dees 2007; 
Kerlin 2006; Light 2005; Martin and Osberg 2007; Neck, Brush, and Allen 2009; 
Nicholls and Cho 2006). They are nonprofit, for-profit or hybrid organizations that aim to 
support marginalized populations without depending on traditional philanthropic or 
nonprofit funding models. They also aim to address some of the more destructive impacts 
of rampant capitalism (Boteach and Stegman 2012; Derber 2010; Greider 2010; Klein 
2007; Korten 2012; Reich 2015). If it succeeds, the social enterprise model could prove 
to be a viable pathway to greater social justice in an era of decreasing funding for 
government services and nonprofits (Dees 1998a; Emerson and Twersky 1996; Harding 
2004; Murphy and Coombs 2009; Wilson 2008). On the other hand, skeptics worry that 
the perils of privatization, bottom-line thinking, and deceptive marketing potentially 
embodied by the “business methods” social enterprises employ may undermine the 
potential of this new approach to solving social problems (Bateman and Chang 2012; 
Dart 2004; Farmer 2009; Nega and Schneider 2014).  
Given the debates in the literature, this study focuses on the ways social 
entrepreneurs perceive and manage tensions between social mission and financial goals. 
Their ability (or lack thereof) to reconcile these contradictory imperatives determines 
whether social enterprises ultimately succeed or fail as vehicles for social justice. 
 
The Social Enterprise Trend 
Studying social entrepreneurship is a growing trend in academia and society at 
large. At least three journals have been founded in the last eleven years to deal 
exclusively with the phenomenon. Over 150 US campuses offer courses in the field of 
social enterprise. Many of the universities offering courses nationally have also banded 
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together into a global network called “Ashoka U” (Wells 2014). Conferences such as the 
now 13-year old Stern-NYU conference facilitate the exchange of scholarly information. 
Inc. and Fast Company magazines recognize successful social entrepreneurs, as do more 
established media outlets such as Forbes and Bloomberg Business. Incubators and 
accelerators tailored specifically to young people who want to “turn unreasonable 
thinking into unreasonable doing” offer boot camp style programs (such as the 
Unreasonable Institute and Root Cause) for those hungry to make a difference but 
uninspired by traditional career choices. Several large fellowship-granting organizations 
offer significant funding and in-kind resources to successful candidates, along with 
access to alumni networks, including the Skoll, Schwab, Omidyar, and Draper Richards 
Kaplan foundations as well as Echoing Green and Ashoka. Legal frameworks have 
evolved as well; those who found social enterprises can now adopt new legal forms in 
some states (the L3C, benefit corporation) or apply for certification proving they meet 
social value creation goals and metrics (B-Corps).  
 Despite its ubiquity, the term “social enterprise” can be a struggle to define. 
Indeed, much of the early literature on social enterprises and social entrepreneurship 
focused on defining the phrase. Social entrepreneurs became the focus, defined as 
“catalytic” (Waddock and Post 1991), mission-driven, persevering social change agents 
(Anderson 1998; Dees 1998; Martin and Osberg 2007). One debate in the literature 
focused on which activities performed by these individuals constituted social 
entrepreneurship. Martin and Osberg (2007) argued that social entrepreneurs and their 
social enterprises were different from people and organizations that provided social 
services or engaged in activism. Others argued that social entrepreneurs and social 
enterprises combined service provision, activism, entrepreneurship, and other types of 
activities (Neck, Brush and Allen 2009). Those involved in Work Integration Social 
Enterprises argued that basic service provision, as long as it was directed toward 
marginalized populations, was social enterprise (Cooney 2013) while other scholars 
claimed that opportunity recognition and innovation were required to distinguish social 
from non-social enterprises (Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, Kato and Amezcua 2013). A second 
debate related to the legal structure of a social enterprise. The argument for an inclusive 
definition that incorporates for-profit and nonprofit enterprises as well as hybrid forms of 
	 3	
organization (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Battilana, Lee, Walker and Dorsey 2012; 
Waddock and McIntosh 2011) won over a more exclusive definition that restricted the 
legal form to nonprofit or limited profit enterprises. Regardless of the nuances to which 
one subscribes, currently and broadly speaking, social enterprises are organizations that 
combine a focus on a social mission with business strategy. 
It can be as difficult to name a social enterprise as to define it. Well-known 
examples stand out. The Grameen Bank is a social enterprise often used as an exemplar. 
Founded by Nobel Prize winner Muhammad Yunus, it popularized microfinance, the loan 
of small sums of money primarily to poor women to develop small businesses while 
embedding them in peer “solidarity” groups that ensure loan repayment. charity:water (a 
nonprofit that works with local partner organizations to provide clean water solutions in 
poor villages that are maintained long-term by local stakeholders), and Better World 
Books (a benefit corporation that invests in literacy through the sale of used books 
online) are both well-known social enterprises, as are KIPP, Engineers Without Borders, 
Terracycle, Acumen Fund, Root Capital, Room to Read, and Barefoot College.  
 There are many less well-known but equally interesting examples. Sword & 
Plough is a quadruple bottom-line for-profit social enterprise: it aims to create jobs for 
military veterans (people), reduce military waste (planet), foster civilian-military 
dialogue (purpose), and donate ten percent of profits to veterans’ causes (profit 
donations). To do so, it uses military canvas destined for the trash to create tote bags—
sewn by veterans and with the aim of being a conversation starter. Moneythink’s social 
mission is to teach financial literacy to poor students by using cell phone apps to help 
them track their spending along with more traditional budgeting lessons offered by 
college volunteers. Moneythink is funded by donor dollars, much of which they solicit 
from big banks. It also plans to develop a proprietary app that it could sell for income. 
Marcie Muelhke founded Celia Grace when she could not find a “green” wedding dress 
for her own ceremony. She hires local refugee women to sew the dresses from silk she 
has purchased from women’s cooperatives in Asia and lace tatted in the southern United 
States. Welcoming America, a social enterprise now consulting to the White House, aims 
“to flip immigrant integration on its head,” shifting the system from a focus on newcomer 
integration to one on local creation of welcoming communities.  
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Whether for-profit or nonprofit, focused on poverty, health care, education or the 
environment, all of these organizations use business strategies to address significant 
social problems. Common threads among these social enterprises include proposing 
innovative ideas and putting those ideas into action, promoting dialogue and 
collaboration rather than advocacy or confrontation, and generating revenue at least in 
part through sales. 
 
Stuck or Soaring at the Intersection of Social Mission and Market Logics? 
 
Social entrepreneurs often receive uncritical attention for the work they do to 
address complex social problems. For example, in describing social entrepreneurs in the 
New York Times, Nicholas Kristof wrote, “Passionate individuals with great ideas…chip 
away at global challenges” (2010: para 7). Social entrepreneur guru David Bornstein 
wrote that “Social entrepreneurs are the driven, creative individuals who question the 
status quo, exploit new opportunities, refuse to give up—and remake the world for the 
better” (2004: 15). These are optimistic statements. Yet when confronted by both 
financial and social mission driven imperatives, what are the challenges and trade-offs 
that social ventures face in delivering their solutions? And, in the face of these 
challenges, do social ventures remain true to their social missions?  
 The presence of differing existential philosophies is discussed in social 
entrepreneurship literature using an institutional logics framework. Institutional logics are 
sets of practices and beliefs that drive modern institutions (Alford and Friedland 1985). 
Of the five main institutions in contemporary society—the capitalist market, the 
bureaucratic state, democracy, the nuclear family and religion (Friedland and Alford 
1991)1—each has its own organizing principles that provide constituents with a sense of 
purpose and explain “the way a particular social world works” (Jackall 1988: 118). 
Individuals create and recreate these complex sets of norms and rules to make behavior 
																																																								
1 Alford and Friedland (1985) described capitalism, bureaucracy and democracy as different perspectives 
on and modes of inquiry into the concept of the state, and subsequently built on their theory (1991) to 
describe the five dominant logics cited above. Thornton (2004) revised their five dominant logics into six—
the market, the corporation, the professions, the state, the family and religions—to indicate that 
“democracy” and “bureaucracy” conflated ideology (democracy) and means of organization (bureaucracy), 
characteristics related to several institutions.  
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predictable (Jackall 1988). Social enterprise is located at the intersection of two logics: 
social mission (parallel to democracy in the above framework) and market logics.  
According to Alford and Friedland, the market logic is one in which private 
production and market control are institutionalized into as many human activities as 
possible (1985: 429); Boltanski and Thevenot (1991) described it as the logic of money, 
management and business strategy, embodying profit and competition, and commercial 
relationships between people. From a practical perspective, for-profit companies 
exemplify the archetypal market or business logic through their focus on client service, 
revenue and profit. A market logic promotes a focus on salesmanship and service 
delivery, fiduciary responsibility, is constrained by scarce client attention and resources, 
and is organized around sales cycles, client expectations, business plans, and sales 
brochures (Billis 2010; Doherty, Haugh and Lyon 2014; Jay 2013). In contrast, a social 
mission logic is one in which individuals require citizenship, participation and decision-
making rights (Alford and Friedland 1991). Boltanski and Thevenot (1991) described it 
as the logic of social contracts, solidarity and respect within the context of a welfare state. 
From a practical perspective, the archetypal social mission logic is exemplified by 
nonprofit organizations, with a focus on mission, public service and solidarity. It 
promotes collective action and education, is guided by the normative expectations of 
stakeholders, is funded by donations, and is organized around grant funding cycles (Billis 
2010; Doherty et al. 2014; Jay 2013). 
In theory, neither logic is given priority in social enterprise; rather, social 
enterprise is located at the intersection of these two organizational “drivers.” However, 
Smith and colleagues (2013) list numerous tensions that will emerge between social 
mission and market logics, including organizing tensions from divergent internal 
structures and processes and belonging tensions from divergent subgroup identities. 
Boltanski and Thevenot were definitively negative, writing that while some logics might 
coexist, conflicts between social mission and market logics would be irresolvable. 
“Compromise with the business world and the civic [social mission] world seems 
impossible” (1991: 337).  
Social entrepreneurship research has work to do to address questions related to 
dual logics sufficiently. Scholarship progressed from definitional debates in the early 
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decades of research to topics such as innovation in poor countries (Mair and Marti 2009), 
socially entrepreneurial communities (Haugh 2007) and impact measurement (Lepoutre, 
Justo, Terjesen and Bosma 2011). To the extent that studies arose around the fundamental 
question of how to address challenges resulting from the coexistence of social mission 
and revenue goals, researchers provided fairly straightforward answers that suggested 
problem-solving approaches such as engaging an external consultant (Jay 2013), hiring 
staff carefully (Battilana and Dorado 2010), and creating “spaces of negotiation” to 
discuss differences (Battilana, Sengul, Pache and Model 2014). While these outcomes 
provided examples of useful tools, they did not address core issues raised by the 
overlapping and potentially contradictory logics of engagement. Dacin and colleagues 
suggested that in cases of co-existing social mission and market logics, further research 
should investigate whether social entrepreneurs would compromise their social objectives 
to suit the demands of funding bodies (2011). This question of whether one logic risks 
subsuming the other is crucial to understanding the potential of social entrepreneurship; 
in particular, do market imperatives jeopardize social mission achievement? This 
empirical research study examined the complex dynamics perceived, negotiated and 
endured by social ventures as they navigated the intersection of financial and social goals. 
 
Why Now?: Social Enterprise as a Modern Phenomenon 
Economic sociologists and institutional logics theorists explain that individual and 
organizational behavior can only be understood if it is situated in its social and 
institutional context (Polanyi 1944; Thornton and Ocacio 2008). Thus, the hypotheses of 
this study were rooted in the current economic context of deregulated capitalism, 
privatization, trade liberalization and low corporate taxation. It predicted that social 
enterprise would attempt to harness both the business strategies dominant in today’s most 
profitable corporations and the social change goals emanating from the trends of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Googins, Mirvis and Rochlin 2007; Waddock and 
McIntosh 2011), conscious capitalism (Williams 2014) and collaborative consumption 
(Botsman and Rogers 2010; Schor and White 2010). However, given the power and 
predominance of neoliberal trends in the current global order (Hartwich 2009; Klein 
2007; Korten 2012), it also predicted that a market logic would dominate social enterprise 
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operations at times when it conflicted with a social mission logic. While social 
entrepreneurship has developed as one response to the consolidation of the power of 
global capital and rebels against some of its conditions, it also harnesses the processes 
and resources of the current economic order enough that it becomes dependent on them 
for survival. The neoliberal context has created the perfect storm of forces for social 
enterprise to arise and thrive. 
On the one hand, social enterprises make use of current global economic trends 
that allow for innovation and social value creation. First, the pace of change has sped up 
and business and communication technologies have developed rapidly. Many businesses 
therefore are adapting and responding to changing demands much more quickly than they 
used to, moving capital, setting up and dismantling production systems, and adjusting 
supply quickly based on demand (Friedman 2012; Greider 2010; Klein 2007). Social 
entrepreneurs harness the power of globalization to create social change anywhere in the 
world they detect a problem, often leveraging technology in order to work quickly, 
cheaply, and innovatively (Zahra, Rawhouser, Bhawe, Neubaum and Hayton 2008). 
Second, national and international tax systems have developed in which corporations get 
significant tax breaks for philanthropy or “impact investment” (Derber 2010; Korten 
2012). Social entrepreneurship is a vehicle for corporate donations or investment, and 
social entrepreneurs make substantial use of corporate philanthropic dollars as seed 
funding (Seelos and Mair 2005). Third, in an era when many consumers and shareholders 
are pushing corporations to become more accountable for their social impacts, which has 
led to the mainstreaming of corporate social responsibility and triple bottom line 
mandates (Googins, Mirvis and Rochlin 2007; Waddock and McIntosh 2011), social 
enterprises can access significant corporate funding as a way for corporations to realize 
their social goals. 
On the other hand, these characteristics leveraged by social entrepreneurs are also 
direct results of a neoliberal economic order that has perpetuated the social and 
environmental problems that social entrepreneurs address (Alderson 1999; Boteach and 
Stegman 2012; Korton 2012; Reich 2011). The conditions that have allowed for the rise 
of social entrepreneurship—globalization including communication and technological 
innovations, reduced taxation and lax regulation, and corporate funding of social goals—
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are conditions related to the rise of market reforms that were concurrent to the 
dismantling of government institutions, welfare services, and the rise of individualism 
into arenas previously dominated by the state such as health, education and labor 
relations (Boas 2009; Kozol 2012; Pizzigati and Collins 2013). While social 
entrepreneurship addresses pervasive social problems such as inequality and poverty, it 
uses market tools within a neoliberal framework to do so. As Gregory Dees wrote, “For 
social entrepreneurship to flourish, we need public policies that recognize and 
deliberately harness its potential. These policies should free social entrepreneurs to 
innovate and experiment, manage the risk of their experimentation, encourage private 
investors to support this activity, and allow those involved to reap appropriate rewards for 
their success” (2007: 29). This description parallels descriptions of any high-tech or start-
up entrepreneur taking advantage of the current business context. While social 
entrepreneurs are often celebrated as heroic individuals, I would argue that rather than a 
courageous reaction to social ills, social enterprise has arisen out of a necessity to fix the 
problems that have resulted from neoliberalism, using the tools of neoliberalism, in a 
form accepted by neoliberalism. One might even wonder if social enterprise is the 
preferred method of social welfare provision of neoliberals since it takes care of the 
poorest without challenging the structures of inequality and depends on consumer dollars 
and corporate philanthropy. The result, I predicted, would be the dominance of market 
goals over social mission goals if and when these two logics conflicted. 
 
The Researcher’s Standpoint 
Smith (1987) and Haraway (1988) discuss how where we stand in relation to 
those we study shapes how and what we see during the research process. I remained 
conscious of the experiences that shaped my approach to my research questions, and 
conscientious about the lenses I used to understand and situate the knowledge shared with 
me.  
Three paths led me to this topic. The first was a disciplinary path. I have an 
interdisciplinary background, but social entrepreneurship brings these disciplines 
together. I have a background in conflict resolution and negotiation; I am a student of 
sociology; and I was a lecturer at a business school. My conflict resolution background 
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makes sites of inherent conflict of interest. My sociological self is passionate about social 
problems and systemic transformation towards justice. The business school where I 
worked was investing significant resources into the idea of business adopting social, 
environmental and economic responsibility (or SEERS) for global issues. Thus social 
entrepreneurship brought together my disciplinary interests and raised questions that 
intrigued me. The second path was an ideological one. I was cynical about the “business 
methods” used by social entrepreneurs, as the economic system in which I have grown up 
has increased the inequality and suffering around us, not solved it. And yet, there was 
vibrant energy directed to social causes among the social enterprise faculty and students 
with whom I talked. Thus social entrepreneurship brought together my deep-rooted 
skepticism about 21st century capitalism with my curiosity about new ways to engage 
students in social justice.  
The third path arose from early experiences exploring social entrepreneurship. My 
initial investigations into the phenomenon took me to two conferences. The Ashoka U 
Exchange was dominated by the paradigm of the social entrepreneur as nonprofit 
“changemaker.” Discussion centered around causes and passion, embodying a sense that 
“if you pursue your passion the money will follow.” The culminating event was a TEDx 
talk where social entrepreneurs delivered motivational speeches to the audience. 
Conversely, Harvard Business School’s Social Enterprise Conference (SECON) was 
dominated by the paradigm of the savvy startup entrepreneur. This conference centered 
on financial themes, with conversations about potential funders, financial instruments and 
tools, scaleability, and networking with investors. The culminating event was a pitch 
competition in which winners were offered cash injections into their social enterprises. 
These two conferences, both on social enterprise, had entirely different focuses: one on 
social mission, the other on market mechanisms. How were both sets of participants 
“social entrepreneurs”? How were Ashoka participants different from traditional 
nonprofit actors and SECON participants from start-up founders? How could a model 
based on cause and passion survive in competition with one aggressively seeking 
investment for sustainability and scale. Furthermore, could any of these ideas address 
intractable social issues in a way that previous efforts had not? Dacin and colleagues’ 
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question echoed: will social entrepreneurs compromise their social objectives to suit their 
funders? Would a market logic dominate or dilute the social goals of social enterprise? 
Awareness of my own ideological predispositions and my privilege in relation to 
social problems has been an important aspect of conducting this research project with 
integrity. My position has been a motivating force, pushing me to explore these questions 
and to persevere. However, I also had to remember to acknowledge my cynicism and 
leave it aside at times when exploration and interviewing required open curiosity rather 
than closed-minded certainty and when data contradicted my skepticism by presenting a 
nuanced landscape of actors and actions. When narrow-minded judgment did creep in, 
conversations with people more astute and experienced than I were invaluable.  
 
Methodological Considerations 
To investigate these questions, I followed Boltanski and Thevenot’s suggestion to 
look for conflicts between institutional logics to understand their relative power. 
Opposing logics tend to be most obvious when they are in conflict, since individuals use 
these logics to devise justifications for their positions (1991: 25). Thus this study used in-
depth interviews with social entrepreneurs in which I asked them not only about their 
motivations and organizations in general, but more specifically about what tensions they 
faced, what conflicts resulted, the dynamics they perceived and the trade-offs they made.  
Given the vagueness around what counts as a social enterprise, I made two 
sampling decisions. First, I employed the broad definition of “organizations that use 
business methods for social change.” In part this choice was a practical one. Social 
venture funders and other related organizations employ a broad definition and support a 
wide array of organizational forms and purposes, and those who self-identify as social 
enterprises embody varied forms and purposes. I wanted my parameters to emulate the 
reality on the ground. Also, I wished to explore the tensions that social enterprises 
experienced between logics, and I hypothesized that for-profit and nonprofit social 
ventures would experience these tensions differently. Including several organizational 
forms and purposes would allow me to compare multiple cases. Second, I applied several 
theoretically-derived criteria to constrain my sample (Patton 1990). One criterion was to 
include only social enterprises in my sample that had been awarded a fellowship by 
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nationally- or internationally- recognized social enterprise fellowship funding 
organizations or received a competitive spot at an accelerator or incubator. I called this 
technique the “gatekeeper criterion;” since a major gatekeeping organization in the field 
had validated the organization as a social enterprise, it had garnered legitimacy from a 
field leader and thus “counted.” Furthermore, I applied criteria to increase the chances 
that respondents would have experienced tensions between social mission and market 
logics so that I could explore thoroughly their perceptions of this experience. As a result, 
I selected only social enterprises that addressed economic development/poverty 
alleviation, since as their social mission these organizations were trying to increase the 
market opportunities of their beneficiaries. Also, organizations were 2-7 years in age, at 
period which one respondent referred to as the “funding valley of death,” since they were 
too old to receive seed funding but too young to be considered a “sure bet” by investors. I 
also included only those organizations that were US-based and US-focused, in order to 
enhance my ability to make comparisons. 
I conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-four social entrepreneurs and four 
high-level decision-makers at fellowship foundations. Each interview lasted between 60-
150 minutes. To uncover themes, this research used a grounded theory approach to 
understand respondents’ perceptions of their interactions with stakeholders. It did not set 
out to measure the presence of market and social mission logics, but to determine how 
respondents viewed and experienced the multiple forces at work within their social 
enterprises (Charmaz 2006; Cresswell 2013). As such, interviews were coded using a 
grounded approach to identify broad themes guided by the research questions (Charmaz 
2006; Miles and Huberman 1994). Subsequently, all material related to each theme was 
aggregated and recoded for sub-themes in order to elucidate within-case and cross-case 
patterns (Miles and Huberman 1994). Interviewing, coding and analyzing were iterative 
processes. I also wrote memos to refine codes and field notes to elaborate on themes, 
questions, and insights (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
I followed in the interpretive tradition of knowledge-building, which is based on 
the social meanings actors assign to their interactions (Nielsen 1990: 7). It assumes that 
organizational actors actively create the reality they inhabit, and that individual members 
create frames of reference that they share through these social interactions (Berger & 
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Luckmann 1967; Isabella 1990; Neilsen 1990; Weick 1979). I took a phenomenological 
epistemological perspective to capture this lived experience of individuals (Schutz 1967). 
Phenomenology asserts that what is true is “the simple sense perception of something” 
(Heidegger 1996: 25). It is a qualitative sociological approach to investigation that 
suggests that reality is what exists in human consciousness.  It is only through the 
sensation of human experience that phenomena become part of one’s reality. A 
phenomenological perspective emphasizes “understanding social phenomena from the 
actor’s own perspective” and acknowledges that the salient reality is what “people 
perceive it to be” (Taylor and Bogdan 1984: 1-2). Both the interpretive tradition and 
phenomenology understand that different social actors may understand social reality 
differently, producing different meanings. 
Taking a phenomenological approach to my work constituted trying to understand 
what experiences of tension between market and social mission logics meant for the 
various people I interviewed. I strove to understand the experience from the perspectives 
of multiple actors.  Phenomenology was a particularly relevant theoretical framework for 
my research as different actors had differing interpretations of experientially shared 
phenomena such as the presence of multiple institutional logics (Schutz 1953; Heidegger 
1996). 
 
Three Articles – Three Levels of Analysis 
Each of the three following articles addresses questions around institutional logic 
conflicts and trade-offs from a different level of analysis: individual, organizational, and 
systemic. Together they offer a nuanced perspective on the capacity of social enterprise 
to deliver social justice and systemic transformation. 
 
An Individual-Level Perspective – “Social Entrepreneurs at the Crossroads: Four 
Approaches to Responding to Dual Institutional Logics” 
 
Social entrepreneurship literature suggests that social entrepreneurs are 
compassionate individuals with entrepreneurial orientations motivated to address 
intractable social problems innovatively (Alvord, Brown and Letts 2004; Arend 2013; 
Austin, Stevenson and Wei-skillern 2006; Barendson and Gardner 2004; Lehner and 
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Germak 2014; Mair and Marti 2006; Miller, Grimes, McMullen and Vogus 2012; Van de 
Ven, Sapienza and Villanueva 2007). However, this study suggests that motivation is 
more nuanced. I derived four unique categories of social entrepreneur, each driven by a 
different motivation. Disillusioned Dreamers were motivated by frustration with the 
traditional nonprofit system. Social Capitalists were motivated to engage in ethical 
capitalism. Do-Somethings were motivated to engage immediately and directly in solving 
social problems. Bridgebuilders were motivated to bring together social mission and 
market actors for social change. While each of these motivations related generally to 
alleviating social problems and social exclusion, each category of social entrepreneur 
operated from a specific ideology that resulted in their attachment to either a social 
mission or market institutional logic.  
The findings suggest that not all social entrepreneurs perceive tensions between 
logics. Of those that do, many do not wrestle with those tensions but rather defer to one 
institutional logic as their guide. Only one group, Bridgebuilders, perceived tensions and 
in the face of these tensions persisted in focusing on both logics to harness synergies. 
Furthermore, whether and how social entrepreneurs perceived logic tensions, and whether 
they responded to those tensions, related to their initial motivations to become social 
entrepreneurs. Bridgebuilders stood out as exemplifying the ideal of the social 
entrepreneur. Whereas the majority of social entrepreneurs fell back on the mandates of 
one logic or the other, Bridgebuilders combined both social mission and market logics in 
their intentions and operations. This makes Bridgebuilders significant role models for the 
field of social enterprise. Since they were motivated to enhance each logic by 
intermingling it with the other, they constantly noted and managed tensions with the goal 
of greater synergy. As a result, Bridgebuilders may offer the best hope of creating social 
enterprises as a new approach to achieving social justice in an era of privatization and 
reduced government funding for social mission-related work. They maintained their 
focus on social mission and funding goals, overcoming Boltanski and Thevenot’s (1991) 
assertion that irresolvable conflicts between the two would arise if both were priorities.  
 
An Organizational Level Perspective – “One Size Does Not Fit All: Legal Form and US 
WISEs” 
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This article addressed a subset of my sample, focusing on work integration social 
enterprises (WISEs), organizations that address the chronic unemployment of 
marginalized populations. The data demonstrated that contrary to the expectation that 
WISEs would exemplify “contested” organizations (Besharov and Smith 2014), eight of 
the ten WISEs did not experience significant conflict. Rather than embodying two equal 
and coexisting institutional logics that made conflicting demands on the social enterprise, 
WISEs generally had one logic that dominated their operations, a market logic in for-
profit WISEs and a social mission logic in nonprofit WISEs. Beneficiaries’ employability 
emerged as an important variable, with for-profit WISEs creating jobs for more 
employable populations and nonprofits offering job training and “wraparound” services 
to harder-to-employ populations. Significant tensions were experienced only in two 
WISEs, where social entrepreneurs attempted to prioritize a job training/services mission 
within a for-profit legal form. These two WISEs were structured to focus on customers 
and profit for survival, but the social entrepreneurs instead focused on beneficiaries and 
public service. Tensions arose between the high cost of services and insufficient revenue 
and threatened the existence of both organizations, as they could not survive without 
sufficient profit from sales or investment. In these two cases, the tension became so 
significant as to lead to a “re-formulation” of the WISE away from a for-profit model to 
prevent organizational demise. 
On the one hand, this study suggests that a job creation approach aligns best with 
a for-profit WISE form and a job training/services approach to a nonprofit WISE form. 
The old adage of fitting form to function holds true. In the case of WISEs, for-profits 
successfully hired marginalized populations and nonprofits prepared them for these jobs. 
On the other hand, while both for-profit and nonprofit WISEs embody both social 
mission and market logics, neither has necessarily succeeded in creating a system-
transforming organization that brings the archetypal market model of the for-profit 
together with the more robust social mission of training/services/job creation. Rather, the 
two cases in this study that attempted this combination had to “re-formulate” to survive. 
This study suggests that breaking traditional nonprofit and for-profit patterns and 
generating robust market and social mission outcomes within one organization is 
challenging—more challenging than this sample of WISEs could handle. 
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A Systemic-Level Perspective – “Stakeholder Resistance to Social Enterprise Hybridity” 
This article shifted from social entrepreneurs to key stakeholders—those who 
control resources—to examine how they support or hinder social entrepreneur attempts to 
balance competing logics. This data suggests that key stakeholders are resisting the shift 
toward dual institutional logics, and pushing social entrepreneurs to prioritize the revenue 
generation and business strategy encompassed by a market logic. This includes both 
traditional stakeholders such as customers and donors, and hybrid-specific stakeholders 
such as fellowship-granting foundations and impact investors. While social entrepreneurs 
attempt some combination of revenue generation and social mission goals, they are 
prevented from combining these logics easily because the stakeholders with whom they 
interact appear to look for and reward a focus on market logic priorities. Customers and 
clients demanded low prices and high value. Donors demanded quantification and impact 
measurement. Investors—both venture capitalists and impact investors—expected market 
rate financial return. 
Finally, gatekeepers also were focused on the market logic characteristics of 
organizational sustainability, scale, entrepreneurial ability and quantification, pushing the 
field toward market logic modes of operating. Social entrepreneurs generally responded 
to stakeholder resistance to hybridity by acquiescing to pressure to emphasize a market 
logic. Counter to current literature that suggests social entrepreneurs should problem-
solve to avoid single logic dominance, social entrepreneurs described their actions as 
dominated by market logic considerations; they allowed price, value, business strategy, 
competition, and measurement to shape their interactions with customers and funders. As 
well, those respondents who discussed impact investors appeared baffled by their 
resistance and generally avoided them. Given the importance of stakeholder buy-in for 
organizational legitimacy, the entire field of social enterprise needs to find a way to 
create and capture stakeholder support for dual logics rather than depending on individual 
social entrepreneurs to withstand the push toward marketization. 
 
Broad Themes Introduced 
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When taken together, the three articles share several broad themes that emerge in 
response to questions around conflicts between social mission and market logics and the 
capacity of social enterprises to address social problems. They include: a) an “absence” 
of tensions; b) the pervasiveness of the market logic; c) nonprofit/for-profit fissure; and 
d) outliers as different eggs in a social mission basket. These will each be addressed 
further in the dissertation’s conclusion.  
Broadly speaking, privileging a market logic over a social mission logic is not 
inherently bad. As gatekeepers, funders, and social entrepreneurs themselves point out, 
revenue is entwined with social mission achievement. Social enterprises require resources 
to survive, which is necessary for keeping the good work going. And even more money is 
required to enable an organization to grow or scale, which is necessary for reaching more 
people or supporting more impactful systemic transformation. However, generating 
income to support a social mission does not necessarily equate with a deep commitment 
to that social mission nor does it ensure that the social mission is robust or enacted with 
integrity. Social entrepreneurs who manage to prioritize social mission in their 
interactions with stakeholders discuss the importance of integrity, genuineness, and laser 
focus on social mission, sometimes at the expense of funding. These qualities of the 
social mission logic may be lost easily when a social entrepreneur emphasizes a market 
logic in their motivation to engage in social entrepreneurship, in their internal 
organizational operations, or in their interactions and relationships with stakeholders.  
If social entrepreneurs and their stakeholders insist on the need to focus on 
business practices at the expense of social mission commitment, there are risks for the 
field. Gatekeepers may push the field towards one that prioritizes a market logic by 
focusing on these skills in the participants they select to become field leaders. Or, social 
enterprises may increasingly develop their business-like nature, de-emphasizing their 
social mission, in order to gain stakeholder recognition or customer loyalty. Furthermore, 
a rigorous focus on measurement as the means to gauge impact may actually contribute to 
the increase of market behaviors of commercialization and quantification at the expense 
of the social mission logic as social entrepreneurs try to find the numbers to demonstrate 
success easily. Continued work to equip social entrepreneurs with the skills to identify 
and address logic conflicts through a dual logic lens, and to educate stakeholders on how 
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to support the field, will help protect its integrity. Otherwise, the risk is that the social 
mission logic will be subsumed by the market logic and that social enterprises will 
compromise their social objectives to serve market priorities. 
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ARTICLE 1  
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS AT THE CROSSROADS: 
FOUR APPROACHES TO RESPONDING TO DUAL INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
 
Introduction 
 
Social ventures are projects that use business methods to create social change (Dees 
2007; Kerlin 2006; Light 2005; Martin and Osberg 2007; Neck, Brush, and Allen 2009; 
Nicholls and Cho 2006). They aim to support marginalized populations without 
depending on philanthropic or traditional nonprofit funding models. Thus social ventures 
rely on two equally fundamental yet distinct logics: to generate revenue and to achieve a 
social mission. This article explores how a sample of social entrepreneurs experiences the 
tensions between social and financial goals and what they do, effectively or ineffectively, 
to resolve them. 
Examples of social ventures that use market mechanisms to achieve a social 
mission exist at the local, national and international level. Sword and Plough, a company 
based in Massachusetts, makes backpacks from recycled military canvas. Their mission is 
fourfold: to maintain an environmentally friendly supply chain, hire unemployed 
veterans, pay fair wages, and increase dialogue across civilian-military boundaries (Brady 
2013). In India, Aravind Eye Care applies a sliding scale payment system to a highly 
standardized approach to cataract surgery. They have performed over 2.5 million 
operations and treated two thirds of their 20 million patients for free as wealthy clients 
subsidize the poor (Matalobos, Pons, and Pahls 2010). At the global level, Aflatoun is an 
international nonprofit that used an innovative social franchise model to increase the 
reach of its children’s financial literacy program from 162,000 in 2005 to two million in 
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2014 (Amar and Munk 2014). Each of these social ventures uses innovative funding 
mechanisms to support their social change work.  
If the social venture organizational form succeeds, it could prove to be a viable 
path to greater social justice in an era of decreasing funding for government services and 
nonprofit work (Dees 1998a; Emerson and Twersky 1996; Harding 2004; Murphy and 
Coombs 2009; Wilson 2008). On the other hand, skeptics worry that the perils of 
privatization, bottom-line thinking, and deceptive marketing may undermine the potential 
of this new approach to solving social problems (Bateman and Chang 2012; Dart 2004; 
Farmer 2009; Nega, and Schneider 2014). How social entrepreneurs perceive and manage 
tensions between social mission and financial goals may contribute to whether social 
ventures ultimately succeed or fail as vehicles for social justice. 
This research extends the investigation into how social entrepreneurs perceive and 
manage multiple logics by analyzing social entrepreneur behavior through the lenses of 
both motivation and institutional theory. Literature on social entrepreneur motivation 
certainly suggests that they have the drive to undertake such challenges. These 
individuals are described as altruistic and driven champions determined to redress 
injustice through vision and hard work (Alvord, Brown, and Letts 2004; Bornstein 2004; 
Elkington, and Hartigan 2008). Motivated by a social mission, there are many accounts of 
inspiring individuals who have achieved innovative social change while operating with 
constrained resources in difficult circumstances (cf Lerner 2013; Mathews 2009; Schwarz 
2012).  
On the other hand, whereas an organization based on one organizational logic 
operates using clear “rules of the game” (Jay 2013: 138), an organization based on two 
logics may find itself at a crossroads, managing competing sets of norms, values, and 
prescriptions (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury 2011). In their 
classic work on institutional logics, Boltanski and Thevenot maintained that the dual 
logics of capitalism and social mission—the latter they subsumed under the category of 
“civic logic”—would create conflicts that could not be resolved. They wrote that 
“compromise with the business world and the civic world seems impossible” (1991: 337).  
This research suggests that both lenses are necessary to understand whether and 
how social entrepreneurs perceive and manage logic tensions. Social entrepreneurs’ 
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motivation is linked to an institutional logic. In turn, whether they perceive and manage 
logic tensions within their social enterprise is related to their initial motivation to enter 
the field. A pattern emerges related to whether and how social entrepreneurs perceive and 
manage tensions based on what motivated them that separates social entrepreneurs into 
four categories: Disillusioned Dreamers, Social Capitalists, Do-Somethings and 
Bridgebuilders. If the social venture is going to stand out as a new organizational form 
based on hybridity, Bridgebuilders are an important model to emulate. While 
Bridgebuilding may be a challenging approach, it may also be the way to achieve 
significant social mission while generating substantial revenue.  
This research contributes to existing social entrepreneurship literature in three 
ways. First, it complicates the idea of social entrepreneur motivation by suggesting that 
rather than being primarily motivated by a social mission, some social entrepreneurs are 
instead/and focused on the market logic, either as a means to social change or as their 
main goal. Second, it suggests that not all social entrepreneurs perceive tensions between 
institutional logics, and if they do perceive tensions, they may ignore them. Finally, this 
research contributes to the literature by bridging individual and institutional level 
analysis. The study suggests that whether social entrepreneurs perceive tensions between 
institutional logics, and how they manage the tensions they perceive, relates to their 
motivation to engage in social entrepreneurship. Conversely, what motivates social 
entrepreneurs may depend on which logic they focus on preceding their social 
entrepreneurship career. 
 
Background 
 
The study of social entrepreneurs stands at the intersection of two literatures: that 
concerning multiple institutional logics and that concerning entrepreneurial motivation. 
Each body of literature is strengthened by attention to the other: thus, the literature on 
multiple institutional logics is strengthened by considering social psychology and the 
literature of motivation is strengthened by considering the interaction between contextual 
and personal factors. 
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Multiple Institutional Logics 
A social venture is a hybrid organization in that it combines a drive to achieve social 
change with a focus on market mechanisms to achieve it. Hybrid organizations embody 
more than one institutional logic (Cooney 2006; Brandsen and Karre 2011; Doherty, 
Haugh, and Lyon 2014; Jay 2013; Pache and Santos 2012, 2013); in the case of a social 
venture, a social mission and a market logic. An institutional logic is a belief system that 
shapes the values and goals of an institutional field (Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Lounsbury 2007; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Thornton and Ocacio 2008). The 
institutional logic guides an organization’s standard mode of operating (Mayer 2014) by 
providing “the rules of the game” (Jay 2013: 138). An institutional logic also explains 
“the way a particular social world works” (Jackall 1988: 118). In other words, 
institutional logics are an intricate set of norms and rules that people create, and recreate, 
to make behavior predictable (Thornton and Ocacio 2008). Traditionally, organizations in 
modern western civilization were guided and shaped by one of five primary logics: 
bureaucracy, capitalism, the family, democracy, or religion (Alford and Friedland 1985; 
Friedland and Alford 1991). However, in the present era there is recognition of 
increasingly complex hybrid organizational forms that embody more than one 
institutional logic (Greenwood et al 2011; Kraatz and Block 2008). Like other types of 
organizations that are representative of institutional pluralism, social ventures are hybrid 
organizations that embody and enact multiple logics; in this case, a market and a social 
mission logic. 
A market logic is one in which market transactions and exchange shape goals, 
legitimacy and decision-making, creating a focus on productivity and economic growth 
(Alford and Friedland 1985; Friedland and Alford 1991; Boltanski and Thevenot 1991). 
Market forces guide an organization to maximize financial returns and generate revenue 
from sales and fees (Doherty et al 2014). A social venture shaped by a market logic tends 
to take the legal form of a business; focus on client service, revenue, and profit; 
emphasize salesmanship and sales cycles; and stress business plans and sales brochures 
(Jay 2013; building on Ewick and Silbey 2002, and Scott 2003). 
In contrast, a social mission logic is one in which extending the provision of 
public programs and rights to all segments of society prevails. Individuals and 
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communities should not only receive rights, but also have a voice in the process (Alford 
and Friedland 1985; Friedland and Alford 1991; Boltanski and Thevenot 1991). A social 
mission logic is rooted in notions of harmony and needs fulfillment, both of the 
individual and of groups (Morrill 2007). Principles such as public benefit, collective 
choice, and social and environmental goal fulfillment infuse a social mission logic. 
Organizations fulfilling a social mission tend to be nonprofits resourced directly through 
membership fees, donations and legacies, or indirectly through taxes redistributed to 
nonprofits through government grants (Doherty et al 2014). The presence of a social 
mission logic is evident when a social venture is involved in public service; focuses on 
the imperatives of mission, service, solidarity and selflessness; uses convening and 
education to disseminate its message; and organizes its activities around campaigns or 
grant funding cycles. Neighborhoods and communities tend to receive attention rather 
than clients (Jay 2013; building on Ewick and Silbey 2002, and Scott 2003). 
While social ventures are based on the ideal of harnessing the potential of both 
market and social mission logics, research describes how the two logics exist in tension 
with each other. These “social-business” tensions manifest internally within the 
organization in four realms: performing, organizing, belonging, and learning tensions 
(Smith, Gonin, and Besharov 2013). Organizational issues such as hiring and measuring 
success become contested. Social ventures may also experience competing pressures 
externally, for example when they must react to competing demands from a variety of 
stakeholders, such as from clients or financers on the one hand, and beneficiaries on the 
other (Kraatz and Block 2008, Pache and Santos 2010).    
Literature suggests that when conflict arises from internal logic tensions responses 
typically result in managers taking one of the following four steps: deletion, 
compartmentalization, aggregation or synthesis (Jay 2013; Kraatz and Block 2008; Pratt 
and Forman 2000). For example, a study of a public-private energy alliance found that 
the social mission and market logics alternated in dominance internally until an external 
consultant contributed to their synthesis (Jay 2013). In response to external logic 
tensions, organizations tend to engage in acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance 
or manipulation (Oliver 1991; Pache and Santos 2010). For example, an organization 
may compromise by partially meeting the demands of external constituents. 
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This research suggests that how social entrepreneurs manage the tensions that 
Boltanski and Thevenot claimed were irreconcilable, and whether they even perceive 
tensions to begin with, depends on their initial motivation to enter the field. Few 
empirical studies have examined the intersections of individual-level and structural-level 
factors to understand how social entrepreneurs manage tensions, but doing so allows for a 
more nuanced understanding of whether social entrepreneurs perceive tensions and the 
strategies they use in response.  
 
Motivation To Become A Social Entrepreneur 
The motivation to be a social entrepreneur is often described in scholarship as a calling to 
make the world a better place (Alvord et al 2004; Bornstein 2004; Dees, Emerson, and 
Economy 2001; Seelos and Mair 2005). Social entrepreneurs are motivated by a vision 
(Waddock and Steckler 2014) to focus their efforts on education, economic development, 
health, or other social sectors (Cukier, Trenholm, Carl, and Gekas 2011) to improve the 
lives of those who cannot access basic or quality goods or services. In contrast to 
commercial entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurs attend to the social good 
(Christopoulos and Vogl 2015), or a collective interest, rather than self-interest (Van de 
Ven, Sapienza, and Villanueva 2007). An “other”-facing orientation motivates these 
individuals to pursue the social good through altruism, empathy and compassion (Arend 
2013; Batson 1998; Dees 2007; Miller, Grimes, McMullen, and Vogus 2012, Roberts and 
Woods 2005; Tan, Williams, and Tan 2005), a public service orientation (Lehner and 
Germak 2014), personal qualities such as energy, persistence, confidence, commitment 
and independence (Barendsen and Gardner 2004), and a strong locus of control, 
innovativeness and tenacity (Lehner and Germak 2014). To some, the personal qualities 
suggested in the literature that must animate a social entrepreneur to persist suggest such 
strength of character that there is a question as to whether social entrepreneurs have been 
mythologized as heroes (Dacin, Dacin, and Tracey 2011; Light 2005; Seelos and Mair 
2005; Vasi 2009). Whether this is the case or not, the literature describes social 
entrepreneurs as individuals motivated to address society’s worst social problems with 
creativity, determination and endurance. 
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Alongside this prosocial orientation, a pro-entrepreneurial background culture is 
also correlated with a drive to engage in social entrepreneurship (Lehner and Germak 
2014). This “entrepreneurial orientation” (Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lumpkin, Moss, 
Gras, Kato, and Amezcua 2013) may be one of the characteristics that distinguish the 
path of a social entrepreneur from colleagues who become activists or engage in 
traditional charity work. This entrepreneurial drive motivates a social entrepreneur to 
create ”social value,” (Corner and Ho 2010; Dacin et al 2011; Santos 2012; Young 2006), 
since alongside service he pursues the “psychic reward from the process of realizing 
ideas” (Martin and Osberg 2007: 34). As such, a social entrepreneur is motivated by the 
entrepreneurial process of combining resources, opportunities and people to innovate 
(Timmons and Spinneli 2007), as well as by a social mission. 
In part because of a risk of fetishizing the social entrepreneur, some scholarship 
has expanded beyond individual level analysis to the interaction of the individual and 
opportunity recognition (Lehner and Kansikas 2012) or the “heart-mind-opportunity 
nexus” (Arend 2013) to explain the emergence of social entrepreneurship. Extending 
from the work of Drucker (1993) and Shane and Venkataraman (2000), this literature 
argues that alongside motivation, the opportunity for action must exist in order for a 
social entrepreneur to engage in social value creation (Dees 1998b; Corner and Ho 2010; 
Lumpkin et al 2013; Perrini, Vurro, and Costanzo 2010; Shaw and Carter 2007). An 
opportunity exists where there is a gap in the provision of services or an unmet social 
need. New institutional theory also argues that context, or external forces, shapes the 
evolution of social entrepreneurship (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Dorado and Ventresca 
2013; Jay 2013; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013; Pache and Santos 2010; Sud, 
VanSandt, and Baugous 2009). New institutional theory argues that external conditions 
contribute to the realization of (or constraints on) social entrepreneurship. As Dorado and 
Ventresca write, “institutional factors are a variable property of actors’ context of action” 
(2013: 80). In other words, an individual’s motivation for social change cannot be 
divorced from its context. Rather, opportunity (or challenge) exists through the presence 
(or absence) of certain institutions (Dart 2004; Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, and Ireland 2011; 
Light 2005; Robinson 2006). These external contexts or conditions that contribute to or 
shape individual motivation for social change have been studied through the lens of 
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crescive conditions (Dorado and Ventresca 2013), community embeddedness (Seelos, 
Mair, Battilana and Dacin 2011); institutional voids (Mair and Marti 2009); increased 
social and economic stress (Peredo and Chrisman 2006), increased public awareness of 
social problems or the high cost of not joining the cause (Dorado and Ventresca 2013; 
Van de Ven et al 2007), and the presence of a facilitative community (Haugh 2007; 
Peredo and Chrisman 2006). 
Thus research has examined contextual factors that encourage the emergence of 
social entrepreneurship. However, little work has looked at how a social entrepreneur’s 
motivation results from the dominance of one institutional logic in that context, or how it 
determines which contextual factors he or she pays attention to within a social venture 
and whether these are perceived as conflictual. This study argues motivation is key 
because it helps us understand how a social entrepreneur perceives and reacts to multiple 
institutional logics. In turn, a social entrepreneur’s motivation can only be fully 
understood by applying an institutional logics framework. Thus individual motivation 
and institutional logics are mutually constitutive in the social venture realm. Motivation 
cannot be understood without understanding institutional logics, and how institutional 
logics play out cannot be understood without understanding a social entrepreneur’s 
motivation. In fact, understanding which logic has motivated a social entrepreneur may 
help in determining whether a social entrepreneur will perceive tension between 
institutional logics in a social venture and how they will respond to these tensions. Only 
by linking motivation and institutional logics scholarship in social entrepreneurship can 
we fully understand the potential for social venture success, longevity, and ability to 
achieve social justice goals. 
 
Methodology 
An empirical, qualitative study was conducted in the interpretive tradition of knowledge-
building based on individuals’ own understanding of their interactions and the meaning 
they assign these interactions (Nielsen 1990:7). It assumes that organizational actors 
actively create the reality they inhabit, and that individual members create frames of 
reference that they share with others through social interactions (Berger and Luckmann 
1967; Isabella 1990; Neilsen 1990; Weick 1979). Qualitative studies provide rich, “thick” 
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data that helps researchers to identify themes, consequences and holistic interpretations 
(Miles and Huberman 1994).  
Interviews with twenty social entrepreneurs working within twenty different 
social ventures were conducted. Seventeen respondents were the founders or co-founders 
of their own social ventures and were running their organization. Of the three who were 
not founders, two were the current directors of their social venture and one was a senior 
staff member (See Table 1). 
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Table 1: Respondents 
 Org Mission Focus Org 
Age at 
I'view 
(years) 
Role/Gender Legal 
Structure 
1 Youth  5 Founder/M NP 
2 Refugee integration 7 Co-Founder/M H 
3 Women’s empowerment 2 Co-Founder/F H 
4 Youth  10 Director/F NP 
5 Financial literacy 5.5 Founder/M NP 
Disillusioned 
Dreamers 
6 Disabled job 
training/employment 
7 Founder/M FP 
7 Veteran employment 2 Founder/M 
8 Veteran 
employment/environment 
2 Co-Founder/M 
9 Environment 4 Co-Founder/M 
10 Women’s empowerment 2 Founder/F 
Social 
Capitalists 
11 Food 6 Co-Founder/M 
FP 
 
12 Food  5 Founder/F 
13 Food  5 Coordinator/F 
14 Youth 3 Founder/M 
15 Youth 4 Founder/M 
NP 
 
Do-
Somethings 
16 Youth 5 Coordinator/M  
17 Job training 6 Co-Founder/M 
18 Refugee integration 5 Founder/M 
19 Financial literacy 5.5 Founder/M 
NP 
 
Bridge-
Builders 
20 Housing 5 Founder/F H 
 
 
A combination of purposive and convenience sampling was used (Patton 2002). 
In order to be considered a social venture, the organization or its founder must have 
received funding or an award at some point by “gatekeeper” organizations in the field of 
social entrepreneurship. This was for two reasons: to provide external validation of the 
social venture status of an organization, and to increase the potential that a funder was a 
stakeholder in the organization, thus increasing the likelihood of an experience of 
competing logics. Each social venture had to focus on economic development (also 
referred to as poverty alleviation) since this sector is the most common for social ventures 
(Cukier et al 2011). Only organizations between the ages of two and seven years old were 
selected, an organizational age one respondent referred to as “the valley of death.” This 
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was the age at which financial struggles are most salient for organizations. They often 
struggle for financial survival, since they are at the point where they are too old for seed 
funding but still struggling to establish themselves. Finally, organizations had to be US-
based and US-focused. Within these purposive sampling guidelines, a convenience 
sample of social ventures willing to engage in the research was interviewed. 
Interviews were voluntary, and confidentiality and anonymity were offered to 
each respondent. Interviews ran for 60-120 minutes and were semi-structured, in the 
tradition of Kvale (1996) and Weiss (1994). Specific questions asked to all social 
entrepreneurs to elicit responses related to the research question included “what do you 
see as the overall goal or mission of the organization,” “what are the major challenges 
you face in your work,” and “have you ever had to make any tradeoffs or compromises 
between your mission and bringing in money?” While these questions were consistent 
across the interviews, each interview also used probes to follow up on points raised in 
their responses and conversations went in various directions as a result.  
Interviews were transcribed verbatim, imported into HyperResearch, and coded 
using a grounded approach within the context of themes guided by the research questions 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). Using a grounded approach to data analysis, the four 
categories of Do-Somethings, Social Capitalists, Disillusioned Dreamers, and 
Bridgebuilders emerged from the interview data in response to the question of how social 
ventures experienced the co-existence or competition between the logics of social 
mission achievement and revenue generation.  
 
Findings 
 
Without being fully self-aware of the choices they make, social entrepreneurs draw on 
one of four approaches to the contradictions that challenge their organizations. They were 
categorized by their approaches as Do-Somethings, Social Capitalists, Disillusioned 
Dreamers, and Bridgebuilders (See Table 2). 
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Table 2: Summary of Findings 
Category # of 
respondents 
Motivation Legal 
Form 
Perceived 
Tension? 
Responded with 
focus on? 
Disillusioned 
Dreamers 
6 Nonprofit system 
broken 
3NP; 
2H; 
1FP 
Y 5 on Social 
Mission;  
1 (FP) on 
Market 
Social 
Capitalists 
5 Capitalism can 
solve social 
problems 
FP 2Yes; 3No Market 
Do-Somethings 
 
5 Act first think 
later to solve 
social problems 
NP N Social Mission 
Bridgebuilders 4 Bring market and 
mission together 
to transform 
systemic 
problems 
5NP; 
1H 
Y Both Social 
Mission and 
Market 
 
 
Disillusioned Dreamers 
 
Motivations. Six respondents were “Disillusioned Dreamers.” Respondents’ work 
experience spanned from overseas aid work to domestic human service work, targeting 
populations from youth to women to refugees. These social entrepreneurs began their 
careers as traditional aid or social service workers. Over time, however, instead of finding 
fulfillment, they were deeply frustrated by what they perceived as systemic failures in the 
social service sector. Disillusioned, they were motivated to find alternative ways to work 
towards a social mission.  
 Three common threads encompassed respondents’ critiques of their experiences 
in traditional government, nonprofit or NGO work. First, they disliked how funding 
processes worked for traditional nonprofits. Frustrated by the constant chase for funding 
dollars, they discussed how challenging it was to devote time to the social mission of 
their organizations when nonprofit survival depended on prioritizing grant writing and 
fundraising. When they did receive funding, often it was tied to conditions that did not 
seem appropriate. Second, respondents critiqued traditional nonprofits for their failure to 
achieve their social missions. Alongside external constraints, they had experienced what 
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they perceived as sub-par approaches to poverty alleviation by nonprofits. They ascribed 
organizational challenges such as bloated bureaucracy, lack of knowledge or professional 
mismanagement to a dysfunctional nonprofit system. One respondent commented that 
while she had been doing microfinance work in Africa, the consultants brought to her 
host country by the aid organization knew little about the business skills they were trying 
to teach. She realized that she was contributing to this cycle and returned to the US to 
pursue business studies to gain the skills she was being asked to teach. Unhappy with the 
status quo, she completed a business degree and then co-founded a social venture.  
Respondents who had worked in domestic nonprofits also focused on the failure 
of organizations to achieve their missions. An individual who had worked for years with 
a state refugee organization said with emotion about his own current refugee-focused 
social venture, “Don’t quote me, but we’ve done more than the [state] refugee 
resettlement agencies ever have.” He was unimpressed by the state infrastructure 
supporting refugees of which he had been a part until founding his own venture.  
Third, frustration with traditional NGOs and social services also resulted from the 
experience that stringent rules and regulations led to paternalism and a lack of creativity. 
Respondents felt that bureaucracies imposed prescriptions that undermined beneficiaries’ 
agency, proactivity, and individuality. One respondent who worked with urban youth 
gave the following testimony of how he operated his social venture very differently than 
required by most state-funded agencies by honoring his beneficiaries’ own self-
knowledge:  
We also recognize that we don't know what's best for our students. I think it's 
been one of my biggest frustrations in the nonprofit world in general but also 
specifically with this population. Everyone likes to think they know what's best, 
but seriously, the guys I pick up have bullet holes in the front of their house. If 
you don't wake up every morning and look out, when you go out your door, look 
left and right, not to see if there is a car coming but if there's a bullet coming at 
you, there's no way you can actually understand what is best. (Org 1) 
 
Rather than the common “three strikes you’re out” policies of state-funded agencies, this 
respondent had an open door policy that he believed honored the youth’s self-agency and 
was tolerant of their lives’ chaos, giving the best chance of success. Similarly, other 
respondents thought that social ventures allowed for innovation and experimentation 
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normally curtailed in social service agencies. One explained that, “for institution-based 
stuff, you have to be more regimented [than social ventures]. There’s not as much free 
will” (Org 4). In their experiences with traditional nonprofit or aid work, respondents 
believed that a lack of flexibility and creativity led to inhibited responses to poverty and 
economic development. 
 
Perception of dual logics. Disillusioned Dreamers perceived tension between the market 
and social mission logic. Though what had originally motivated them was using a market 
logic to support their social mission ambitions , they subsequently found that these two 
logics were not easily combined. Using market tools to further their social mission 
provided challenges.  
Two Disillusioned Dreamers found that the market would not bear the prices 
required to fund their social missions sufficiently. Neither of these social entrepreneurs 
could afford the costs of the “wraparound services” they wanted to offer their 
beneficiaries through the revenue generated by selling their products. However, 
established as for-profit companies, these social ventures could not supplement their 
income through means other than product sales. A third social entrepreneur perceived 
such significant tension between his social mission and market logic that he hid his social 
mission from customers. He found that when potential customers learned he worked with 
a marginalized population, they were concerned that quality would be compromised. 
After initially putting pictures of people with disabilities on his website, he realized:  
That wasn’t helping us at all. Actually, it was becoming a liability to use that as a 
marketing ploy...as soon as they find out that there are disabled people working in 
this company they don’t think we’re a real company anymore. (Org 6)  
 
Hiring people with disabilities even led competitors to use his social mission against him 
by “warning” potential customers about his hiring practices.  
Three other Disillusioned Dreamers experienced tensions between logics due to 
donors rather than customers. Donors imposed conditions that inhibited social mission 
achievement. They wanted greater numbers of clients served to “prove” greater impact, 
wanted certain conditions met, or refused to fund operational costs. The respondents 
found  these restrictions on funding undermined social mission achievement. As one 
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respondent described, “What [foundations] want to see is big stuff happening…we have 
big stuff happening but it’s in a smaller environment” (Org 4). She found that funders 
were focused on a minimum number of beneficiaries served regardless of the depth or 
innovativeness of their experience.  
 
Responses to dual logics. All but one of the Disillusioned Dreamers responded to the 
tension they perceived between market and social mission logics by focusing on the 
social mission. One respondent was clear that if he focused exclusively on the social 
mission, the money would follow. As a result, he refused money from donors that offered 
conditional funding. Two responded by changing how they engaged with the market. 
Originally for-profit social ventures, both reformulated into hybrid organizations with 
for-profit and nonprofit components. As a result, some money was generated by the 
products they sold, but their main efforts were redirected from sales to fundraising. As 
nonprofits, they could target donors whose interests were aligned with the social mission, 
so these respondents felt freed from focusing so much on market considerations and 
could redouble their focus to social mission efforts.  
One social entrepreneur responded to the tension by placating funders in a small 
way (she felt) by raising the number of beneficiaries they reached in a year from sixteen 
to twenty. She felt that this round number satisfied donors while allowing her to focus on 
social mission achievement. The fifth respondent who addressed this tension by focusing 
on his social mission did so with the greatest attention paid to harnessing market tools to 
achieve his mission. He was planning a creative but risky fundraising effort that would 
allow the nonprofit to scale by incurring debt. While nervous about the risk, he was 
believed this approach would facilitate transformational social impact.  
Only one of the Disillusioned Dreamers focused primarily on the market logic in 
the face of tensions between logics. He only hired workers who could deliver at market 
standards, did not disclose his social mission proactively, and focused on business 
strategy. The social mission was not unimportant. For example, he retained one disabled 
worker hired at the company’s founding though she underperformed, and he continued to 
operate much of the service manually to hire more workers, rather than automating. Yet 
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in response to tensions he believed running a solid business benefitted his target 
population best. 
 
Social Capitalists 
 
Motivations. Each of the five people in this group referred to capitalism as a source of 
poverty alleviation and economic development, though they were not asked this question 
directly. This group believed in the power of capitalism to deliver economic parity. 
According to one respondent, “Business is good. Markets are good. People buying and 
selling and creating jobs, that's the way that the world turns for better or for worse. That's 
it, that's it. That's capitalism” (Org 9). They described capitalism as the preferred vehicle 
for social justice since Americans are committed to capitalist principles. Rather than 
framing their motivation to found social ventures as a response to the failures of social 
service provision, they framed it as inspired by businesses that do good and do well. 
Chobani Yogurt (low-sugar yogurt), Tesla (electric car), Zipcar (car-sharing) and Costco 
(fair wages and benefits for workers) were all cited as examples of businesses that thrived 
in the marketplace and delivered on social principles.  
The five Social Capitalists had two patterns in common aside from a belief in the 
power of capitalism: a desire for autonomy and a focus on social venture growth. Rather 
than reporting to a board, they preferred the autonomy to make decisions independently 
inherent in a small business, such as how to raise seed funding or rework a product 
design. As one respondent noted, “I love this business and I love what I'm doing and I 
don't want to be beholden to a board” (Org 10). Also, a common focus on growth led to 
pursuing additional investors or growing the consumer base or range of products offered.  
Respondents in this category differed in their interpretations of the extent 
capitalism had to be managed to create greater social justice. Two respondents were 
laissez-faire-style capitalists, ideologically driven by a free market mindset. They argued 
that job creation was the key to alleviating poverty. As one said:  
I believe business has lifted more people out of poverty than socialism or 
nonprofits. Look at China under socialism. People had horrible lives and they 
worked in sweatshops and now that they’re opening up, people’s lives are getting 
better, the free market parts of China are doing better than the more socialist parts 
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of China. There’s never been a better force to lift people out of poverty than 
capitalism. (Org 7) 
 
This respondent asserted that capitalism allowed producers to introduce consumers to all 
kinds of products that do good, from fitness bracelets to easy-storage vaccines. He 
explained people “love their iPhones…what people love is not nonprofits,” suggesting 
that products and market exchange, not government intervention and charity, were the 
most efficient means to achieve change. 
The three other Social Capitalists were more circumspect, reflecting that 
capitalism was not an inherent vehicle to social good unless approached properly. Rather, 
capitalism properly managed was the means to good ends. They focused on promoting 
fair business practices within a capitalist system. One discussed the ethical 
responsibilities of all businesses, including fair pay and an environmentally responsible 
supply chain:  
The fibers of business are that people should be paid well, they should be able to 
make their own economic decisions in life, and from the job that they have 
benefits and those things. We can make products out of recycled materials so 
we're not creating anything new, from scratch. So take those two principles but 
also have a product that's really competitive on the market, that people really 
want. That's growing a business and that's what a good business can be. (Org 9) 
 
Another said that while he was “all for” competition, fair competition was key (Org 11). 
Businesses of similar size and quality should compete, but small businesses forced to 
survive in an era of large superstores able to undercut prices and wages was another 
story. Competition should be among equals 
Thus this group of respondents differed on the extent to which capitalism should 
be laissez faire or actively managed, but all were inspired by the capitalist ideal that 
production and consumption would address social problems. 
 
Perception of dual logics. Three of the Social Capitalists did not perceive the social 
mission and market logics as operating in tension. Two did perceive a tension. The 
former group believed that the simple existence of their company led to mission 
achievement. By creating jobs or maintaining an environmentally responsible supply 
chain they were having social impact. Thus the social mission and the market logic were 
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in concert. As one respondent explained, the realization that one could do good through 
sales was an important revelation for him. He had thought: 
It was either, "Well, you can be an NGO and you might help people, or you might 
work in a business." But I never really understood that you could do good by 
selling product. And so when that became clear, I think that that was a good 
avenue for me.  (Org 9) 
 
Another represented the lack of perception of tensions when he first explained that their 
product sold because the “social element is huge” of employing veterans, but then 
explained that “at the end of the day we’re a fashion company” that survived by offering 
trendy products (Org 8). As a fashion company, price was paramount. Any contradictions 
between mission and business strategy were not seen as tensions.  
On the other hand, the latter group perceived that the combination of a social 
mission and a market logic caused tension.  One respondent referred to this as a “classic 
tension” (Org 11) between profit and mission, wherein to have more impact required 
raising prices, which resulted in fewer sales.  
Responses to dual logics. Regardless of whether they perceived a tension between 
market and social mission logics, the five capitalists focused on issues related to the 
market logic. They worked to perfect their products and price points to increase sales. 
Their understanding was that should sales increase, social mission impact would increase 
by default. In general the resulting strategy was to decrease the product cost and lower 
prices, though at times a higher price gained the product market cache and thus was the 
better strategy. One respondent captured this turn to focusing on product and market 
salience when she said: 
I've had to learn that I need to lead with product and follow up with mission. If 
the product is no good that's the end of the business. So we spend a lot of time on 
product. Getting it right, getting it perfect. (Org 10) 
 
Another reiterated that to survive against competition, his social venture just kept 
products on the shelves that would sell. When asked if this approach led to compromises, 
he responded “I don’t think they’re compromises…For me it’s a dialog in which you are 
always trying to make a more winning argument…The mission is not fluid, the 
manifestation of the mission is fluid” (Org 11). Thus focusing on price, value, advertising 
and other sales-related tasks were not seen as in tension with the mission. The Social 
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Capitalists focused on the business decisions they felt were necessary to keep their 
businesses sustainable, with the assumption that the longer they were in business, the 
more social mission they would achieve. 
 Indeed, all five Social Capitalists had created their social ventures as for-profit 
companies, underscoring their adherence to capitalism and business as a vehicle to reduce 
poverty. All five responded to potential tension between market and mission by choosing 
to have their mission embodied within a product, maintaining that the more product they 
sold the more mission would be achieved. However, as business owners focused on 
remaining competitive, these social entrepreneurs directed their attention to business 
strategy and the market logic. Their response to dual logics was to focus on the market 
logic. 
 
Do-Somethings 
 
Motivations. The five Do-Somethings each held a deep commitment to a social issue. 
However, unlike the Disillusioned Dreamers who aimed to redress a broken nonprofit 
system, or the Social Capitalists who were committed to harnessing the powers of market 
transactions, the Do-Somethings often arrived to the social entrepreneurship space 
unexpectedly. As one respondent said in answer to the question of how she had decided 
to found her social venture, “Believe me, by accident, completely by accident!” (Org 12).  
A Do-Something was action-oriented. The above respondent noted: 
I've had people say, "You're part of the poverty problem. You're giving out free 
food." Ok. See you. I'm completely uninterested in that peripheral [debate]. I 
really just want to talk about solutions because I think [that] for so long, we as a 
nation, as a globe, as a generation of people, we just are shouting from the 
platform, "This is why my view's better. This is why I'm better. This is why we 
should do this. Listen to me." Blah blah blah. And in that time all of our collective 
problems have continued to grow. So I just want to talk about solutions. (Org 12) 
 
This social entrepreneur interpreted other people’s interest in debating solutions as 
grandiosity and her own solutions as the best course of action, thus justifying her 
continual action. In fact, all five respondents talked at length about the causes of and 
solutions to the social problems they were addressing, and much less about concrete plans 
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for funding, sustainability, or scale. Do-Somethings were motivated to address a social 
issue with their own solution quickly, and sometimes without strategy, in order to get 
something done now.  
 
Perceptions of dual logics. The Do-Somethings did not perceive tensions between social 
mission and market logics. They were mired in classic nonprofit challenges and worried 
about issues including attracting seed funding for novel projects, what to do with grants 
won for trendy projects that did not play to the organization’s expertise, how to cover 
operational expenses and grow their donor bases. Additionally, they worried about 
interorganizational partnerships and effectively communicating to the public. However, 
their financial concerns were not related to operating within a transactional market, and 
the two organizations that did generate a portion of their revenue through sales saw it as a 
minute component of their overall budget. Furthermore, to the extent there were stresses 
from operating within a nonprofit “market” of funding competition, the respondents did 
not note this. While they worried about financial issues, these were not seen as in tension 
with their social mission.  
 
Responses to dual logics. The Do-Somethings’ action-oriented focus led them not only to 
overlook, or look beyond, tensions between social mission achievement and revenue 
generation, but to jump into trying out social mission programs with minimal thought into 
long-term sustainability. One Do-Something described a project her social venture took 
on in this way: 
[Our] vision has always been "I want to provide healthy meals for people, healthy 
food, for anybody, no matter what your financial resources are. Everybody should 
have access and if I can provide the skills for you also to learn to grow [food] then 
we're going to try to put on this program to see what the response is." And maybe 
sometimes, like in this instance, it just didn't work out. Maybe we could have 
done more feasibility studies to see how we could have really made it happen and 
really sustainable. Because I'm not sure that there really was much talk. It might 
have been, just, hey, this is a really nifty idea. (Org 13) 
 
While iteration and learning from failure are both key entrepreneurial skills, this program 
was launched and failed with little reflection given either to its potential or lack of 
success. 
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For Do-Somethings, starting a social venture was often an afterthought, just as 
was determining how to proceed. One respondent described her lack of familiarity with 
both nonprofits and the business world before starting:  
So you can tell I’m not a business catalyzer, I’m not a business starter, I’m not a 
businessperson… People started to call me and say, ‘Whoa. You're on to 
something. You should incorporate as a non-profit.’ And I was like, ‘I don't know 
what that means.’ (Org 12) 
  
She, like other Do-Somethings, jumped in to solving a social issue with little thought 
given to developing organizational or funding skills. However, they did not see tension 
between social mission and funding questions. Rather they felt that they could not get 
others to see how articulate and resourceful their solutions were. 
In response to structural and strategic challenges, Do-Somethings tended to leap 
from task to task, seeming to avoid analyzing long-term issues. One, lacking a strategic 
funding plan, was thrilled her venture had won a vehicle through a corporate competition 
for which someone else had nominated them as it answered her concern as to how the 
organization would grow. Another, after describing how he had “dropped the ball” on 
keeping up with state legislation on hybrid organizations that might inform his 
fundraising choices, described how the rest of his day would be to “go over some funding 
stuff, then start working on a little bit of curriculum--the program starts running soon--
and then just tackle the rest of the day from there on out” (Org 15). Ambitious, dedicated, 
and solution-oriented, Do-Somethings seemed to survive by action rather than strategy. 
In fact, the press offered one the inspired moniker of “go-giver”: driven to act, driven to 
make change, but perhaps lacking in self-reflection. 
 
Bridgebuilders 
 
Motivations. Four respondents bridged the worlds of social mission and market-driven 
activity with a careful intentionality to blend these worlds strategically to create synergies 
as yet untapped. As a result, Bridgebuilders exemplified organizations that embodied, 
recognized and wrestled with the tensions that resulted from encompassing multiple 
logics.  
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These respondents became social entrepreneurs because of a motivation to bridge 
social and market spheres to create systemic transformation. Their goals were not only to 
help marginalized populations but to change the systems that marginalized them. Thus 
they subscribed to William Drayton’s view that “Social entrepreneurs are not content just 
to give a fish or to teach how to fish. They will not rest until they have revolutionized the 
fishing industry” (Drayton in Ashoka 2008). Bridgebuilders strategized that they could 
accomplish more mission by using business tools such as standardization, gathering and 
sharing metrics, delivering high quality, and scaling. In turn, these tools would help them 
generate more revenue for their mission.  
Bridgebuilders were motivated by the process of bridgebuilding, not just the 
outcome, envisioning systemic transformation in how things are done. To accomplish 
this, Bridgebuilders brought together social mission and market actors, such as nonprofit 
leaders and activists on the one hand, and corporate executives and donors on the other. 
They believed that carefully combining market and social mission logics would lead to a 
spiraling cycle of ever-increasing impact and revenue-generation. They experimented 
with interesting combinations of actors and activities to look for synergistic 
arrangements.  
One social entrepreneur wanted to bring the more market-oriented social enterprise world 
together with the social justice world so that they might learn the best of each other’s 
approaches. “I’m trying to bring advocacy and movement-building to social enterprise, to 
be a model of bringing those two worlds together” (Org 18). For example, he was 
beginning to influence legislation by working with members of Congress without calling 
attention to his organization’s role in this advocacy work. Another respondent had the 
epiphany to work with the corporate “enemies” rather than against them to reach more 
people while raising minimum standards. She said, “Now, on the for-profit side I've spent 
a lot of time bringing big business into doing our work right? So I had to sell some pretty 
smart [corporate] people that we could do this.” On the flip side, “I get push back from 
nonprofits like we signed a deal with the devil” (Org 20). By bringing corporate and 
nonprofit actors together into a network she hoped to humanize each actor for the other 
and harness the expertise of each.  
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These four social entrepreneurs, who carefully aligned their mission with their 
strategic fundraising or financing practices and used business tools to accomplish their 
mission, all the while bringing actors from both worlds together, perhaps best 
exemplified social entrepreneurship literature’s portrayal of social entrepreneurs as 
“visionaries” (see Light 2006) or “changemakers” (Drayton 2006). They were motivated 
by the very idea of bridging social mission and market spheres and the resulting potential. 
 
Perceptions of dual logics. Despite numerous ideas on how to build bridges between 
social mission and market spheres and actors, Bridgebuilders perceived many tensions 
between these worlds. They experienced walking a tightrope between different 
stakeholder norms and expectations. For example, financial actors stated commitment to 
novel funding approaches then balked at ideas that seemed too new, or controversial. One 
respondent described how an experienced social venture funder shied away from her 
organization: 
[A National Foundation] who supports social entrepreneurs, we spent a long time 
educating them on [our mission related to affordable housing]. And at the end of 
the day a few [National Foundation] Board members said, "You know, that's 
probably something we don't want to get involved with. That type of housing.” 
That TYPE of housing, right? And then when we debriefed on it, I mean they 
were sold on ME as THE social entrepreneur to do this, but they got pulled back 
because it was THAT type of housing. (Org 20) 
 
Some Bridgebuilders, worried about this kind of corporate or government funder fear, 
restricted some of their activities or more controversial aspects of their mission for fear of 
putting off funders.  
In attempting to engage with “unusual suspects,” Bridgebuilders perceived a 
tension even around the term “social entrepreneur.” Many mainstream corporate 
philanthropists and investors saw the term as vague, ambiguous, or ideological. As a 
result, social ventures often stuck to traditional labels of “entrepreneur” or “nonprofit” to 
solicit funds, and thus felt tension between existing actors and new ideas. As one 
respondent described it: 
Because social entrepreneurship carries…I don’t know if…I don’t know…I don’t 
know that it’s negative connotations, but it’s one of those kind of things like, if 
you’re giving an investor presentation and you’re wearing a great looking suit, but 
you have sandals on, because you think you’re hip and you’re differentiating 
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yourself, and people are looking to things that are abnormal about you, so that 
they can call that a flaw and validate their assumptions. And so unless you’re 
speaking to an audience that is pre-verified as loving the idea of social 
entrepreneurship, like when I’ve spoken to social entrepreneurship classes at a lot 
of universities… in those occasions I’m happy being introduced as a social 
entrepreneur. But if you Google me…I characterize myself as an entrepreneur. 
(Org 19) 
 
Thus social entrepreneurs perceived a tension between their identities as social 
entrepreneurs and the actors they hoped to engage.  
Finally, within the nonprofit sector specifically, social ventures that tried to bring 
stakeholders from different worlds together were criticized as “apologists” for industry or 
“selling out” to standardization and efficiency pressures at the expense of mission-related 
impact. As well, nonprofit social venture boards, often comprised of nonprofit 
professionals, tended to push back on novel financial endeavors, calling them too risky.  
 
Responses to dual logics. Social entrepreneurs who built bridges did not just aspire to this 
goal; they actively engaged in practices to bring business and social mission worlds 
together. As a result, in the face of logic tensions they focused on both logics, trying to 
apply the best tools of each world. From their discussions, however, it was clear that 
there was no common playbook on how to do so. There were as many methods to 
bridgebuilding as there were respondents. Their practices to address logic tensions fell 
into two categories: practices they used externally to create a network of partners and 
those they applied internally within the organization. 
First, social ventures focused their bridgebuilding tactics across stakeholders and 
organizations, looking externally beyond their own organizational boundaries. A primary 
tactic was to build relationships between business-oriented and mission-oriented actors. 
Respondents wanted to eliminate barriers to working across ideological lines and develop 
a network of allies focused on one mission. Sometimes this required the social venture to 
act as an interpreter, and sometimes as an intermediary brokering knowledge or products. 
One respondent described her role this way: 
I describe us as interpreters to the nonprofit language and the factory language. 
When we have big projects going we do weekly calls between factory and 
membership and sometimes we'll stay on at the factory and just explain to them. 
The non-profit is hollering about their environmental review. That is so foreign to 
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a factory. [The factory says] ‘What in the heck are you talking about?’…So we 
spend a lot of time getting a good understanding between the two. (Org 20) 
 
Bridgebuilders also strategized about fundraising and messaging across market-
oriented and mission-oriented stakeholders. One approach was to raise income only 
through product sales or unrestricted funding, to eliminate dependence on funder 
conditions. Vetting funders allowed social ventures to think strategically about mission 
alignment and walk away if necessary. Furthermore, nonprofit Bridgebuilders preferred 
(or only accepted) unrestricted funds in which the social venture had decision-making 
autonomy, for example, allowing them to allocate money to operational as well as 
program costs to ensure money for staff and strategic planning. Some Bridgebuilders 
framed their message differently for different stakeholders. For example, one social 
entrepreneur had two business cards, one that he used to sell services to customers and 
another he used to raise money from potential donors. His bridgebuilding tactic was to 
prove his effectiveness to all audiences even if he did this in different ways for different 
stakeholders. Once accepted by a more typical social mission- or market- oriented 
audience, he would discuss his hybridity. These social entrepreneurs focused on the 
importance of appropriate storytelling to sell mission-oriented work to for-profit 
audiences and business efficiency to mission-oriented audiences. 
Second, Bridgebuilders focused internally, consistently applying business tools to 
organizational management and strategy. They developed clear business plans for their 
organizations (for-profit or nonprofit) and insisted on constant iterations of strategic 
planning. Another internal approach was to continuously model bridgebuilding practices 
regardless of pushback. One respondent focused on developing social justice programs 
within his social venture and scaling this work. He intended to demonstrate that a social 
venture can successfully advocate and educate (typically perceived as traditional 
nonprofit activities) within the context of a business plan and fundraising. They also 
approached growth methodically. Respondents focused on local activity first in order to 
develop best practices and demonstrate social impact. The three who had scaled across 
state lines did so slowly before establishing national headquarters. The idea of starting 
small and making mistakes early with less money at stake was common to Bridgebuilders 
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who wanted to develop a foolproof case around the benefits of applying business 
practices to social missions. 
Finally, managing bridgebuilding tensions also took the form of strategic 
approaches to generating revenue. Bridgebuilders were proud of their ability to generate 
revenue and earned income. For some this came in the form of strategic mission 
alignment with corporate funders, for others in lucrative government contracts, and for 
still others the success was in setting up an organizational structure in which a for-profit 
organization or revenue generating program funneled money into a nonprofit partner or 
parent organization.  
Bridgebuilders perceived significant tensions between social mission and market 
logics, but persisted by responding with ways to bridge divergent practices and 
constituents to leverage synergies. 
 
Discussion 
 
This article describes a qualitative empirical study that investigated whether social 
entrepreneurs perceive tensions between social mission and market institutional logics, 
and if so, how social entrepreneurs respond to these tensions. The findings suggest that 
not all social entrepreneurs perceive tensions, but of those that do, many do not wrestle 
with those tensions but rather defer to one institutional logic as their guide. Only 
Bridgebuilders perceived tensions and in the face of these tensions persisted in focusing 
on both logics to harness synergies. Furthermore, whether and how social entrepreneurs 
perceive logic tensions, and whether they respond to those tensions, relates to one of four 
motivations that inspired them initially to become social entrepreneurs (See Table 3). 
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Table 3: How Social Entrepreneurs Perceive and Respond to Logic Tensions 
 Focus on Two Logics in Response to Tensions? 
 No Yes 
No Do-Somethings 
Social Capitalists 
 
Perceive 
Tensions? 
Yes Social Capitalists 
Disillusioned Dreamers 
 
Bridgebuilders 
 
 
 
Motivation and Logics  
 
Social entrepreneurship literature suggests that social entrepreneurs are altruistic and 
compassionate individuals with entrepreneurial orientations motivated to change the 
world and address intractable social problems innovatively (Alvord et al 2004; Arend 
2013; Austin et al 2006; Barendson and Gardner 2004; Lehner and Germak 2014; Mair 
and Marti 2006; Miller et al 2012; Van de Ven et al 2007). However, this study suggests 
that motivation is more nuanced. There are four unique categories of social entrepreneur, 
each driven by a different motivation. Disillusioned Dreamers were motivated by 
frustration with the traditional nonprofit system. Social Capitalists were motivated to 
engage in capitalism at its fairest. Do-Somethings were motivated to engage immediately 
and directly in solving social problems. Bridgebuilders were motivated to bring together 
social mission and market approaches to social change. While each of these motivations 
relates generally to alleviating social problems and social exclusion, each category of 
social entrepreneur does so specifically with an attachment to one or both logics.  
Understanding how their motivations vary helps to explain why different social 
entrepreneurs deal differently with being at the intersection of two institutional logics. 
Depending on what motivates them, social entrepreneurs pay attention in greater or lesser 
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degree to the different logics that shape their organizations. Social Capitalists, motivated 
by capitalism’s potential, focus on a market logic. Do-Somethings, motivated to busily 
act to address social problems, focus on a social mission logic. Disillusioned Dreamers, 
motivated to address nonprofit inefficiency and ineffectiveness, perceive tensions but 
remain focused on a social mission logic. Only Bridge-Builders, motivated to bring 
together social mission and market actors to create synergies between them, both 
perceive tensions and remain focused on both social mission and market logics. The 
variation in motivation helps to explain why different social entrepreneurs focus on 
different logics. 
In line with scholars who highlight the importance of context (cf Dorado and 
Ventresca 2013; Haugh 2007; Kistrick et al 2011; Mair and Marti 2009; Peredo and 
Chrisman 2006; Seelos et al 2011), the evidence here is that context is indeed important 
to the creation of social entrepreneurs. But key is understanding context through an 
institutional logics framework. The dominant logic of the context motivating a social 
entrepreneur will tend to shape whether he or she perceives tensions between institutional 
logics. The evidence suggests that if they are motivated by a social mission logic, they 
will be Disillusioned Dreamers or Do-Somethings. If they are motivated by economic 
factors, they will be Social Capitalists. If they are motivated to bridge the two worlds of 
social mission and market to create synergies between them, they will be Bridgebuilders. 
Thus a social entrepreneur’s motivation is linked to an institutional field guided by a 
central logic, and that logic will shape what category of social entrepreneur they become. 
 
Dominant Logics and Social Ventures as Legitimate Hybrids 
 
Since social entrepreneurs operate in hybrid organizations at the intersection of social 
mission and market logics, it seemed they would perceive and wrestle with resulting 
tensions. Instead, some did not perceive tensions at all, and while others did perceive 
tensions they did not wrestle with them. Those few social entrepreneurs who did perceive 
tensions and wrestle with them seemed to best exemplify the idea of a social 
entrepreneur.  
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To summarize in more detail, almost half of the respondents did not perceive 
tensions (five Do-Somethings and three of five Social Capitalists). Thus, despite being 
the founders or high-level managers of hybrid organizations, they did not perceive 
tensions between the dual logics on which their venture was founded. Not being aware of 
logic tensions may bring the risk of not being prepared for any negative ways this tension 
may impact the social entrepreneur’s primary motivation. For example, should Do-
Somethings not be aware of tensions between social mission and market logics, they may 
be unprepared for (or oblivious to) challenges that a given product sales strategy may 
create for social mission achievement. Conversely, should Social Capitalists be unaware 
of tensions between logics, they may be unprepared for (or oblivious to) how adopting a 
social mission may require altering their pricing strategy and affect sales. On the other 
hand, not perceiving tensions may make operating easier as the social entrepreneur is less 
distracted by tensions. Either way, given that being a social entrepreneur is about existing 
at the crossroads of two ”standard modes of operating,” it was notable that several of the 
respondents did not perceive tensions.  
While half did not perceive tensions, sixteen respondents prioritized one logic 
regardless of whether they perceived tensions (all but the four Bridgebuilders) rather than 
working to integrate both. While prioritizing one logic is not inherently bad, it too 
minimizes the idea of a social entrepreneur as an individual at the crossroads of two 
logics. It undermines the hybrid nature of the organizational form social entrepreneurs 
had deliberately selected—since they established a social venture rather than a traditional 
nonprofit or business. Thus disengaging from the complexities caused by hybridity may 
solve the problem of tensions resulting from dual logics, but it also may alter the hybrid 
character of the social venture. As one logic or another becomes the focus of the social 
entrepreneur, one result may be that the social entrepreneur defaults to the norms, values 
and prescriptions of that one logic. The result may be that the social venture begins to 
appear more like a traditional single-logic organization than a hybrid. For example, as the 
Social Capitalists respond by focusing primarily on price and value decisions, they may 
begin to look more like traditional companies than social ventures. As the Disillusioned 
Dreamers and Do-Somethings respond by continually prioritizing social mission over 
business planning, they may begin to look more like traditional nonprofits. If a social 
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entrepreneur acts in line with one dominant institutional logic, he or she may appear to 
conform to one institutional logic or the other.  
As a result, this may create problems of organizational legitimacy. For example, 
Social Capitalists who have established for-profits may find it difficult to convince 
customers that their social mission is more than a statement on paper. This could lead to 
criticisms of not being fully committed to a social mission, or even deceptive marketing. 
Do-Somethings who have founded nonprofits may find it difficult to convince funders or 
foundations that they are deserving of social entrepreneurship-targeted funds. 
Disillusioned Dreamers are harder to predict, since they see tensions but respond as 
nonprofits. Their ability to discuss tensions may garner them support from customers and 
funders. Yet their continued prioritization of a social mission logic may challenge their 
social venture legitimacy as they minimize revenue generation.  
The category of Bridgebuilders stands out as exemplifying the social venture as a 
new organizational form. It combines both social mission and market logics in its 
intention and operations. This may make Bridgebuilders significant role models for the 
social venture field. Since they are motivated to enhance each logic by intermingling it 
with the other, they constantly note and manage tensions with the goal of greater synergy. 
However, it also makes them founders of the most unfamiliar organizational form, which 
may generate skepticism from funders and investors who are unfamiliar with hybrids 
and/or who are risk-averse. It also may create organizational instability if constant 
tension becomes overwhelming or challenges have no tried-and-true solutions to which 
social entrepreneurs can turn. 
As a result, Bridgebuilders may offer the best hope of social ventures as a new 
approach to achieving social justice in an era of privatization and reduced government 
funding for social mission-related work. They maintain their focus on social mission and 
funding goals, overcoming Boltanski and Thevenot’s assertion that irresolvable conflicts 
between the two would arise if both were priorities.  
 
Bridging Levels of Analysis 
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Given the focus of this study on both social entrepreneur motivation and institutional 
logics, it also contributes to the social entrepreneurship literature by bridging individual 
and institutional level analysis. What motivates an individual social entrepreneur 
mediates the extent to which his or her social venture will experience the hybridity 
associated with this organizational form. Each of these four categories of social 
entrepreneur presents a pattern as to whether they perceive tensions between social 
mission and market logics, and how they respond to these tensions. How social 
entrepreneurs perceive and respond to tensions leads to a logic that is prominent in that 
organization. Disillusioned Dreamers are motivated by a social mission logic, perceive 
tensions with the market logic, but stay focused on a social mission logic. Social 
Capitalists are motivated by both logics, may or may not perceive tensions, but in the end 
focus on a market logic. Do-Somethings are motivated by a social mission logic, do not 
perceive tensions, and remain focused on a social mission logic. Bridge-Builders are 
motivated by a social mission logic, perceive tensions, and finally focus on both logics. If 
these are patterns that continue, they may contribute to constituting the developing field 
of social entrepreneurship, which will in turn reflect back these norms and expectations 
on new social ventures. Thus patterns that connect individual level motivation and the 
experience of institutional level logics become mutually constitutive.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study is based on a small sample of social entrepreneurs with specific parameters for 
inclusion. Respondents all worked at economic development or poverty alleviation social 
ventures that are US-based and US-focused. Furthermore, all had received support from 
(inter)national social entrepreneurship foundations or accelerators and as such had been 
selected by gatekeepers as those with the greatest potential. As such, the study findings 
are not generalizeable. However, they raise questions to investigate in future research. 
 To follow up on this study, future research might assess whether the four 
categories of social entrepreneur uncovered in this study hold true in a more general 
population of social entrepreneurs. As well, the growing focus on impact assessment 
would be useful in this context, to compare the impact of each of the four categories to 
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help to assess carefully their relative performance. Current research that elucidates the 
types of tensions that social ventures experience (cf Smith et al 2013) would help to 
categorize the tensions that different types of social entrepreneurs experience. This would 
begin to address if there are certain types of tensions that are most avoided or hardest to 
address, and which tensions Bridgebuilders address first or best. Case studies of social 
ventures run by Bridgebuilders would add depth to our understanding of their capacities 
and potential. Finally, existing theories on navigating paradox might shed light on how 
Bridgebuilders experience and accept living with logic tensions.  
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ARTICLE 2 
ONE FORM DOES NOT FIT ALL: 
LEGAL FORM AND U.S. WISES 
 
 
Introduction 
Social entrepreneurship is a growing trend in which organizations use market solutions to 
address pervasive social problems (Hoffman et al, 2012; Mason and Doherty, 2015; 
Smith et al, 2013). Such organizations have at least two sets of goals: those directed 
toward achieving a social mission and those directed toward revenue generation (Young 
and Kim, 2015).  
The social mission logic of a social enterprise drives the venture to pursue social 
objectives and social change (Mair et al, 2012; Mair and Marti, 2006; Zahra et al, 2009) 
to “explicitly improve societal well-being” (Perrini 2006), in major areas of pressing 
social need including poverty, health, education, and violence (Certo and Miller, 2008). 
The extent of the social goals ranges from fulfilling basic needs (Mair and Marti, 2006) to 
large-scale transformation and “pattern-breaking change” (Light 2008: 5; also see Alvord 
et al, 2004; Martin and Osberg, 2007). A market logic seeks adequate revenue for 
organizational sustainability using a range of approaches, from grant funding for 
nonprofit organizations, to market transactions with customers for goods and services, to 
impact investment from investors willing to inject capital for a mixed return of financial 
and social value (Defourny and Nyssens, 2007; Neck et al, 2009). 
 With both social mission and market institutional logics (Alford and Friedland, 
1985; Thornton et al., 2012) driving their strategy and operations, social enterprises are 
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categorized as hybrid organizations. Hybrid organizations combine multiple institutional 
goals and demands into one organization (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Pache and Santos, 
2010). Given the multiple guiding logics embodied within hybrids, these organizations 
might anticipate conflict arising between them. Indeed, research suggests that multiple 
institutional logics create incompatible goals in organizations (Greenwood et al., 2011; 
Pinch and Sunley, 2015; Smith et al., 2013). Besharov and Smith (2014) label hybrid 
organizations with two central logics and incompatible goals “contested” organizations. 
They pick out these organizations as particularly ripe for high levels of internal conflict.  
 Little research has been done on how social enterprises that are “contested” 
manage their tensions effectively. A few studies are the exception: they suggest careful 
hiring and socialization processes (Battilana and Dorado, 2010), “spaces of negotiation,” 
(Battilana et al., 2014) and external consultants (Jay 2013) are helpful. However, the 
ways in which social enterprises mitigate conflict remains under-studied. 
The work integration social enterprise (WISE) is one type of social enterprise that 
might experience high levels of tension as a contested organization. It is dedicated to 
bringing the low-qualified, long-term unemployed at risk of permanent exclusion from 
the labor market into the workforce through product or service sales that generate 
revenue for the social enterprise (Battilana et al., 2014, Cooney and Shanks, 2010; 
Defourny and Nyssens, 2008). It is a popular form of social enterprise, since more social 
ventures address poverty than any other social issue (Cukier et al., 2011). While there is 
no single WISE model, generally employees are trained to provide basic products (such 
as baked goods) or services (such as janitorial or ground maintenance), and supported 
with additional services. Eventually the WISE offers beneficiaries a job or assists them to 
look for employment in the labor force. For example, Greyston Bakery, founded in New 
York in 1982, hires employees regardless of barriers such as criminal record or 
homelessness, on the philosophy that “we don’t hire people to bake brownies, we bake 
brownies to hire people.” Participants are offered training, employment, and support 
services (Kiser et al., 2014). 
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WISEs are likely to be “contested” organizations because of their dual 
institutional logics of social mission fulfillment and market goals. Given the potential that 
WISEs have to address the problem of unemployment among marginalized populations, 
this paper set out to understand what kinds of tensions emerge in WISEs given their 
hybridity, and how founders of “contested” organizations managed tensions and conflict 
sufficiently to help WISEs survive and thrive. 
 
Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) as Social Enterprise 
Employment for marginalized populations has been a longstanding social problem 
(Jenson, 2000; Stigletz, 2012; Wacquant, 2009), and continues to be a significant issue 
today (Joffe-Walt, 2013; Krueger et al., 2014; Semuels 2015). WISEs are one vehicle to 
economic integration for people traditionally excluded from the work force.  
WISEs embody social mission and market logics, both of which can be defined by 
many characteristics, including ideal type of organization, strategic imperatives, 
constraints, and artifacts (Billis, 2010; Doherty et al., 2014; Jay 2013) (See Table 1). The 
archetypal social mission logic is embodied by nonprofit organizations, with a focus on 
mission, public service and solidarity. It promotes a focus on collective action and 
education, is guided by the normative expectations of stakeholders, is funded by 
donations, and is organized around grant funding cycles. For example, the American 
nonprofit Juma Ventures is a national WISE that trains and mentors low-income youth to 
work in ballpark concession stands to earn income and develop leadership skills. It also 
helps with college preparation, savings, and financial aid applications (jumaventures.org).   
	 67	
Table 1: Comparison of Market and Social Mission Institutional Logics 
Organizational 
Archetype/Institutional 
Logic 
Private/Market Nonprofit/Social Mission  
Ideal type organization Business firm Nonprofit organization or 
Association 
Normative Expectations Client service Public service 
Strategic /operational 
priorities 
Guided by market forces 
and individual choice to 
maximize financial return. 
Revenue and profit. 
Guided by commitment to 
distinctive mission to social 
or environmental goals. 
Mission, public service, 
solidarity, selflessness 
Human resources Paid employees under 
management control 
 
Staffed by combination of 
employees and volunteers 
Income sources Revenue from sales and 
fees 
Revenue from membership 
fees, donations, legacies 
Notable activities/capacities 
for action 
Salesmanship, innovative 
service delivery 
Collective action, education 
Constraints Rules of the game, scarce 
client attention and 
resources, fiduciary 
responsibility to financiers 
Normative expectations of 
stakeholders 
Time Sales cycles, quarterly 
reporting 
Campaign momentum, 
tipping points, grant 
funding cycles 
Artifacts (carriers) Business plan, sales 
brochures 
Grant proposals 
From Billis, 2010; Doherty et al., 2014; Jay, 2013 
 
Like Juma Ventures, most WISE social missions include one or more of three 
components: job training, employment, and “wraparound” services. Job training includes 
building job specific skills such as baking or cleaning, and transferable skills such as 
collegiality and attendance. Employment may include assistance with finding 
employment or providing full-time employment. “Wraparound” services may include 
employment-specific help such as resume writing and networking, or more general 
supports such as counseling or access to language training (Battilana et al., 2014; 
Cooney, 2011; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). Both Greyston Bakery and Juma Ventures 
encompass all three components. For example, beyond apprenticeships and employment 
	 68	
Greyston provides childcare, housing, counseling, and tutoring (Kiser et al., 2014; Tran, 
2015).   
In contrast, for-profit companies embody the archetypal market or business logic 
with their focus on client service, revenue and profit (See Table 1). A market logic 
promotes a focus on salesmanship and service delivery, fiduciary responsibility, is 
constrained by scarce client attention and resources, and is organized around sales cycles, 
client expectations, business plans, and sales brochures (Billis, 2010; Doherty et al., 
2014; Jay, 2013). For example, Dancing Deer is a multimillion-dollar wholesale and 
online gourmet bakery that sells its products in Whole Foods Market. It is also an inner-
city Boston-based company that primarily hires immigrants (Perman, 2006). The founder 
views her investment in employees, such as English classes during work hours, as 
beneficial for efficiency and loyalty, reducing investment required in training new hires 
(Heymann and Berrera, 2010). 
Despite literature on the general importance of fitting organizational form to 
function (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith and Nathanson, 1979), and specifically in social 
enterprise (Gair, 2005; Lynch and Walls Jr., 2009; Westaway, 2012), WISEs may take 
several legal forms, since hybrid organizations “do not fit neatly into the conventional 
categories of private, public or nonprofit forms” (Doherty et al 2014: 417-418). Hybrids 
may exist as nonprofit or for-profit organizations, or as newer legal forms, such as L3Cs 
and benefit corporations (Haigh and Hoffman, 2012; Lang, 2013; Reiser, 2011). For 
example, Dancing Deer is a for-profit, Greyston Bakery is a for-profit with a foundation, 
and Juma Ventures is a non-profit. 
 
There are several reasons that work integration is a social mission ripe for the 
attention of social entrepreneurs. First, a “sheltered workshop” model—day programs for 
individuals with disabilities that provided simple tasks for reduced pay (Migliore, 
2010)—have generally fallen out of favor. Criticisms include subpar working conditions, 
less-than-minimum wages, no formal employee status, and limited opportunity to 
transition into open employment (Decker, 2011; Hoffman, 2013; Lenhart, 2000). Second, 
those working with other traditionally excluded populations also recognized the need for 
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employment integration. However, programs for youth, homeless, unemployed, the 
formerly incarcerated, and refugees are underfunded and insufficient (Abramsky, 2013; 
Campbell, 2014; Moran and Petsod, 2003; Solomon, 2012). Critics argue that existing 
programs provide skills rather than jobs (Heinrich and King, 2010; Moran and Petsod, 
2003). Third, the rise of structural unemployment (Bode, Evers, and Schulz, 2006; 
Stigletz, 2012) and reduction in welfare programs (Cooney, 2011, 2013) increased 
economic exclusion as a social issue and made it ripe for social entrepreneurs.  
It is easy to see how the archetypal WISE embodies both social mission and 
market logics. Its social mission is attentive to excluded populations, helping them 
overcome poverty by reintegrating into the productive workforce. Its market logic is to 
have beneficiaries engage in the market, to satisfy customers, and have the organization 
generate sufficient revenue through the products and services it sells to reinvest in 
beneficiaries and organizational capacity. However, given the dichotomy between these 
logics, it is also easy to predict that significant challenges arise in WISEs around 
priorities. Should companies like Greyston Bakery and Dancing Deer automate their 
equipment as competition increases—which may minimize employment opportunities? 
Should they invest in advertising or services? 
To date there is little research on how WISEs integrate these two logics. Most of 
the research that does exist has focused on European models, which have achieved some 
balance of logics. While models vary from country to country (Defourny and Nyssens, 
2008; Galera and Borzaga, 2009), in general European WISEs are publicly funded (an 
least in part) vehicles through which governments implement employment programs 
(Defourny and Nyssens, 2008, 2010). As such, they are regulated through EU subsidies 
and policies related to gaining government contracts (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010). In 
France, for example, beneficiaries must be two years out of work, receive training and 
counseling, and work for the WISE for a maximum of two years (Battilana et al., 2014). 
Thus European WISEs may have achieved a balance of social mission and market logics, 
but have done so with support from the state. In the US, while the government mandates 
job-training programs through the Workforce Investment Act (Heinrich et al., 2009), 
providers are not limited to WISEs and WISEs are not founded, regulated, or supported 
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by the state. There is no overarching body that determines who counts as a beneficiary, 
what (if any) services they must receive, or whether the goal of a WISE is to create jobs 
or improve job access.  
Thus, US WISEs manage dual logics without support or regulation on how to 
balance them. One might expect them to be “contested” organizations with high levels of 
internal conflict resulting from goal tensions. On the other hand, given the success of 
well-known US WISEs like Greyston Bakery, some social entrepreneurs overcome the 
tensions that arise. Given the growing need for vehicles to support populations 
marginalized from the workforce, and the increasing prevalence of social enterprise in the 
area of economic development, this research sought to understand the tensions that 
manifested in WISEs between social mission and revenue generation goals and whether 
and how they were managed successfully. 
 
Methods 
This research emerged from a larger study I conducted on the tensions between social 
mission and market logics in social enterprise. I employed qualitative methods to explore 
the phenomenon of multiple institutional logics within an organization as respondents 
experience it (Cresswell, 2013; Patton, 2014). 
Each of the social enterprises in the original study had been selected by an 
(inter)national funding agency or incubator as a social enterprise deserving of attention. I 
utilized this “gatekeeper” selection approach to address the question of “who counts” as a 
social enterprise. From among these possible respondents, I used purposive sampling to 
select those who worked from the US on US-based poverty alleviation or economic 
development to enhance comparisons. I also considered organizational age, favoring  
“middle aged” organizations that had existed long enough (2-8 years) to use up seed 
funding opportunities and who faced financial challenges on a regular basis. Within this 
purposive sample, the respondents were selected through convenience sampling (Bernard 
and Ryan, 2010) (see Table 2). 
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Respondents were interviewed using a semi-structured approach, allowing for 
additional elaboration and commentary (Kvale, 1996; Weiss, 1994). Questions related to 
the social mission of the WISE, any tensions that arose between social and financial 
imperatives, how the program was developed and implemented, and how it had evolved. 
Interviews lasted between 60-120 minutes. All respondents were offered anonymity and 
the opportunity to withdraw at any time. Most interviews were recorded (three used note-
taking only) and transcribed verbatim, then uploaded into HyperResearch software for 
transcription.  
Data was coded for themes and sub-themes, with careful attention to “significant 
statements” related to the experience of tension (or lack thereof) between institutional 
logics (Cresswell, 2013: 193). Coding became an iterative process that occurred multiple 
times throughout the research process. I developed matrices to elucidate within-case and 
cross-case patterns. I also wrote memos and field notes to elaborate on themes, questions, 
and insights (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
While analyzing the data from the larger study, two cases emerged in which a 
social enterprise had re-formulated from a for-profit company to an alternative legal 
form. Whereas the social enterprises in the study took various approaches to their social 
mission, these two were WISEs. As a result, I separated out the WISEs, for a total of ten 
cases, and explored the themes of the study within that context. While further research is 
needed to determine the generalizability of these findings, nevertheless, they offer initial 
insight into US WISEs and their experience of tensions between social and financial 
goals. 
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Table 2: Respondents 
Category Org Target Population Org 
Age at 
I'view 
(years) 
Role/Gender Legal 
Structure 
3 People with disabilities 7 Founder/M 
2 Women 2 Founder/F 
5 Adults in high unempl. 
areas 
4 Co-Founder/M 
Market Logic 
Dominates 
8 Veterans 2 Co-Founder/M 
FP 
 
9 Youth in juvenile justice 
sys. 
5 Coordinator/M 
10 Youth in gangs 5 Founder/M 
1 Youth in high unemp. 
areas 
3 Founder/M 
Social 
Mission Logic 
Dominates 
6 Chronically homeless 6 Co-Founder/M 
NP 
 
7 Refugees 7 Co-Founder/M FP to NP Transitioned 
Organizations 4 Women refugees 2 Co-Founder/F L3C to 
NP/L3C 
 
 
Findings 
Of the ten social entrepreneurs interviewed who founded or ran WISEs, most did not 
perceive significant tensions between their social mission and revenue generation. Given 
the divergent goals and the prediction that this would lead to “contestation” (Besharov 
and Smith, 2014), this was a puzzling finding. Since it seemed to be a matter of each 
social entrepreneur having a clear set of strategic priorities, the cases were then divided 
according to which logic dominated.  
A classic story surfaced of “form following function.” A pattern emerged between 
the legal form of the WISE and the dominant logic. A market logic dominated in for-
profit WISEs; a social mission logic dominated in nonprofit WISEs. Where tension 
between the logics might be anticipated due to organizational hybridity, the legal form 
determined the course of action.  
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 However, two cases stood out where respondents discussed significant tensions. 
Organizations 4 and 7 had been founded as for-profit companies but with the intention to 
prioritize a social mission of job training and wraparound services. The conflicts they 
experienced were related to this mismatch between form and function. Both found over 
time that their sales revenue did not cover the expenses incurred by offering wraparound 
services to beneficiaries. 
 Furthermore, when the WISEs were categorized according to the type of 
beneficiary served, the story became one of target population employability. The four for-
profits that did not perceive significant tensions targeted marginalized populations that 
were skilled enough to take on basic jobs and the four nonprofits targeted those with 
significant barriers to employment. Thus in eight cases, form and function were aligned 
through the population that was being served. For-profit companies could depend upon 
the basic skills of their workforce, thus hired them as employees and moved forward with 
a market logic dictating operations. Non-profit WISEs prioritized the multiple barriers of 
their difficult-to-employ beneficiaries, using grant funding to (help) pay for training and 
wraparound services. In both high-tension WISEs, the founders adopted a for-profit 
model to work with refugees. While refugees might be employable over the long-term, 
their barriers to immediate employment caused problems within a for-profit model, and 
the WISEs became “contested” organizations (see Table 3). 
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Table 3: Beneficiaries Served and Supports Provided 
 For-profit WISEs Nonprofit WISEs 
Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Orgs 3, 2, 5, 8 
 
 
 
 
Orgs 9, 10, 1, 6 
 
Org 7 (founded as FP;  
 re-formulated to NP) 
 
 Org 4 (founded as L3C;  
re-formulated to L3C/NP  
                    partnership) 
 
Targeted 
Populations 
People with disabilities 
Women 
Adults in high unempl. areas 
Veterans 
 
Youth juvenile justice sys. 
Youth in gangs  
Youth in regions of high unemployment 
Chronically homeless 
 
Refugees 
 
Social Mission 
Approach 
Job Creation: 
Fair wages 
Benefits 
Minimal job training 
Job Training: 
Training program with wage/stipend  
Job supervision/assistance 
Support Services (Each org offered a  
combination including:) 
Mentoring 
Job placement assistance 
Informal counseling/mentoring 
Social skill development 
Field trips 
Transportation 
Liaising with community services 
Financial counseling 
Housing assistance 
Case management 
Drop-in space 
Weight trainers 
Computer access for GED/job applications 
Food and nourishment 
Court accompaniment 
 
Prioritizing the Market Logic: Four For-Profit WISEs 
Four of the ten WISEs prioritized aspects related to a market logic in running their 
organizations to ensure organizational survival and growth. All four were for-profit 
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businesses that sold goods or services produced by their beneficiaries who were hired as 
regular workers (see Table 4). 
These four social ventures had social missions to create jobs for marginalized 
populations. The missions of job creation included “jobs with dignity” and earning a 
“living wage.” Each targeted their job creation to a different population, including war 
veterans, people with disabilities, women, and people living in an area of high 
unemployment. Workers were employed as laborers, in manufacturing, or as 
craftspeople. Two of the four organizations outsourced to (or “partnered with”) other 
companies who employed the beneficiaries (for example, a clothing social venture 
outsourced their sewing to a factory that employed veterans). They did not offer job 
training or wraparound services. Only Organization 3, with employees with disabilities, 
offered a few accommodations: they offered targeted trainings for new hires and 
maintained a slow pace of work as part of their business model.  
Each venture prioritized market considerations over social mission when the two 
logics might have caused tensions. In cases where decisions needed to be made about 
how to proceed, these four WISEs gave priority to outcomes that focused on reducing 
expenses and increasing output to increase the business’ competitive advantage. In their 
operations they prioritized market logic indicators such as customer service, revenue and 
profit, salesmanship. 
Customer service and profit took precedence over public service and community 
needs in decision-making. Without overlooking the social mission, each WISE focused 
on how to maintain sales or services for their clients. For example, in an effort to sell 
more products, Organization 2 planned to reduce the supplies purchased from its 
beneficiaries to keep prices down for the clientele. Personal gain as well as product sales 
was a goal, as several respondents discussed profit in terms of accumulating personal 
wealth as well as sustaining the organization. A focus on client service and profit also 
manifested through careful hiring policies. Organization 8 fulfilled their mission by 
outsourcing their labor to a sewing factory out-of-state that employed veterans. However, 
they hoped to switch from this model to direct hiring so that they could pay workers less. 
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For their part, Organization 3 maintained a hiring policy in which disabled workers were 
expected to be self-sufficient. These four WISEs were guided by salesmanship and client 
preferences. Organization 5 reflected that a good “story” or social mission was not 
enough to sell products and Organization 3 had omitted any reference to the social 
mission in its sales material when they determined it created sales challenges. 
It is not that the for-profit ventures in this category abandoned their social 
missions, but they saw their social missions fulfilled by hiring marginalized populations 
as employees. When decisions related to customer service and revenue called for 
prioritizing either social mission or market forces they emphasized aspects related to a 
market logic.   
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Table 4: Quotes related to Market Logic and Mission Logic Prevalence in WISEs 
Organizatio
nal 
Archetype/I
nstitutional 
Logic 
Private/
Market 
 Nonprofit/Soc
ial Mission  
 
Ideal type 
organization 
Business 
firm 
Orgs 3, 2, 5, 8 Nonprofit 
organization 
Orgs 9, 10, 1, 6  
Normative 
Expectations 
Client 
service 
You see the public is looking and they 
want security, professionalism. So I have 
to think, [is] a person with a disability 
able to meet that standard [of] someone 
without a disability? (Org 3) 
 
Public service And I wanted the guys who were going be 
kicked out, expelled. I didn't want the guys 
who were in school and doing well. I 
wanted the guys that were on the way 
out…This [detective] said to me…our 
guys…are sociopaths, they are going to 
kill somebody…But the fact is they're out 
in the community. (Org 10) 
Strategic 
/operational 
priorities 
Guided by 
market 
forces and 
individual 
choice to 
maximize 
financial 
return, 
revenue 
and profit. 
Our bags might seem expensive but 
aren’t compared to similar 
products…There will always be people 
who can’t afford our product. At the end 
of the day, we’re a fashion company. We 
need to maintain a level of exclusivity to 
sell the bag… (Org 8) 
 
I could potentially get rich off of this 
idea that is helping these people and 
making people feel good. That's, that's 
pretty cool. (Org 5) 
 
Guided by 
commitment to 
distinctive 
mission to 
social or 
environmental 
goals, mission, 
public service, 
solidarity, and 
selflessness 
In staff meetings, “It’s all about the 
program” and the program staff are all 
willing to “sacrifice revenue to focus on 
the mission.” (Org 6) 
Something we always say is, "You know, 
if the most [social] impact comes with us 
being a 75,000 dollar organization then 
we're going to be a 75,000 dollar 
organization. If it's a 56 million dollar 
organization we'll be a 56 million." (Org 
10) 
 
I'm not looking to make money on it, that's 
not in me, that drive toward personal gain. 
(Org 9) 
 
Human 
resources 
Paid 
employees 
under 
managem
ent control 
So, you know, if a person with a 
disability wants to work here, they have 
to apply for the job like anyone else, and 
be interviewed…to be able to do the job 
without assistance…That’s important. 
(Org 3) 
Staffed by 
combination of 
employees and 
volunteers 
I've been given pretty much free reign with 
the whole life of this project. I haven't 
heard anything from the Board really and 
my supervisors have both given me a lot of 
freedom to take this in whatever direction I 
wanted to. (Org 1) 
 
Key 
activities/ca
pacities to 
act 
Salesmans
hip, 
innovative 
service 
delivery 
After four seconds [at a bridal show 
exhibit] I say "fair trade" or whatever 
and [customers] just blank over and 
they're done. They are not even 
interested. But if you start with "Look at 
this silk. You've never seen anything 
like it. This is a silk dress. Most dresses 
are polyester…", it's just a much more 
effective sales strategy. (Org 2) 
Collective 
action, 
education  
We did snow removal…It brought in a lot 
of money, which was really attractive, but 
one of the things that I really like about the 
landscaping is you can plan it. It's very 
scheduled and the people that we work 
with need that structure. We missed the 
money…but [snow removal] is a 
nightmare, it's an absolute nightmare. (Org 
1) 
Constraints Rules of 
the game, 
scarce 
Most of our sales are not from our 
mission, but about “the price and can 
you get the job done and do you stand 
Normative 
expectations of 
stakeholders 
Management says to me, “No, no, no, no. 
Relax. You don't have to make it self-
sustaining. Just focus on making GOOD 
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client 
attention 
and 
resources, 
fiduciary 
responsibi
lity to 
financiers 
behind your work.”…It's about the 
money and meeting your business 
obligations. They don't want to hear the 
social mission. Moreover, our 
competitors have used it against us… As 
soon as people find out that there are 
disabled people working in this company 
they don't think we're a real company 
anymore. (Org 5) 
 
[products] and quality interns. (Org 9) 
 
Artifacts 
(carriers) 
Business 
plan, sales 
brochures 
Find a product that really has a place in 
the marketplace, that's something that's 
really needed. And don't just make it a 
product that you think is going to sell 
because you have a good story because 
the story's not gonna sell it. (Org 5) 
Grant 
proposals 
We have a really awesome grant writer 
[the Director of the parent 
nonprofit]…which is really nice because it 
allows me to focus on parts of the program 
that are more meaningful. (Org 9) 
 
Prioritizing the Social Mission Logic: Four Nonprofit WISEs 
Four of the ten WISEs prioritized their social mission logic when making decisions about 
the organization. All four organizations in this category were nonprofits imbued with a 
social mission logic that superseded a market logic (see Table 4). 
 These four nonprofits had a social mission to serve a specific marginalized 
population that faced significant and multi-faceted barriers to employment, such as the 
chronically homeless, those with addictions, criminal records, or youth. Rather than job 
creation, these nonprofits focused on job training and readiness programs with supports 
to assist with job placement after program-completion. Three offered 4-12 month 
apprenticeships in which individuals received a stipend or hourly payment and support to 
find jobs post-graduation. The fourth offered courses leading to national certification in 
personal training, and certified beneficiaries offered paid sessions to clientele. These four 
WISEs also offered wraparound services such as counseling, housing assistance, 
transportation, and education supports. 
 Each of these four nonprofit WISEs prioritized their social mission when it came 
into tension with a market logic. In cases where decisions needed to be made about 
spending and revenue, they focused on their beneficiaries’ needs above organizational 
growth or sales. They emphasized public service, social mission, education, and grant 
proposals.  
	 79	
There were many examples of decisions where nonprofit WISE prioritized 
beneficiary support services over revenue generation. While the Director of Organization 
6 saw potential earnings if he purchased a nearby business to expand the WISE, he did 
not do so to mitigate financial risk, preferring to ensure that current revenue was 
reinvested into participant needs. He was proud of creating a scholarship fund when a 
beneficiary indicated that a driver’s license would be helpful in job-hunting. Organization 
1 dropped their snow removal program despite a significant loss in revenue since it was 
not aligned with their beneficiaries’ needs for predictability. While salesmanship and 
quality service delivery were not unimportant, nonprofit WISEs put their primary 
attention on remedying participant gaps in skills and knowledge and took a supportive 
rather than rigid approach that might be found in a workplace. In Organization 10, “If 
someone's coming in here every day, or if they're coming in once a year, it's a victory all 
the same.” In Organization 6, when one beneficiary did not attend a mandatory support 
group, he was allowed to continue after “a really serious conversation.” Additional 
services included social skill development, field trips, transportation, liaising with needed 
community services such as language training and drivers’ education classes, financial 
counseling and assistance opening bank accounts and savings plans, housing assistance 
and case management. Many other supports were offered informally.  
As one way to ensure the ability to prioritize social mission over profit generation, 
these founders used grant money rather than earned income to guarantee funding for 
operations. As such, they were immersed in grant cycles and proposal writing. Three of 
the four respondents ran the social enterprise programs of larger nonprofits. Thus, their 
finances were enmeshed with their parent organizations, part of whose role was 
assistance with grant applications and soliciting donors. This structure provided 
protection from tensions that might have emerged between social mission and market 
logics as the parent nonprofits had the resources to commit to fundraising.  
The four nonprofit WISEs in this category prioritized aspects related to a social 
mission logic when making decisions about their primary goals. 
Two “Contested” WISEs that “Re-Formulated”: Organizations 4 and 7 
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Two social ventures had recently transitioned, or “re-formulated,” from for-profit 
businesses to another legal model: one to a nonprofit and one to a nonprofit/for-profit 
partnership. Both re-formulated as a way to accommodate their prioritization of a social 
mission logic over a market logic, made tension-filled by a for-profit form (see Table 5). 
The founder of Organization 7 established a for-profit WISE from frustration with 
how refugees were “resettled” in his state. Government programs focused on literacy and 
housing, but in his opinion, “Refugee resettlement is not viable without economic 
development.” Refugees were willing to work hard for little pay but jobs were lacking. 
He founded a food product business with refugees as apprentice chefs to demonstrate that 
refugees were exemplary employees who could run businesses. His “business model” 
dictated that he only employ actively job-searching refugees for one year, as an incentive 
to look for permanent employment and allowing him to recruit new employees. He also 
provided services to enhance their employability and his business operations 
concurrently. 
 The founder’s experience was one of satisfaction from the social mission—and so 
many tensions that ultimately he determined the project was not viable as it stood. He 
said, in hindsight “had I been business savvy I would have known at the beginning” a 
non-profit model was a better choice. 
 As a for-profit, the founder experienced tensions across most dimensions of his 
company. His social mission guided his priorities, yet he lost money year after year 
funding the company through product sales. Regardless, the social mission was “non-
negotiable.” For example, as planned, his best workers moved on, which he called “a bad 
business plan in terms of revenue.” Thus an apprentice skilled at marketing who left to 
found her own company was a “really a great story of the mission working,” yet left a 
hole at the organization that the founder had neither the time nor the resources to fill.  
As well despite costs and inefficiencies, the company provided wraparound 
services such as case management and transportation, which he viewed as critical for 
success. For example, apprentices cooked in a rented kitchen from 4-11 pm—late for 
those using public transit and living in unsafe neighborhoods. Since he could not afford 
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to hire transportation, he often drove them himself. In fact, the founder did much of the 
work himself, from menial tasks to marketing. He was constantly challenged by how to 
allot his time, as he wished to hire refugees to take over responsibilities yet they required 
training—which he had to do himself as the sole employee. He had taught one apprentice 
how to do payroll, but could not find the time to train him fully in bookkeeping, which he 
continued to do himself. In another case, he trained a refugee to manage mail order 
products, only to have the refugee unknowingly missed a deadline for a large refund. 
Thus much of the training he did was resource-intensive but without financial return.  
In 2012, it was clear that the enterprise must either close or change. The tension 
between a non-negotiable social mission that incurred costs, and insufficient sales 
revenue to cover those costs, meant that the organization was unsustainable. He “re-
formulated” by founding a nonprofit and bringing the social venture under the nonprofit 
umbrella. He explained, “The nonprofit has been very helpful. There was no other 
solution.” The WISE now covers approximately 60% of its operating costs through sales 
and the rest through fundraising, and the founder is now salaried. Converting the WISE 
from a for-profit business to a nonprofit organization allowed him to fund the costs 
associated with the social mission of helping refugees access permanent employment. 
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Table 5: Org 4 & 7 (Before Re-formulation) Tensions 
 ORG 4 TENSIONS ORG 7 TENSIONS 
Ideal type 
organization; 
Normative 
Expectations 
Business firms prioritizing public service 
Strategic 
/operational 
priorities 
Revenue going to support social mission but social mission not increasing the revenue. 
 
Support services, not market feedback, guiding expenditures, causing expenses to 
outpace income. 
 
Founder(s) working as volunteer. Human resources 
 Founder trained apprentices; best ones 
moved on to other jobs, requiring 
continued investment in training. 
 
Mistakes made by apprentices were 
“learning opportunities” that could be 
costly.  
 
Sales insufficient to cover expenses. 
 
Income sources 
Anticipated raising money from Impact 
Investors (II) willing to invest in a social 
mission, however, II demanded financial 
return and did not invest. 
 
Founder worked full-time doing all 
training and basic tasks to stay afloat, 
(since company could not afford an 
employee), thus had no time for marketing 
or business planning 
 
Time and energy went into social mission at the expense of salesmanship and marketing Notable 
activities/Capacit
ies for action  Expected innovative social mission to 
appeal to II, but it did not. 
 
 
Constraints; 
Time; Artifacts 
(carriers) 
Tended to ignore/overlook for-profit constraints and focus on beneficiaries. 
 
In the second example of a WISE that “re-formulated” away from for-profit 
status, the co-founders of Organization 4 wanted to help marginalized women become 
self-sufficient. They had overseas aid experience in small business development and 
wanted to do more to create opportunities for women-led business. Early in the idea 
phase, one co-founder explained she had believed that funding an organization through 
the sale of a product was easier and more sustainable than soliciting donations. Immersed 
in the idea of business as “cool” and efficient, she had thought traditional nonprofits were 
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really “old school and like being in the Dark Ages.” Instead, the co-founders decided to 
establish a company to help refugee women and women victims of violence make and 
sell a small consumer product. Despite her initial optimism, the respondent now believes, 
“There’s a myth that business is more reliable than philanthropy.” Her experience was 
one of unsustainable tensions between social mission and market logics. 
In the early months they focused exclusively on their beneficiaries: on how many 
women they could train, how much they could pay, and how much product they could 
make, believing that the market would absorb as many items as could be produced: 
We put our hearts ahead of the business. So we focused production not on “what 
do we have a customer for right now, and what would people buy, and what's the 
right price point, and what are the right colors?” …We didn't ignore it completely 
but we basically trusted that if we had high quality [products] come in that we 
would sell them. 
Instead, they had items the market did not want, improper packaging, and a “really, really 
ugly” website. For one major holiday, when they had expected to sell thousands of items, 
they sold six hundred. In hindsight, they had not prepared for the market reality. 
While the founders understood the extent of start-up costs, they expected the new 
field of “impact investors” to invest in the social enterprise. As a result, their remaining 
time and energy was spent trying to fundraise from a sector that was supposed to be 
willing to accept a lower financial return on investment in exchange for significant social 
benefit. However, impact investors wanted competitive financial return. The respondent 
explained, “We spend a lot of time on trying to raise capital when we should have been 
working on marketing and sales. And it distracted our whole team…we were just not 
what anyone was looking for.” They dealt with start-up costs by soliciting loans from 
family and friends. As well, the founders went without salaries. The respondent reflected, 
“Looking back, we thought the business could do it all.” 
 In 2012, a potential partnership with an established retail company caused 
Organization 4 to rethink their business model. They could not cover existing costs, let 
alone those entailed in expanding production. As a result, they “re-formulated” by 
launching a nonprofit organization to partner with their existing for-profit. The nonprofit 
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could raise the money required for training and services. “Now that the nonprofit has 
taken on the pieces that really aren’t about driving the business side I think the [for-
profit] is much better positioned for business success…It doesn't make sense for a 
business to invest in training, you'll never recover that money.” The respondent is now 
optimistic about the new, differentiated organizational roles. While a for-profit WISE 
could not sustain the investment required to train the women, a partnership model in 
which a nonprofit raised funds for the social mission appeared more viable and has 
survived so far. 
 
Discussion 
This study investigated whether US WISEs experience tensions between their two goals 
of social mission achievement and revenue generation, and whether and how they 
manage these tensions successfully. Based on interviews with ten founders or managers 
of WISEs, the evidence shows that contrary to the expectation that WISEs would 
exemplify “contested” organizations (Besharov and Smith, 2014), eight of the ten WISEs 
did not experience significant conflict. Only two cases experienced prolonged and 
ultimately irreconcilable tensions between their social mission and market logics. Rather 
than embodying two equal and coexisting institutional logics that made conflicting 
demands on the social enterprise, WISEs generally had one logic that dominated their 
operations, a market logic in for-profit WISEs and a social mission logic in nonprofit 
WISEs. Since WISEs had clear dominant logics, tensions were minimal. Beneficiaries’ 
employability emerged as an important variable, with for-profit WISEs creating jobs for 
more employable populations and nonprofits offering training and services to harder-to-
employ populations. Significant tensions were experienced only in two WISEs, where 
social entrepreneurs attempted to prioritize a social mission logic within a for-profit legal 
form. In these two cases, the tension became so significant as to lead to a “re-
formulation” of the WISE away from a for-profit model to prevent organizational demise. 
 
Form and Function: Aligning Form and Social Mission Approach 
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Research has demonstrated the importance of aligning form with function in 
organizations generally and social enterprises specifically (Chandler, 1962; Gair, 2005; 
Lynch and Walls Jr., 2009; Nathanson and Galbraith, 1978; Westaway, 2012). This study 
suggests the importance of extending this imperative to WISEs. In the case of social 
enterprises, scholars tend to be structurally agnostic, defining them as hybrid 
organizations that may take any number of legal forms (Doherty et al., 2014; Haigh and 
Hoffman, 2012; Lang, 2013; Reiser, 2011). However, as this study demonstrated, fitting 
form to function, or legal structure to social mission, mattered. 
In terms of function, WISEs aim to integrate excluded populations into the labor 
force. To do so, they adopt one or more approaches including job creation, job training, 
and/or “wraparound” services (Battilana et al., 2014; Cooney, 2011; Cooney and Shanks, 
2010; Defourny and Nyssens, 2007, 2010). Little research has been done to discern which 
WISEs employ which approach when, beyond a general understanding of European 
models that tend to integrate all three within a context of government regulation and 
support (Battilana et al., 2014; Defourny and Nyssens, 2010), and a few studies on the 
US (Cooney, 2013) and Canada (Chan, 2015). However, the evidence from this study 
suggests that WISEs in the US tend to adopt an either/or approach to social mission 
achievement: either a job creation or job training with wraparound services. Furthermore, 
each of these approaches is best suited to a particular organizational legal form. 
The study suggests that a job creation approach aligns best with a for-profit WISE 
form and a job training/services approach to a nonprofit WISE form. Tensions emerge 
when the logic associated with the legal form is not the dominant logic utilized in 
organizational operations. In this study two for-profits experienced this misalignment. 
These two WISEs were structured to focus on customers and profit for survival, but the 
social entrepreneurs instead focused on beneficiaries and public service by providing job 
training and support services. Tensions arose between the high cost of services and 
insufficient revenue and threatened the existence of both organizations, as they could not 
survive without sufficient profit from sales or investment. 
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 This study demonstrates the importance of aligning legal form and social mission. 
For-profits can achieve a social mission—if that mission is aligned with a for-profit 
approach to social change. A for-profit WISE is best suited to a social mission of job 
creation for employable populations. Where nonprofit organizations can provide training 
and support services, for-profit companies can create jobs that are maintained through 
sales of products and services. There are risks of mission drift—should a for-profit find 
that its prioritization of a market logic takes over, there may be a pull to hire workers 
without the challenges presented by the target population. For-profit WISEs may wrestle 
with committing to their target population while ensuring the workers hired have the 
basic abilities required by the job. Alternatively, the creation of a government system that 
regulates and supports WISEs in the US, both requiring social mission fulfillment (hiring 
policies) and supplying funding for income gaps (subsidies), might mitigate the risks 
facing for-profit WISEs. 
Form and Function: Aligning Form and Target Population Employability 
In the case of WISEs, organizational function relates to the population served as well as 
the approach to workforce integration. Each of the ten WISEs in this study targeted a 
particular population. In the two cases in which tensions arose, there was a lack of 
alignment between form and target population.  
 The four for-profit WISEs using a job creation approach worked with populations 
that had low barriers to employment. In each case—veterans, women, people with 
disabilities, and people in areas of high unemployment—it may have been hard to get 
work due to stigma, an interrupted employment history, or lack of job access, but once 
offered a job beneficiaries were capable of working. Once employed, these workers could 
produce the goods or services needed to generate profit. In contrast, the four nonprofit 
WISEs without tensions all worked with target populations that displayed significant 
barriers to employment. One worked with the chronically homeless, many of whom had 
experienced mental health or addictions issues. Three worked with youth—gang 
members, youth in the juvenile justice system, and those living in areas of poverty. Any 
youth are by definition hard to employ due to legal age restrictions and school 
	 87	
attendance; these populations had further barriers to employment. They needed 
investment in training and support services to increase their job-readiness, and grant 
funding provided dependable, consistent revenue that was targeted for those in the 
greatest need. Since beneficiary skill could not be depended upon to generate sufficient 
operating revenue, donor funding ensured adequate income. 
 Refugees proved to be the confounding population. The two WISEs that 
experienced high levels of tension targeted refugee populations. On the one hand, the 
need for wraparound services was not a surprise. Each founded their organizations based 
on providing training and supports. On the other hand, the founders expected that the 
market would support each organization’s investment in refugees through product sales 
given refugee willingness and motivation. In the end, both WISEs experienced 
unsustainable tensions. Neither organization was willing to decrease the training or 
services they offered, but neither organization generated sufficient income to remain 
solvent. The immediate barriers to employment exhibited by refugees who needed job 
training and support services required a level of social mission that market income could 
not cover.   
“Re-formulating” as a Conflict Management Technique 
With regard to how to address logic tensions in a social enterprise, the literature 
has suggested specific responses such as implementing careful hiring processes that allow 
for the socialization of new workers into a hybrid mindset (Battilana and Dorado, 2010) 
or creating spaces of negotiation that allow for staff representing particular logics to 
come together (Battilana et al., 2014). However, these emerged from research done on 
larger and more established social ventures in Latin America and France. Furthermore, in 
France the field is regulated by government policies (Battilana et al., 2014; Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2010). In the US, many social enterprises are small and young, thus hiring 
practices and spaces of negotiation are less relevant. As well, government is less 
involved. Instead, this study suggests that conflict is preempted altogether if the 
organization’s legal form and dominant logic are aligned. When for-profit WISEs 
prioritize a market logic and work with populations with low barriers to employment, and 
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nonprofit social ventures prioritize a social mission logic and work with populations with 
significant barriers, social enterprises do not experience intense logic conflicts. Thus the 
question of how to address tension between social mission and market logics successfully 
becomes irrelevant. 
On the other hand, in contested WISEs where the social mission and market 
logics conflict, a key conflict management technique is not tactical or interpersonal but 
structural. Conflict will be lessened when social entrepreneurs “re-form” to properly align 
form and function. This study suggests generally the transition required will be in the 
direction of a for-profit company to a nonprofit or nonprofit/for-profit partnership 
arrangement. Then the social venture can access grant funding to alleviate income gaps. 
Alternatively, the target population could be substituted for one that is more easily 
employable and the social mission exchanged to a narrow one focused only on job 
creation. Either way, the evidence here suggests that structural rather than interpersonal 
interventions will reduce conflict that is generated by a lack of alignment between legal 
form, target population, and employability. 
Conclusion 
This study investigated the tensions between social mission and market logics that 
emerge in WISEs due to organizational hybridity and how these tensions are best 
managed. Contrary to both theoretical predications and common sense logic, WISEs 
experienced little tension when their organizational form and social mission were aligned. 
As a result it is clear that despite the array of legal forms a WISE may adopt, this choice 
matters. The legal form determines the dominant logic that must dictate strategy and 
social mission approach to operate without conflict. On the other hand, the plethora of 
forms that US WISEs can and do take may also indicate that the issue of chronic 
unemployment of marginalized populations remains intractable. Social entrepreneurs 
have yet to uncover the perfect approach to eliminate the problem and as yet none has the 
capacity to solve the issue systemically. Future research could delve more deeply into the 
question of which WISE approach is most effective, and look more broadly at how social 
enterprises in other sectors manage institutional logic tensions effectively.
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ARTICLE 3 
STAKEHOLDER RESISTANCE TO SOCIAL ENTERPRISE HYBRIDITY 
 
Introduction 
Social entrepreneurs, innovators within the growing field of social entrepreneurship, 
experience multiple challenges to establishing themselves, their innovations, and their 
social enterprises as accepted and legitimate components of the mainstream economy. 
Many of these challenges manifest from the co-existence of social mission and market 
goals within social enterprise. Existing literature has tended to emphasize how social 
entrepreneurs should problem-solve to overcome adversity. This research moves beyond 
the individual social entrepreneur to question how key stakeholders contribute to tensions 
between social mission and financial goals and whether problem solving is realistic in the 
face of stakeholder priorities. Thus this study adds to research that has been focused 
largely at the individual and organizational level by moving to the broader systemic level. 
Academic scholarship has identified that at the root of many of social enterprise 
challenges are the often contradictory goals of social mission achievement and financial 
sustainability (Doherty et al, 2014; Smith et al, 2013), both important drivers, or 
“institutional logics,” embodied by social enterprise. At the individual level, social-
business tensions (Smith et al, 2013) may manifest as a challenge to staying motivated to 
work against the status quo with little support (Bornstein, 2004; Drayton, 2006), 
developing innovations that succeed in their goals with demonstrable impact (Haugh, 
2005; Ormiston and Seymour, 2011; Short et al, 2009), and surviving failure (Leadbetter, 
1997; Seanor and Meaton, 2008). At the organizational level, social entrepreneurs face 
internal challenges such as hiring and organizational identity buy-in (Battilana and 
Dorado, 2010), and external challenges such as working with potential collaborators and 
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dealing with competitors (Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010). At the institutional 
level, a lack of field-level players or “institutional voids” (Mair and Marti, 2009; 
McMullen, 2011), and boundary-drawing between who counts and who does not (Dart, 
2004; Nicholls, 2010) may provide social-business challenges for social entrepreneurs.  
 Scholars have begun to study how social entrepreneurs and related actors achieve 
social mission and market goals together successfully. At the individual level, literature 
describes the heroic nature of social entrepreneurs who overcome obstacles and suggests 
would-be players develop the skills of determination, resilience, and persistence to 
enhance their potential for success (Bornstein and Davis, 2010). At the organizational 
level, current research demonstrates that careful hiring and socialization policies will 
facilitate organizational survival and success (Battilana and Dorado, 2010), as will 
“spaces for negotiation” for staff to address their different perspectives (Battilana et al, 
2014) and the use of external consultants to offer insight into misaligned goals and 
practices (Jay, 2013). To establish a solid institutional presence, academics and 
practitioners discuss the importance of understanding the nature of hybridity or multiple 
institutional logics embodied within a single sphere (Doherty et al, 2014; Smith et al 
2013), and propose alternative framings of the institutional goals to encourage accuracy 
and legitimacy, such as describing social entrepreneurship’s aims as falling on a 
continuum between value capture and value creation, rather than between profit and 
social change (Santos, 2012). 
 While the literature on social entrepreneurship has progressed from problem 
identification to problem-solving, the solutions and best practices proposed remain 
centered on the individual social entrepreneur. Implied is that if social entrepreneurs are 
aware of the tensions that emerge between conflicting institutional logics and address 
them, they can overcome the resulting challenges. Yet this line of thinking that centers on 
the individual social entrepreneur and his or her behavior ignores a broader, contextual 
level perspective that includes other stakeholders external to the social enterprise. 
Stakeholder support is crucial to the project of social entrepreneurship: stakeholder 
engagement does not just increase organizational sustainability (Sloan, 2009) but can 
legitimate a growing field, which in turn leads to increasing stakeholder support (Dart, 
2004; Newth and Woods, 2014; Nicholls, 2010; Suchman, 1995), which is manifest most 
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crucially in the form of material, financial and expertise resources (Shane, 2003). 
Furthermore, given that social entrepreneurship encompasses two sets of goals, social 
enterprises amass a double array of stakeholders in the form of customers and investors 
on the one hand, and donors and beneficiaries on the other (Lepage et al, 2014; Newth 
and Woods, 2014), with potentially double the power to be supportive or challenging. 
Therefore, understanding stakeholder priorities as social entrepreneurs pursue their dual 
goals of social mission achievement and revenue generation helps to illuminate the 
continuing challenges social entrepreneurs experience to becoming mainstream. 
This paper begins by contextualizing the question of stakeholder expectations 
within the literature on social entrepreneurship institutional logics and hybridity, then 
discusses the importance of stakeholder buy-in or resistance for organizational legitimacy 
and resource acquisition. After describing the qualitative research methods used to 
undertake this study, it presents data on social entrepreneur perceptions of stakeholder 
priorities validated by interviews with social entrepreneurship gatekeeper organizations. 
The article closes by discussing the implications and limitations of these findings.   
Social Enterprise, Institutional Logics, and Stakeholders 
Social enterprise arose as a novel field because, in name and in promise, it sits at the 
intersection of two institutional logics. An institutional logic is the central logic that 
provides the organizing principles that shape the way individuals think and behave within 
that institution (Alford and Friedland, 1985; Jackall, 1988; Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton 
and Ocacio, 2008). It provides individuals with a sense of purpose (Friedland and Alford, 
1991) and determines “the way a particular social world works” (Jackall, 1988: 118). 
Thus institutional logics create a “standard mode of operating” that allows stakeholders to 
predict the behaviors of, and within, any organization in a given institutional field. 
Situated in between two institutional logics, a social enterprise is guided by both social 
mission and market logics (Boschee, 2001; Dacin et al, 2011; Doherty et al, 2014; 
Dorado, 2006; Mair and Marti, 2006; Thompson and Doherty, 2006; Tracey and Phillips, 
2007; Vega and Kidwell, 2007).  
A market logic dictates that profit and business strategy should guide economic 
interactions as well as practices and beliefs within the social world (Alford and Friedland, 
1985). In organizations governed by a market logic, strategic priorities are to maximize 
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revenue and accumulate profit (Jay, 2013). Profit is achieved through high levels of 
productivity and efficiency on the one hand, and superior or innovative customer or client 
service on the other. In the logic of market transactions, customers seek low prices and 
high value while investors seek capital growth. The archetypal market-driven 
organization is a business firm, and key business-related stakeholders include customer, 
clients, lenders, and investors (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1991, Doherty et al, 2014, Jay, 
2013). 
Many theorists have described the market as a force for good. In the market logic 
of Adam Smith’s (1776) “invisible hand”-guided economic system, the logic unfolded so 
that a completely free market, with pure competition between buyers and sellers, 
unencumbered by intervention or manipulation, would lead to better products at cheaper 
prices ultimately to the benefit of all. However, given the social and economic inequality 
created by the current economic system, compassionate actors feel the need to intervene 
in the economic order in order to redress disparities between the privileged and the 
disadvantaged (Miller et al, 2012; Arend, 2013). Social entrepreneurs, for their part, 
explicitly focus on a social mission as well as market practices to ensure the welfare—
and future economic inclusion—of those who are suffering from the current economic 
system. 
Consequently, social enterprises encompass a social mission as well as a market 
logic. The realm of “the social” is not easily defined; as Phills and colleagues write, 
“Explaining what social means is both central to our argument [about social 
entrepreneurship] and especially vexing” (2008: 3). Institutional logics theorists 
Friedland and Alford (1991), and Boltanski and Thevenot (1991), capture the meaning of 
the “social” in their discussions of “democratic” and “civic” logics. Giving voice to all in 
decision-making, and satisfying individual and collective needs, are central in both cases. 
Often a social mission will target those who suffer from a particular disadvantage, such 
as disease, hunger or poverty (Christensen et al, 2006; Light, 2009) or who lack access to 
basic healthcare, food, education, jobs or justice (Austin et al, 2006; Phills et al, 2008). 
Additionally, a social mission logic may transcend a focus on individuals to focus on a 
whole community or a population that suffers from marginalization (Alvord et al, 2004; 
Bornstein, 2004; Martin and Osberg, 2007). Finally, sometimes a social mission logic 
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includes the component of social transformation; in other words, remaking the system 
that has created unmet needs (Alvord et al, 2004; Zahra et al, 2009). As Phills wrote, 
“The key feature of social value—whether it is spiritual, moral, societal, aesthetic, 
intellectual, or environmental—is that it transcends economic value” (Phills 2005: 22; see 
also Austin et al, 2006; Certo and Miller, 2008; Dees, 1998; Mair and Marti, 2006). 
Archetypal social mission organizations are government and non-profit agencies that 
provide for social welfare, and key social mission-related stakeholders are donors (either 
individual or organizational) and beneficiaries (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1991; Doherty et 
al, 2014; Jay, 2013). 
Despite the conflicting “standard modes of operating” and resulting challenges 
that these two co-existing logics create, modern organizations are increasingly hybrid 
(Battilana et al, 2012; Smith et al, 2013) or “complex” (Greenwood et al, 2011) in the 
number of logics they embody. At least three bodies of literature related to organizations 
describe how they may embody more than one logic, suggesting both that hybridity can 
permeate an organization easily, and that it has become normal and acceptable. 
Organizational identity research explains that dual identities may coexist within a given 
organization (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Foreman and Whetten, 2002; Pratt and 
Foreman, 2000). For example, research on social enterprise mission statements identifies 
that social enterprises can have both a utilitarian identity focused on profit and a 
normative identity focused on a social or ideological mission (Moss et al 2010). 
Literature on triple bottom line opportunities (Elkington, 1997; Emerson, 2003; Waddock 
and Graves, 1997; Waddock and Rasche, 2012) and impact measurement (Darby and 
Jenkins, 2006; Hulme, 2000; Lepoutre et al, 2011; Ormiston amd Seymour, 2011) 
suggests that organizations can create and measure both economic and social value. 
Third, literature on organizational culture describes the possibility of two co-existing 
internal drivers; for example, Dees (2012) discusses the cultures of charity and innovative 
problem-solving that may be embodied in a social enterprise.  
Despite this literature on ways that multiple logics co-exist within an 
organization, a key challenge is the need to combine the stakeholders that comprise each 
logic into one broad network; in the case of social entrepreneurship, customers and 
investors on the one hand and donors and beneficiaries on the other. This surplus of 
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stakeholders is useful, as resource acquisition is needed for the sustainability of 
individual social enterprises and the field as a whole (Newth and Woods, 2014). As Desa 
and Basu (2013) detail, resources such as capital, material and expertise (Shane, 2003) 
have key roles in the emergence (Brush et al, 2008), product development (Plambeck, 
2011), growth (Villanueva et al, 2012; Wadhwa and Basu, 2013), and competitive 
advantage (Clarysse et al, 2011) of new ventures.  
 However, stakeholders can prove resistant to a phenomenon when it challenges 
the status quo (Becker et al, 2011; Schumpeter, 1934), contributing to paternalistic 
change efforts at best (Waddell et al, 2015), and this resistance may impede resource 
mobilization (Dart, 2004; Nicholls and Cho, 2006) and success (Vasi, 2009). Indeed, 
social entrepreneurs face particularly challenging circumstances because they draw from 
dual logics (Dacin et al, 2011). Using Suchman’s (1995) construct of organizational 
legitimacy is useful for understanding the flow, or lack, of resources directed to social 
entrepreneurship (Dart, 2004), as social entrepreneurship challenges the status quo in 
several ways. According to Suchman, first, an organization is afforded cognitive 
legitimacy when it operates in a way to which people are accustomed. Second, an 
organization is afforded moral legitimacy when it operates in a way that aligns with 
people’s ideology, or the way people think it should operate. Third, an organization is 
afforded pragmatic legitimacy when it yields value to its stakeholders. Social enterprise 
challenges the way stakeholders expect market logic organizations to operate and how 
they believe they should operate; likewise with social mission organizations (Newth and 
Woods, 2014). Furthermore, given the lack of precedent for social enterprise, the degree 
to which it will yield value to stakeholders appears untested to stakeholders. Thus while 
organizational theories demonstrate how hybrid organizations can combine logics into 
their operations, whether or not stakeholders accept dual logic organizations and afford 
them the legitimacy required for resource acquisition is another question. When a new 
field has yet to establish its legitimacy on cognitive, moral, or pragmatic grounds, 
stakeholders may prove resistant and their support and resources may be a hard to access. 
That said, social enterprise stakeholders might be divided into two groups. 
Traditional stakeholders used to the established “standard modes of operating” of 
archetypal market logic and social mission logic organizations may be more resistant than 
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new groups of stakeholders who arise parallel to a novel field. In the case of social 
enterprise, two key groups of stakeholders developed contiguously with the dual goals of 
social mission and market in mind. First, impact investors are a new class of investors 
interested in innovative financing vehicles to solidify the connection between market and 
social mission logics (Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011; Hochstadter and Scheck, 2014; 
Moore et al, 2012). Second, national and international “gatekeeping organizations”—
social entrepreneur fellowship-granting organizations (such as Ashoka, Schwab and 
Skoll) and social enterprise accelerators in the case of social entrepreneurship—offer 
recognition, funding, social networks and in-kind resources to successful candidates in 
order to support social enterprise and grow the field (Bloom, 2012; Dees and Anderson, 
2006; Joos and Leaman, 2014; Schatz, 2015).  
Thus while social entrepreneurs might expect resistance from traditional actors, 
on the other hand, they expect stakeholder groups that arose around embracing dual 
logics to be supportive of their hybridity and more forthcoming with resources. Whereas 
Dacin and colleagues (2011) ask “would social entrepreneurs compromise their 
objectives or social mission in order to suit the agendas and priorities of large funding 
organizations, governments, and foundations” this research revises the question to ask 
“will social entrepreneurs feel they need to compromise their social mission objectives or 
will stakeholders have objectives appropriate to the hybrid nature of social 
entrepreneurship?” While literature on organizational legitimacy suggests that traditional 
funders—foundations, individual donors and investors—may resist hybrid goals and 
remain focused on the status quo of a market logic, hybrid-specific stakeholders—social 
entrepreneurship fellowship-granting organizations and impact investors—should be 
supportive of hybrid actors and support their endeavors. Customers, choosing to be 
patrons of social enterprise, and aware of trends around conscious capitalism (Williams, 
2014), should act supportively toward the hybrid aspirations of social enterprises.  
 
Methods 
This qualitative study used interviews with twenty social enterprises and four gatekeeper 
organizations to address questions about resistance and challenges social entrepreneurs 
experienced vis-à-vis their stakeholders.  
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Seventeen respondents were the founders (or co-founders) and CEOs of their own 
social enterprises and were running their organization (see Table 1). Two were running 
their social enterprises but were not the original founder. One was not the founder but a 
member brought on in early stages and part of the top executive team. Fourteen 
respondents were male and six were female. Of the twenty social enterprises, eleven were 
nonprofit, six were for-profit and three were hybrid organizational forms. Of the four 
respondents at gatekeeper organizations I interviewed, two were from social 
entrepreneurship fellowship-granting organizations and two from social enterprise 
accelerators. Each had a competitive selection process in which applicants were carefully 
vetted. The fellowship organizations managed significant financial resources that were 
granted to fellows to inject into their work. The accelerators used donor and investment 
dollars to fund their services and grants. As well, accelerators either managed impact 
investment funds or connected social entrepreneurs to impact investors. While the 
accelerators did not offer fellows as much funding as the fellowship granting 
organizations, they offered some financial support as well as in-kind services and access 
to business and consulting networks. All four of these respondents were women. One was 
a partner, one a CEO, and two were senior staff members in decision-making positions. 
To identify respondents I used a combination of purposive and convenience 
sampling (Patton, 2014). I was purposeful in relation to several characteristics in order to 
ensure consistency for comparison purposes. In order to be considered a social venture, 
the organization or its founder must have received funding or an award by gatekeeper 
organizations in the field of social entrepreneurship. With no agreement in the literature 
as to the definition of social entrepreneurship or a social enterprise, using external 
validation of the social enterprise status of an organization decreased researcher bias in 
determining who could participate as a respondent. Each social venture had to focus on 
economic development (also referred to as poverty alleviation) since this sector is the 
most common for social ventures (Cukier et al, 2011). Only organizations between the 
ages of two and eight years old were selected, an organizational age one respondent 
referred to as “the valley of death” at which financial struggles are most salient for 
organizations. They often struggle for financial survival, as they are too old for seed 
funding but still struggling to establish themselves. Finally, organizations had to be US-
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based and US-focused in order to ensure consistency for comparison purposes. Within 
these purposive sampling guidelines, interviewees were selected through convenience 
sampling (Bernard and Ryan, 2010). 
Specific questions asked to all social entrepreneurs related to the research 
question included “what do you see as the overall goal or mission of the organization,” 
“what are the major challenges you face in your work,” and “how would you describe 
your relationship with your funders, [or financers, or customers]?” Questions asked to 
gatekeeper organizations included “what are the qualities of a social venture that is going 
to thrive,” “tell me about the decision-making processes about which candidates are 
awarded funding,” “what conditions do you attach to your funding,” and “how do you 
know if your funding recipients have complied with your conditions?” While these 
questions were consistent across the interviews, each interview also used probes to follow 
up on points raised in their responses and conversations went in various directions as a 
result. 
Interviews were voluntary, and confidentiality and anonymity were offered to 
each respondent. Interviews ran for 60-150 minutes and were semi-structured, in the 
tradition of Kvale (1996) and Weiss (1994). Interviews were transcribed verbatim and 
imported into HyperResearch. Qualitative studies provide rich data that helps researchers 
to identify themes (Miles & Huberman, 1994). To uncover themes, this research used a 
grounded theory approach to understand respondents’ perceptions of their interactions 
with stakeholders. It did not set out to measure the presence of market and social mission 
logics, but to determine how respondents viewed and experienced the multiple forces at 
work within their social enterprises (Charmaz, 2006). As such, interviews were coded 
using a grounded approach to identify broad themes guided by the research questions 
(Charmaz, 2006; Miles and Huberman 1994). Subsequently, all material related to each 
theme was aggregated and recoded for sub-themes (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Interviewing, coding and analyzing were iterative processes.  
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Table 1: Overview of Respondents 
Respondents 
Org Mission Focus Org Age at 
Interview 
(years) 
Role/Gender Legal 
Structure 
1 Food  5 Coordinator/F NP 
2 Financial literacy 5.5 Founder/M NP 
3 Food  5 Founder/F NP 
4 Youth empowerment/ 
Skills training 
10 Director/F NP 
5 Youth empowerment/ 
Skills training 
3 Founder/M NP 
6 Refugee integration 5 Founder/M NP 
7 Food 6 Co-Founder/M FP 
8 Veteran 
employment/environment 
2 Co-Founder/M FP 
9 Job training and 
employment 
7 Founder/M FP 
10 Youth empowerment/ 
Skills training 
5 Founder/M NP 
11 Refugee integration 7 Co-Founder/M H 
12 Women’s empowerment 2 Founder/F FP 
13 Youth empowerment/ 
Skills training 
4 Founder/M NP 
14 Job training 6 Co-Founder/M NP 
15 Environment 4 Co-Founder/M FP 
16 Youth empowerment/ 
Skills training 
5 Manager/M NP 
17 Women’s empowerment 2 Co-Founder/F H 
18 Housing 5 Founder/F H 
19 Financial literacy 5.5 Founder/M NP 
20 Veteran employment 2 Founder/M FP 
 
Findings: Privileging a Market Logic 
Sixteen of the twenty social enterprise respondents perceived that their key stakeholders 
demanded they prioritize a market logic in their interactions. These stakeholders appeared 
to resist the social enterprise call to trade some financial return on investment for 
achievement of a social mission. This was the case with relation to customers, funders 
(donors and investors), and impact investors. In triangulating to further understand the 
prevalence of market logic thinking in the field of social entrepreneurship, interviews 
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with four social entrepreneurship gatekeeper organizations also yielded data suggesting 
that social entrepreneurship fellowship organizations and social enterprise accelerators 
expected social entrepreneurs to focus primarily on the development of their market logic 
characteristics. Only two respondents refused this stakeholder prioritization of a market 
logic, by avoiding interactions with them. Finally, in two cases where the social 
enterprise recently transitioned away from a for-profit structure to a new organizational 
form,  the relationship with institutional logics is in transition and currently uncertain (see 
Table 2). 
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Table 2: Social Enterprises and the Logics Prioritized 
Logic 
prioritized 
Perceived 
Dominant 
Stake- 
holder 
 
Social 
Entrepreneur 
Response to 
Stakeholder 
Orgs Quote 
Customer Focus on Price 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 
12, 14, 15, 
16 
“At the end of the day, you 
need to compete on price” 
(Org 15) 
 
While customers care about 
the social mission, “it's 
definitely deep seated in 
American culture that you 
should get the lowest price on 
everything you buy and if you 
don't, you're a fool” (Org 7) 
Adapt Methods 1, 4, 6, 13 
Market 
Funder 
Adapt 
Vocabulary 
18, 19, 20 
We “find a way to frame our 
mission that’s genuine but 
palatable” to attract corporate 
funders (Org 6) 
Mission Beneficiary Focus on 
Social Mission 
3, 10 The audience was “asking all 
of these questions about 
messaging and do we change 
it to fit the foundation…[No.] 
We’re very honest with 
funders about who we are and 
what we do because if we’re 
not then how are we ever 
going to solve the problem.”  
OR 
“We’ve always kept our work 
very genuine. It’s about the 
students. They tell us what is 
needed and our job is to find 
those positive solutions.” 
(Org 10) 
Unknown In 
Transition 
 11, 17  
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Customers Demand Low Price and High Value 
Nine of the sixteen social entrepreneurs who perceived a market logic as dominant had 
customers as a key stakeholder group. Five of these social enterprises were product-
oriented, selling clothing or food items. Four were service-oriented and provided 
janitorial, painting, or related services. In all nine cases, the social entrepreneurs 
perceived that customers selected their product or service for reasons of low price or high 
value, not social mission. As a result, these social entrepreneurs felt the need to shift 
away from a focus on social mission to an emphatic or exclusive focus on price.  
 Organization 15 exemplified a social enterprise that learned that customer 
behavior was dictated by price, value, and self-interest. Originally, it sold a product that 
involved a long explanation. As a young traveler in Africa, one of the co-founders 
noticed how many Africans were wearing T-shirts donated from America. Wanting to 
expose the misguided intentions of charity and its heavy environmental footprint (why 
not stimulate the local economy by investing in a local clothing industry?), his 
organization was founded to “repatriate” T-shirts by hiring African workers to create 
bags and scarves from these t-shirts to be sold back in America. “That was a lot to 
explain to people,” the respondent said. “People were like, ‘well, that’s great, but what 
can you do with my t-shirts?’” While still focused on job creation and environmentalism, 
they abandoned the politics of international aid and turned to t-shirt blankets made in the 
USA using recycled material. Developing an understanding of consumer behavior, 
however, took time. The co-founders wrote that: 
Many social businesses get into trouble doing market research because everyone 
tells them it’s a good idea and the charity component will mean something, both 
to investors and customers. Unfortunately, once the product goes to market, they 
find out nobody is willing to pay for it. (Org 15). 
 
The respondent said of his customers, “Maybe five percent, they're willing to pay five 
percent more but at the end of the day, you need to compete on price.”  
Others found their situation was similar, that potential customers cared about 
value rather than social mission. Customers purchased products due to lower price points, 
not their positive environmental impact or empowerment potential. Social enterprise 
service providers also found they were hired for the value they provided. One explained 
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that “97% [of his business] is the price and can you get the job done and do you stand 
behind your work” (Org 9). As a result, they found when pitching to potential clients that 
it was safer to wear their business “hat” than their social mission “hat” and to emphasize 
price and value rather than the positive social impact. 
Not all customers were uninterested in social mission; respondents found, 
however, that a social mission had to be accompanied by low price and high value to 
attract purchasers. As one explained, while his customers cared about the social mission, 
“It's definitely deep seated in American culture that you should get the lowest price on 
everything you buy and if you don't, you're a fool, and somebody's taking advantage of 
you, and you're letting them” (Org 7). For these social entrepreneurs, experience had 
taught them that customers’ purchasing decisions were based on price, not social mission. 
 
Funders Demand Numbers 
Seven social enterprises generated much or all of their income from funders rather than 
through sales to customers. Funders included corporate and private foundations, 
government, and individual donors and investors. All seven perceived that funders 
expected an emphasis on a  market logic in their operations and they discussed how they 
altered their methods in order to more strategically engage and satisfy their revenue 
sources. There were two ways in which these social enterprises demonstrated a 
commitment to a market logic in deference to funders. The first was to emphasize the 
market methods they used to achieve their social mission. The second was to adopt 
market vocabulary to describe the social enterprise focus. 
Four respondents described shifts they made in order to emphasize the market 
methods their social enterprises used to achieve the social mission. These respondents did 
not want to lose their social focus, but they did alter the way they accomplished their 
mission in order to attract funders more strategically. One determined that his 
organization would use dialogue rather than advocacy to achieve its mission. He found 
that corporate and government funders were not interested in funding social enterprises 
that advocated on behalf of a target population, especially one that was politically 
divisive, like refugee or LGTBQ populations. Rather, these funders preferred to support 
the use of dialogue between all segments of a community since this was a less 
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confrontational way of achieving social change. Another revised the means her 
organization used from working in-depth with a small number of beneficiaries to working 
less in-depth with a greater number of beneficiaries. She found that funders displayed 
greater interest in her work when she could quantify higher numbers of people served 
more than when she could describe a deeper quality of empowerment. A third found that 
her organization had learned to accept mission creep in exchange for incoming funding 
dollars. On the one hand it had recently closed a relevant program that was no longer 
attracting funds. On the other, it had started another large program, tangentially related to 
its mission, for which it had been awarded funds. Thus these organizations shifted away 
from depth or narrow focus to achieve their social missions in order to meet the interests 
of funders and towards breadth, numbers, and noncontroversial issues. 
The second way that social enterprises altered their behavior to meet funder 
interests in a market logic was through a shift in language. One respondent realized that 
in doing her work, not only was she having an impact with regard to her stated mission, 
but a bi product of the work were environmental benefits. Since funders seemed more 
interested in environmental improvements than her organization’s primary mission, she 
was shifting to incorporate environmental language in order to “sell” the message to a 
new set of donors. As one member of the organization said, “carbon savings…is one of 
the things we've kind of packaged into our marketing points for funders…we’re trying to 
develop our argument more on the environmental side so we can tap that community of 
funders” (Org 18). Another had finessed his pitch to capitalize on what he saw as the very 
trendy “cradles to careers” vocabulary that currently caught donors’ attention (Org 13). 
Two respondents chose to brand themselves as “entrepreneurs” rather than a “social 
entrepreneurs” when interacting with donors or investors. One of them dreamed of 
modeling for young people the viability of being a “social entrepreneur” as a career 
choice, but found the term alienated most funders. As a result, he now used 
“entrepreneur” in his marketing materials, online presence, and conversations with 
funders. The other had no interest in the term “social entrepreneur” as he found it 
discouraged investors.  
Thus these social entrepreneurs found that donor and investor decisions were 
guided by financial priorities and a market logic. 
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Impact Investors Expect Financial Return 
Respondents expressed hope that one new way to bring social mission and market logics 
together was through the new field of impact investing. Yet the six respondents who 
discussed impact investing all had been disappointed by impact investors (see Table 3). 
Impact investors invest in companies or organizations “with the intention to generate 
social and environmental impact alongside a financial return” (www.thegiin.org). In 
exchange for creating social return, financial return may be below market rate. 
Respondents saw impact investors as a new and exciting class of investors in the social 
enterprise field that might have helped to find ways to integrate both social mission and 
market logics. However, while it was an appealing concept, respondents found that when 
they had tried to access this funding tool, it appeared that investors were not prepared to 
receive a lower rate of financial return in exchange for social impact. Interest in a market 
rate of return trumped the creation of social impact when discussing “investment” 
opportunities. 
 
Table 3: Social Enterprises Disappointed by Impact Investment. 
Orgs Quote 
7, 11, 12, 15, 
17, 20 
“We found that when you are pitching or talking to wealthy 
people who might invest in you, the wallet goes away when 
you mention the social side” (Org 15) 
 
 Social entrepreneurs perceived that impact investors were not integrating social 
mission preferences into their investment decisions; rather, they separated their financial 
decisions into the two traditional “buckets” of investments and charity. Investment 
decisions were made to generate market rates of financial return. Philanthropic or 
charitable decisions were made to provide gifts to charities or nonprofits. According to 
one respondent who ran a nonprofit social enterprise, even self-identified impact 
investors had not yet integrated the investment and donation “sides” of their brain (Org 
15). 
Both nonprofit and for-profit social entrepreneur respondents shared this 
experience. On the one hand, a nonprofit social entrepreneur explained that he could not 
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persuade corporate donors to buy his product instead of donating money to his 
organization. On the other hand, a for-profit social entrepreneur explained that in vying 
for venture capital, mentioning a social mission “taints” the discussion with investors and 
“just predisposed them to be wary and turned off” since most venture capitalists would 
see social enterprise as a “more limited opportunity” (Org 20). According to these 
respondents, impact investing was a “sort of middle ground that doesn’t really exist” (Org 
17). To receive these investments social enterprises had to prioritize a market logic. 
 Respondents pointed to several issues that made impact investing in a social 
enterprise difficult to sell to investors. One barrier was the financial success of a few 
companies famed for their social impact that had also generated excellent financial 
returns. A respondent explained: 
What are the great examples would you say?...Ben & Jerry’s and Seventh 
Generation and Stonyfield…I think the people who invested in those got returns 
[of] 20x or whatever the expectation was. So they’re still thinking like, “Okay, 
you’re social impact, that's great, but I ought to able to make as much money 
investing in you” (Org 7). 
 
Others cited the success of environmentally-focused technology, or clean-tech, 
companies in particular, and high-tech companies in general as limiting investor interest 
in social enterprise.  
The returns available in those sectors attracted the attention of impact investors who 
preferred their larger returns. While impact investors were a source of interest among 
these respondents as a potential way to integrate market and social mission logics, social 
entrepreneurs had found that impact investments were more ideal than a reality.  
 
Social Entrepreneurship Gatekeeper Organizations Focus on a Market Logic 
Social entrepreneurs perceived that three key stakeholder groups—customers, donors, 
and impact investors—compelled them to prioritize a market logic over a social mission 
logic in their social enterprises. In their interactions with these stakeholders, respondents 
perceived a need to strategically focus on price, breadth, and revenue in order to remain 
competitive. Social enterprise gatekeeper organizations validated these perceptions. 
Social entrepreneurship fellowship funding organizations and accelerators, who select 
from a pool of applicants those to whom they will offer training, mentoring and funding 
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as social entrepreneurs, as well as the prestige of being an award recipient, surprisingly 
reiterated what social entrepreneur respondents had expressed. Rather than focusing on 
balance between social mission and market logics, these gatekeeper organizations 
believed that social entrepreneurs needed to focus on and refine business-related elements 
of their organizations to be successful.  
While gatekeepers did not discount the social mission logic, they tended to take it 
for granted. Three of the four gatekeeper respondents discussed market logic 
characteristics as those that differentiated successful from unsuccessful candidates; the 
fourth described both logics as equally important. The three main qualities on which 
gatekeeper organizations insisted when assessing applicants, aside from a social mission, 
were the financial sustainability of the social enterprise, impact assessment, and the 
individual entrepreneurial qualities of the social entrepreneurs.  
 
Financial Sustainability 
Social enterprise accelerators tended to praise for-profit social entrepreneurs over 
nonprofit entrepreneurs. They explained that for-profit social entrepreneurs understood 
that organizational sustainability was based on good business practices, while nonprofits 
did not understand the importance of revenue generation. One said: 
And when we work with non-profit social enterprises, generally, we have a very 
difficult…it is an uphill…sort of learning continuum to focus on a business 
model, generating revenue, focusing on the importance of that…And then for the 
for-profits, [they] are equally as committed to the mission but understand that in 
order to achieve mission, they need to be sustainable from a financial perspective. 
(G2) 
 
Therefore, financial mentors and advisors were essential for nonprofit social enterprises 
because nonprofit actors were “just not thinking like a business” (G2). Learning to think 
like a business was key since consumer-buying decisions were generally based on quality 
and cost. Mentors needed to teach social entrepreneurs that mission could not be their 
market “differentiator” since only a small percentage of consumers made buying 
decisions based on conscience. Social entrepreneurs needed to learn that sustainability, 
replicability and scale were key and the accelerator’s role was to help clarify and 
articulate the value proposition, metrics and impact. 
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Social entrepreneurship fellowship-granting organizations also focused on 
financial sustainability. One demanded solid business models from their fellows. She 
asserted that to the extent that donors did not insist on a solid business model, the 
nonprofit sector was “broken” (G4). Furthermore, she believed that full financial 
sustainability was important to social entrepreneurs because they often counted on market 
feedback to provide validation of their impact, for example, in the form of “I know I’m 
providing value because the client is willing to pay me” rather than because the 
beneficiary was benefitting (G4). 
The second fellowship funder explained that since they only selected fellows who 
had already demonstrated significant success it did not need to focus on business 
development, though both impact and financial sustainability were key in their 
assessment of candidates. While working with an applicant on their social mission, they 
looked for two indicators of financial sustainability:  
One is diversity of funding. So, is this person getting all of their money from one 
place, is it their own money, is it somebody else’s money, is it all government, 
how restricted is it, so that we can understand how much room are they leaving 
themselves to, if one [funding] partner goes away, to bounce back from that. So 
that’s one thing. The other is growth. So, what has been their trajectory over the 
last couple of years? (G3). 
 
A history of thinking strategically around revenue generation was necessary to being 
considered for this fellowship. 
One respondent summed up the gatekeeper perspective succinctly when she said, 
“I think we’re moving away from this business-is-evil, non-profit-is-good sort of 
dichotomy” (G2). Gatekeepers expected solid business models and strong financial 
performance from their applicants regardless of legal status. The result was that they 
emphasized a market logic in candidate selection and mentoring.  
 
Impact and Impact Assessment 
For gatekeeper organizations, the idea of impact was interwoven with the idea of 
sustainability, as demonstrating impact was seen as a way to increase revenue generation. 
As one respondent asserted, “An idea without impact is not useful” (G3), since funding 
and survival was contingent on demonstrating impact. To ensure impact, they demanded 
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the implementation of impact assessment. Using metrics, social enterprises should be 
able to track and demonstrate impact to create a solid track record of accountability. In 
the applicant selection process, gatekeepers consistently asked, “What are your metrics? 
How are you measuring yourself?” to assess a candidate’s viability (G2). Metrics needed 
to be transparent and quantifiable.  
Funders claimed that success did not mean quantity over quality. For example, 
they stated that working with fewer beneficiaries but transforming them more deeply was 
preferred over superficially serving a larger population. However, gatekeepers also 
returned to the concept of scaling repeatedly. Scaling, in other words growth in revenue 
and reach, was also seen as an important goal and an enterprise’s past growth or potential 
to grow was used as an indicator of success. Thus quantity was not unimportant and 
social entrepreneurs were expected to adapt if they were not achieving a broad reach. 
“Social entrepreneurs should be willing to be flexible in their means depending on if their 
metrics show that they’re achieving their goals and if not, they should change their 
means” (G4). Gatekeepers asserted this was not only important to fellowship grantors but 
also key to an organization’s future ability to attract other capital. Thus while social 
mission was not unimportant, an emphasis on impact assessment and scale represented a 
market logic focus on strategy, productivity, measurement and quantification, growth and 
revenue generation. 
 
Entrepreneurial Ability 
Like the focus on an organization’s ability to be business-like, gatekeeper organizations 
focused on an individual’s ability to be entrepreneurial by being “data-driven, mission-
driven and highly adaptive” (G4). In particular, these organizations highlighted social 
entrepreneurs’ ability to be flexible. They did not want leaders “who [we]re so gung-ho 
about their idea that they [we]re not willing to be adaptive…A true entrepreneur eats up 
feedback, incorporates, adapts, appreciates, realizes that this is a learning experience, I 
would say that that’s one of the characteristics that we look for now” (G2). This ability to 
be adaptive was not related to mission, on which entrepreneurs were expected to execute 
tunnel vision, but on the means used to attain the vision. Gatekeepers explained that 
entrepreneurs should be willing to challenge their own assumptions, and be open to 
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challenge by others, on the best way to achieve their social mission. One respondent said 
“often fellows or candidates will tell us that ‘you pushed me to think about my work 
differently, or to think about my impact in a much broader sense’” (G3). If the way they 
were going about achieving social impact was less effective than another means, they 
should be willing to pivot in order to achieve the most mission best and most effectively.  
An entrepreneurial nature did not necessarily undermine the importance of social 
mission achievement. And gatekeepers also highlighted valuable individual abilities that 
they sought, such as courage, vision, and self-reflection. But gatekeepers’ intense focus 
on the individual over the target population, and on the creative and reactive abilities of 
the entrepreneur rather than public participation in solutions, contributed to underlining 
the dominance of the market logic in which individuality, and production and 
consumption were valued over solidarity or inclusion. 
 
Refusing to Prioritize a Market Logic 
Two respondents (Org 3 and Org 10) offered a contrast to the majority of respondents by 
refusing to acquiesce to stakeholder pressures to prioritize a market logic. They remained 
focused on their social mission. 
The first, who founded and ran a small nonprofit social enterprise that worked to 
address food insecurity, not only prioritized a social mission logic but spoke about it 
almost to the exclusion of revenue generation or business strategy (Org 3). Her tunnel 
vision centered on beneficiaries, discussing the problems they faced and her solutions. 
When first starting out, she had been surprised that when she approached others in the 
field their first questions to her had been about current and potential funders. Rather than 
responding, she would leave. She said, “I was talking about feeding people. I thought that 
was the conversation we were going to have. That wasn’t the conversation that was 
available to me. So I disengaged, walked away from that.” Similarly, she discussed how 
difficult it had been to initiate contact with donors. She had expected to be awarded 
grants due to the pressing nature of the problem. When donors refused her, she would 
thank them and leave rather than engaging further.  
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Furthermore, she found that audiences were more interested in her entrepreneurial 
skills than the social problem. However, sharing stories of her personal experience 
frustrated her. She said,  
I'm having a little bit of fatigue talking how awesome it is to be an 
entrepreneur…Am I a social entrepreneur? Are we social innovators, visionaries? 
Blah blah blah blah blah. It’s that [the local food shelter] relies on our food! 
About forty other partners rely on our food!” 
 
The social enterprise was small, and as she described, they had raised a small 
sum. Yet she went on to detail the thousands of pounds of food they have redistributed. 
The social enterprise survived by finding stakeholders who supported her mission and 
engaged with her by discussing solutions rather than business strategy. In particular, she 
aligned with allies who were cheerleaders, including powerful local actors. The mayor 
was a supporter, as were key players in related local organizations and celebrity chefs. 
She found additional resources by entering non-profit competitions. She got stories about 
her organization’s mission in the local press, and networking led to international speaking 
engagements and meetings with UN officials. This social entrepreneur continued to 
operate on a shoestring while she discussed the social issue widely, only engaging with 
those who focused on the social mission. 
The second respondent refused the push toward a market logic by strategically 
attracting donors, adeptly marketing his cause and accepting only unrestricted donations 
(Org 10). He operated a gym for gang members and provided national certification in 
personal training. One way that he marketed his mission was to create high levels of 
interaction between his beneficiaries and funders. If a donor was interested in the 
organization, he first had them come to the gym and receive one-on-one personal training 
from a gym member. As the respondent explained, having a “platform where everyone 
can kind of come together and see [our work] alleviates the scariness that might happen 
on paper.” This consistent interaction between potential funders and beneficiaries 
allowed potential funders to experience role reversal, when the beneficiary became the 
expert and teacher. The respondent described his approach as follows: 
It works because we've got this setup where people can come in and see our 
students and actually become directly impacted…So people leave with a great 
workout and they directly impact a young person's life and they start to get to 
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know this young person as the person they are, not the decisions that they might 
have made in the past…You know, our goal is to get [every foundation] in here 
even before we ask for money or apply just so they see the program…It's what 
allows us to stay very true to who we are because it's so interactive. It's not 
theoretical.  
 
This social entrepreneur’s interactions with funders were guided by the characteristics of 
a social mission logic. 
A second way that he refused market logic dominance was to accept only 
unrestricted donations. After one challenging experience when a restricted government 
grant led to some difficult choices, he no longer accepted conditional funding. (The grant 
had mandated that participants be dropped from the program should they be absent; the 
social entrepreneur believed that fulltime attendance was unrealistic for this population.) 
He found that unrestricted funding was forthcoming once donors had engaged with 
students in his enterprise and experienced how well the current model worked. As a 
fellow social entrepreneur commented, he was a brilliant strategist and marketer, drawing 
funders to contribute to his cause without compromising his social mission. 
 
Transitioning Legal Structure and the Unknown Effect on Logic Prioritization 
Two cases were anomalies in that they had been founded as for-profit social enterprises 
but had recently transitioned to another legal structure. One became a partnership 
between a for-profit and a nonprofit; the other became the revenue-generating social 
enterprise of a parent nonprofit. Both respondents explained that as for-profit entities, 
they did not generate enough revenue to cover costs and maintain the desired service 
provision for beneficiaries. These two social enterprises therefore altered their 
organizational structure rather than adjusting price structures, product offerings or 
marketing campaigns. Creating a nonprofit partner or parent allowed the enterprise to 
increase funding by fundraising from granting agencies and/or to uncouple service 
provision from product sales. Whether the social entrepreneurs did not or could not 
conform to the market logic required by a for-profit model, and whether their experience 
with funders will be dominated by one or both logics, is beyond the scope of this article 
(c.f. Woodside, 2015).  
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Discussion and Implications 
This study of twenty social entrepreneurs and four gatekeeper organizations found that 
despite the fundamental importance of both market and social mission institutional logics 
to social enterprise, key stakeholders are resistant to this hybridity. Institutional logics 
create “standard modes of operating" that allow people to predict the behavior of, and 
within, an organization. A social mission logic drives an organization to work towards 
social change, whereas a market logic drives towards economic growth, profit, and 
competition (Alford and Friedland, 1985; Friedland and Alford, 1991; Boltanski and 
Thevenot, 1991; Thornton and Ocacio, 2008). On paper, for example in organizational 
mission statements, social enterprises may appear to balance two logics (Moss et al, 
2010). However, this research suggests that social enterprises are prevented from 
combining these logics easily because they perceive that the stakeholders with whom 
they interact look for and reward a focus on market logic priorities.  
Therefore, one contribution of this research is to question whether traditional 
organizational stakeholders really accept the hybrid nature of social enterprises. While 
social entrepreneurship literature describes social enterprises as embodying both market 
and social mission logics (e.g. Boschee, 2001; Dacin et al, 2011; Doherty et al, 2014; 
Dorado, 2006; Thompson and Doherty, 2006; Tracey and Phillips, 2007; Vega and 
Kidwell, 2007), the evidence here describes how social entrepreneurs perceived that their 
stakeholders resisted this hybridity, and instead placed a focus on market logic 
considerations. Customers and clients demanded low prices, donors demanded 
quantification and impact measurement, and investors expected market rate financial 
return. Given this stakeholder resistance to dual logics and emphasis on a market logic 
(Newth and Woods, 2014), the new organizational paradigm embodied by social 
enterprises seems unsupported. Their offer of financial, material and expert resources in 
exchange for a focus on market priorities suggests the legitimacy of the field is not yet 
established. Stakeholders do not seem to have reshaped their view of organizations to 
include social-business logic hybridity as legitimate; neither as an acceptable or 
ideologically appropriate way of goal-setting (manifestations of cognitive and moral , nor 
do they anticipate acceptable levels of value being created (practical legitimacy) (Newth 
and Woods, 2014; Suchman, 1995).  
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Hybrid-specific stakeholders also emphasized a market logic. Social 
entrepreneurship fellowship granting organizations and accelerators shape who “gets in to 
the club,” who gets rewarded, and who gets connected to specialist networks and large 
pots of money (Bloom, 2012; Dees and Anderson, 2006; Joos and Leaman, 2014; Schatz, 
2015). Impact investors were expected to integrate the logics of market and social 
mission by providing financial investment to support the generation of both financial and 
social return on investment (Bugg-Levine and Emerson, 2011; Hochstadter and Scheck, 
2014; Moore et al, 2012). This research showed that gatekeepers were very much focused 
on market logic characteristics of organizational sustainability, scale, entrepreneurial 
ability and quantification, pushing the field toward market logic modes of operating. 
Furthermore, theoretically committed to supporting ventures that create social as well as 
financial impact, impact investors regardless expected market rate return on investment. 
This left social entrepreneurs either cynical or confused about the utility of impact 
investing as a financing tool for social enterprise.  
The second contribution of this study is to demonstrate that social entrepreneurs 
generally responded to stakeholder resistance to hybridity by acquiescing to pressure to 
emphasize a market logic. Counter to current literature that suggests social entrepreneurs 
should problem-solve to avoid single logic dominance, social entrepreneurs described 
their actions as dominated by market logic considerations; they allowed price, value, 
business strategy, competition, and measurement to shape their interactions with 
customers and funders. As well, those respondents who discussed impact investors 
appeared baffled by their resistance and generally avoided them. In the two cases that 
refused to emphasize a market logic, they chose to focus on their social mission, either 
avoiding funders who expected conversations related to a market logic or carefully 
selecting those who would fund their social mission unconditionally. Thus, even these 
two cases did not respond by reinforcing their hybrid nature but by a retrenchment into a 
single logic. 
In considering these first two contributions, this study serves to question whether 
social enterprises are as inherently hybrid as current literature assumes. When 
organizational hybridity is investigated in terms of how it is enacted in the every day 
interactions and expections of its stakeholders, rather than how it is written into the 
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framework of the organization—in a mission statement or business model, for example—
it appears that social entrepreneurs perceive most stakeholders as agents of a market logic 
and social entrepreneurs respond in kind.  
Privileging a market logic over a social mission logic is not inherently bad. As 
gatekeepers, funders, and social entrepreneurs themselves point out, revenue is entwined 
with social mission achievement. Social enterprises require resources to survive, which is 
necessary for keeping the good work going. And even more money is required to enable 
an organization to grow or scale, which is necessary for reaching more people or 
supporting more impactful systemic transformation. However, generating income to 
support a social mission does not necessarily equate with a deep commitment to that 
social mission nor does it ensure that the social mission is robust or enacted with 
integrity. Social entrepreneurs who prioritize social mission in their interactions with 
stakeholders discuss the importance of integrity, genuineness, and laser focus on social 
mission, sometimes at the expense of funding. These qualities of the social mission logic 
may be lost easily when a social entrepreneur emphasizes a market logic in interactions 
and relationships with stakeholders.  
If gatekeeper organizations that control funding or advise social entrepreneurs 
insist on the need to focus on business practices, there are risks for the field. Gatekeepers 
may push the field towards one that prioritizes a market logic by focusing on these skills 
in the participants they select to become field leaders. Or, social enterprises may 
increasingly develop their business-like nature, de-emphasizing their social mission, in 
order to gain the recognition of gatekeeper organizations. Furthermore, a rigorous focus 
on measurement as the means to gauge impact may actually contribute to the increase of 
market behaviors of commercialization and quantification at the expense of the social 
mission logic as social entrepreneurs try to find the numbers to demonstrate success 
easily. Continued work to educate impact investors and to legitimate qualitative impact 
assessment would help protect the integrity of the field. Otherwise, the risk is that the 
social mission logic will be subsumed by the market logic and that social enterprises will 
compromise their social objectives to suit funders’ funding priorities. 
Finally, a focus on problem solving in the literature suggests that if the challenges 
experienced by social entrepreneurs are analyzed and diagnosed properly, the social 
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entrepreneur can solve them. Social entrepreneurs should reform their operations to 
ensure better outcomes.  However, this conclusion returns the field of social 
entrepreneurship literature back to its origins in the heroic individual, from which it has 
worked so hard to move forward. To propose solutions such as proper hiring policies 
(Battilana and Dorado, 2010) or reframing of the nature of the endeavor (Pache, 2012) is 
not unhelpful, but it does suggest that it is incumbent on social entrepreneurs to fix the 
problems they encounter. If they work hard and smart enough, they will succeed. 
However, for a new field and the organizations within it to be established successfully, 
will, determination and persistence are insufficient. Equally crucial is the buy-in and 
support of all stakeholders that make up its functioning and continuation. Thus a focus on 
what the individual social entrepreneur should or should not do to be successful is one 
response to the challenges encountered within the field of social entrepreneurship, but 
paying attention to the full range of actors, their commitment and resistance, is equally 
important to interpreting whether the field has gained widespread acceptance. 
 
Future Research and Practical Implications 
Social entrepreneurship is not the first new field to emerge. Understanding the experience 
within other emergent fields in relation to stakeholder resistance and buy in would 
provide insights for the field of social entrepreneurship. As such, scholars in social 
entrepreneurship have much to gain by investigating the similarities, differences, and 
lessons learned from the establishment of fields such as equal opportunity (Dobbin, 
2009), HIV treatment (Maguire et al, 2004), corporate environmentalism (Hoffman, 
1999) and the science of chaos (Gleick, 1987). Insights derived from delving into how 
key actors in these fields negotiated the demands of stakeholders that provide financial 
resources would be particularly relevant. From a practical perspective, research on how 
social entrepreneurs can keep beneficiaries forefront consistently in order to maintain the 
ethical nature of the endeavor (Chell et al, 2014; Waddock and Steckler, 2014) could 
provide useful tools to practitioners. Otherwise, the ethical underpinnings of social 
entrepreneurship—the  betterment of marginalized groups in society—may be being 
sacrificed to commercial interests that social entrepreneurs work to satisfy funders, 
investors and consumers. 
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Second, further research is necessary on social enterprise gatekeepers and how 
they are impacting the field. Practically-speaking, gatekeeper organizations should not 
assume that a social enterprise’s social mission is flourishing, since lack of attention may 
lead to the mission being implied but not enacted. Battilana and Dorado’s (2012) case 
study of two microfinance banks suggested that hiring staff without backgrounds in either 
corporate or nonprofit environments—who come “tabula rasa”—may be useful in 
socializing them into an organizational culture that perpetuates a balanced approach to 
mission and profit. However, many of the organizations in this study are small and not 
hiring. Thus research on how gatekeepers can help social enterprises work with the 
people and resources they already have, helping them learn to balance funder and 
beneficiary needs is important. Given that achieving a social objective is at least in part 
what motivates social entrepreneurs (Bacq et al, 2014; Miller et al, 2012; Waddock and 
Steckler, 2014; Zahra et al, 2009), losing focus on this mission might contribute to the 
failure of social enterprises.  
Third, both descriptive and normative research is needed on impact investors. 
Further assessment of what factors do and could motivate their investment in social value 
creation would lend insight into this stakeholder group and how social entrepreneurs can 
leverage their assets for social mission achievement. Research on whether the financial 
success of a few social enterprises (such as Ben & Jerry’s and Seventh Generation) has 
narrowed the focus on impact investing and what incentives might broaden their focus 
could provide useful feedback to the field. Practically, there is an ongoing need to 
develop a funding class that understands the dual logics of social enterprises. Gatekeeper 
organizations may want to focus on educating the impact investor class on social 
investment as much as educating the social entrepreneur on business savvy.  
 
Limitations 
This research selected respondents from among social entrepreneurship fellowship award 
recipients and accelerator approved participants. As a result, this is not intended to be a 
representative sample. For example, gatekeeper organizations’ focus on business acumen 
may have led them to crown a group of social entrepreneurs who demonstrated a 
proclivity to privilege a market logic. Or since award winners generally have been 
	 123	
established long enough to demonstrate some impact, they may feel that they have 
already accomplished the task of embedding their social mission into their enterprise and 
are now focused on business strategy. While gatekeepers and their successful applicants 
may disproportionately shape the field, focusing on them also limits generalizability. As 
well, this was a small sample of respondents who are US-based and US-focused. Social 
enterprises cannot be divorced from the communities in which they are embedded (Bacq 
and Janssen, 2011; Peredo and Chrisman, 2006; Seelos et al, 2011). Research should be 
conducted among a larger group of respondents, including non-award winners, and social 
enterprises based in and focused on different regions of the world, to assess the 
generalizability of these findings. Finally, this is a qualitative study exploring social 
entrepreneurs’ perceptions of their interactions and dominant logics. A quantitative 
analysis that tried to measure the enactment of mission and market logic behaviors would 
provide a compliment to these findings.  
 
Conclusion 
Current literature on social enterprises describes them as hybrid organizations, bringing 
together market and social mission institutional logics in theory and practice. This 
research suggests that social entrepreneurs frequently find that their dominant 
stakeholders resist this hybridity and emphasize market logic priorities. A market logic 
emphasizes profit, competition and business strategy and identifies relationships between 
stakeholders as commercial and strategic. A social mission logic prioritizes participation, 
solidarity and social justice and understands relationships between stakeholders as 
inclusive and needs fulfilling. More than three quarters of the social entrepreneur 
respondents in this study described a market logic dominating their interactions with 
stakeholders. Therefore, this study offers three contributions to research on social 
enterprise. First, it questions the taken-for-granted hybrid nature of social enterprises. 
Since social entrepreneurs described stakeholder expectations, and their own responses, 
as dominated by market logic considerations, a consistent focus on a robust social 
mission may be at risk. Second, it suggests that stakeholders have not yet afforded 
legitimacy to the field of social entrepreneurship. Third, the study also revealed that 
social enterprise gatekeeper organizations (fellowship-granting organizations and 
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accelerators) are focused on developing the business acumen of social entrepreneurs and 
market logic characteristics of social enterprises, and that social entrepreneurs find that 
impact investors expect market rate return on investment. When stakeholders who control 
financial resources prioritize market logic over a social mission logic, social enterprises 
may find their standard mode of operating dominated by this market logic.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
“Social Mission or Revenue Generation? Challenges and Opportunities in Social 
Enterprise from Competing Institutional Logics” investigates the tensions and tough 
choices social enterprises face in delivering their solutions due to their dual institutional 
logics of social mission achievement and revenue generation. On the one hand, social 
enterprises may be a new and effective approach to addressing “wicked” social problems 
plaguing the 21st century (cf Bornstein 2004; Drayton 2006; Elkington and Hartigan 
2008). On the other hand, critics wonder whether managing both financial and social 
mission imperatives inevitably leads to the sacrifice of social value creation (cf Cho 
2006; Edwards 2010; Farmer 2009; Ramdas 2011). As one blogger posted in reaction to 
the exclusive Oxford-based Skoll-funded annual social entrepreneurship forum, it is 
“Beginning to feel like a self-congratulatory gathering of big foundation-backed elite. 
That’s how capital and power works” (Liam 2007). My research aimed to provide nuance 
to this discussion by illuminating why using business methods to solve social problems 
either might create challenges for social enterprises or might help social enterprises 
survive and achieve their social mission.  
This dissertation is comprised of three articles. “Social Entrepreneurs at the 
Crossroads: Four Approaches to Responding to Dual Institutional Logics” analyzes 
individual social entrepreneurs and their motivations, deriving four categories of social 
entrepreneur. “One Size Does Not Fit All: Legal Form and US WISEs” analyzes work 
integration social enterprises (WISEs) and the importance of aligning logic priority and 
legal form. “Stakeholder Resistance to Social Enterprise Hybridity” analyzes the 
resistance from customers, investors, donors and gatekeepers to prioritizing both market 
and social mission logics. While each of the three articles approaches the research 
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questions from a different level of analysis, four common themes emerge. First, in 
general, social entrepreneurs do not wrestle with tensions between their social mission 
and revenue goals. Second, the market logic often dominates the social mission logic. 
Third, while there are many similarities and differences between social enterprises, they 
can be divided generally into two categories: nonprofits and for-profits. Finally, while the 
outliers in each article are different cases, what unites them is a common focus on 
maintaining a robust social mission despite forces pushing toward market logic 
dominance.  
 
The “Absence” of Tensions 
 The intention guiding this research was to understand whether social 
entrepreneurs perceived tensions between social mission and market logics and if so, how 
they managed these tensions. To my surprise and contrary to my hypothesis, the majority 
of the social entrepreneurs I interviewed did not see tensions between the two logics. In 
“Social Entrepreneurs at the Crossroads,” half of individual social entrepreneurs did not 
perceive tensions, and another quarter did not respond to the tensions they did perceive. 
Rather, individual social entrepreneurs approached their social entrepreneurship career 
with a particular mindset already established. Social entrepreneurs fell into four 
categories based on their motivations. In three of these categories, their motivation 
predisposed them to act via a single logic: either from a social mission or market 
perspective. They were Disillusioned Dreamers disappointed with the nonprofit industry, 
Social Capitalists who believed in the potential of capitalism for increased social justice, 
and Do-Somethings who advocated immediate and constant action on a social issue. 
Their experiences were filtered through their motivation, and as a result they approached 
their work either as a series of business decisions or beneficiary-oriented actions. What 
others might perceive as a tension—for example, “do I pay the veterans sewing our 
product less to save money”—they saw either as a business decision—“we hope to save 
on labor costs by paying workers less”—or a social mission mandate—“we need to 
ensure our veterans are making a living wage with benefits.” Only Bridgebuilders, 
committed to bringing market and social mission actors together, continually wrestled 
with the tensions they perceived between logics. 
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Likewise, “Legal Form and US WISEs” demonstrated that social enterprises were 
established using the legal form that best aligned with their founder’s initial mindset. This 
legal form correlated with the logic prioritized in operations. For-profit WISEs embodied 
a market logic and issues were viewed as business decisions. Nonprofit WISEs 
encompassed a social mission logic and issues were viewed through a social mission lens. 
Therefore, a question such as “do we hire the most needy or the most able individuals to 
our program” was not seen as a tension but as a process question with a clear answer (for-
profit answered “most able;” nonprofits answered “most needy”). Finally, in 
“Stakeholder Resistance to Social Enterprise Hybridity,” social entrepreneurs did 
perceive that at a systems level stakeholders resisted dual logics and tended to embody 
market logic preferences such as low costs or quantification of impact. This resistance did 
lead to a sense of frustration among many social entrepreneurs but not to a sense of 
tension. Rather they tended to comply by focusing on price and value for customers, 
quantification and breadth for donors, and avoid impact investors altogether.  
This is not to say that tensions did not exist from a theoretical perspective. Whom 
to hire (an “organizing” tension), how to define success (a “performing” tension), and 
with which partners to ally (a “belonging” tension) (Smith, Gonin and Besharov 2013) 
were all choices that social entrepreneurs had to make, and social mission and market 
logic perspectives determined the “correct answer” differently. Yet social entrepreneurs 
did not generally perceive these as difficult choices that caused conflict or resulted in 
trade-offs. Rather, they approached their work with a dominant logic, or mental filter, 
that provided clear answers when choices or decisions arose—or obviated the question 
altogether by making these decisions de facto components of a business strategy. 
 
Market Logic Dominance 
The second theme that ran through the three articles was the pervasiveness of the 
market logic in daily operations. Certainly the social enterprises all had social missions 
around which they were founded related to poverty alleviation and economic 
development for marginalized populations. However, in terms of questions about where 
to focus time and energy and how to satisfy the broad array of stakeholders necessary for 
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organizational survival, the market logic components of customer satisfaction, 
salesmanship, sales cycles, and revenue dominated social mission thinking.  
The enactment of market logic thinking did manifest differently depending on 
organizational form. Within for-profit social enterprises, social entrepreneurs focused on 
customer satisfaction through low price and high value above all. In nonprofits, the 
dominance of market logic thinking related to the privatization of the social services 
(Dunleavy & Hood 1994). Rather than focus on price, marketing or sales as for-profits 
did, a market logic dominance in nonprofits was manifest in the constant pressure to 
quantify impact with a focus on breadth. Funders wanted high numbers of people served 
with clear indicators of success, they wanted their dollars invested in programs rather 
than operations (such as staff or infrastructure), and they wanted nonprofits to 
demonstrate attempts to diversity funding. (The exceptions were nonprofit social 
enterprise programs, discussed below.) Hybrid organizations that combined separate for-
profit and nonprofit organizations were subject to a market logic “double whammy.” 
Their for-profit operations required a focus on price and value while their nonprofit 
operations necessitated quantification. Finally, the gatekeeper organizations interviewed 
for this research also emphasized market logic thinking, prioritizing efficiency, 
scalability, impact measurement—and innovation if it was sustainable.  
 Nonprofit social enterprise programs, standalone revenue generating programs 
within larger traditional nonprofits, were the form of social enterprise most protected 
from market pressures. One example was a social enterprise program run by a ten-year 
old state-wide nonprofit with multiple programs to help several marginalized populations. 
Its social enterprise was a job-training program to teach juvenile offenders to work in 
restaurant kitchens. Participants created jam and pickled vegetables that they then sold at 
markets and to state institutions. The program had its own staff to run the operation. It 
also generated revenue through product sales. However, it was not under pressure to be 
self-sustaining, as the parent nonprofit wrote program grants and allocated funds to 
program costs. The parent nonprofit also addressed problems that necessitated additional 
resources (e.g., cost of new materials, costs of expanding, staff help with IT or PR, etc.). 
There are risks to this model: it is at the mercy of its parent nonprofit for funding which 
could be cut at any time, social enterprise decision-making could be overridden by parent 
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nonprofit executives, and social enterprise profit and loss can be hard to determine due to 
accounting that muddies the barriers between the social enterprise and its parent. Yet 
these social enterprises felt the most protected from the whims of the market, the fickle or 
punitive nature of donors, and the most supported in their social mission goals. As one 
social entrepreneur said, he wished he had a large nonprofit to house him. Such a 
structure, he believed, would protect him from the dictates of the market logic thinking 
that dominated his social enterprise.  
 
Nonprofit/For-Profit Fissure 
The field of social entrepreneurship is generally accepted as a broad one 
encompassing organizations of any legal form that use business methods for social 
change (Dees 2007; Kerlin 2006; Light 2005; Martin and Osberg 2007; Neck, Brush, and 
Allen 2009; Nicholls and Cho 2006). However, in this research often it was a struggle to 
see the field as a unified one. Certainly some commonalities were apparent across cases. 
For example, the social entrepreneurs had social missions central to their founding based 
on disillusionment with current regimes—either traditional nonprofits or business-as-
usual. And founders expressed a reverence for “business strategy,” whether that meant 
one hundred percent of income derived from sales, bootstrapping and iteration following 
lean startup culture, or nonprofit efficiency and scaling. However, apart from the ideal of 
finding meaning by helping others and pro-business vocabulary, the split between for-
profit and nonprofit social enterprises was striking. It often seemed significant enough to 
lead to existential questions about the nature of the social enterprise field. For-profit 
social enterprises tended to have for-profit problems, and nonprofit social enterprises 
nonprofit problems. 
 The motivations to become a social entrepreneur, as discussed in “Social 
Entrepreneurs at the Crossroads,” differed sharply between individuals who founded for-
profits and nonprofits. Those disillusioned with the traditional nonprofit industry who 
wanted to “get their hands dirty” by acting immediately on a social problem founded 
nonprofits. Those who believed that capitalism was a source of social justice that just 
needed tweaking, refinement or better ethics founded for-profits. Once founded, 
nonprofit and for-profit social enterprises dealt with contrasting sets of priorities and 
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challenges. For-profits focused on customer satisfaction, breaking even, and making a 
profit. For them, ethical supply-chains and pro-social hiring policies often embodied their 
social mission success. Nonprofits focused on reaching broad populations, program 
accessibility, donor satisfaction, and holistic outcomes for beneficiaries that included 
work, personal, and educational enhancement. For them, social mission success was 
evidenced by outcomes such as work for marginalized populations or donor renewal, or 
the provision of wraparound services to marginalized populations.  
This fissure between nonprofit and for-profit antecedents, processes, and 
outcomes made for interesting compare-and-contrast opportunities, but also risked 
repetitiveness of the theme that nonprofit and for-profit social enterprises differ. 
Ultimately it led to questions around the integrity and legitimacy of the “big tent” 
definition of social entrepreneurship and future research opportunities around “who 
counts.” 
 
Outliers as Different Eggs in a Social Mission Basket 
 Each of the three articles focused on a different level of analysis, which elicited 
different topics of importance. While each article depicted comprehensive spectrums that 
derived from the cases, each paper also contained outliers and special categories. The 
first striking characteristic of these outliers was that they contained no overlap. The 
special cases in the first paper were those four “Bridgebuilder” social entrepreneurs who 
resisted the dominance of one logic. They were committed to connecting the social 
mission and market spheres in the service of uncovering synergies between the two. In 
the second article, the two outlier organizations were those that had transitioned from for-
profit legal form to nonprofit or for-profit/nonprofit hybrid when they determined their 
business model could not support their social mission. The third paper had two outlier 
organizations, the two that resisted stakeholder pressure to attend to the market logic 
demands of their funders. No single case was an outlier in more than one article. These 
eight cases also split over their approach to dual logics. The four Bridgebuilders tried to 
comply with market logic demands in order to build bridges while the other four resisted 
market logic pressures. 
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 Despite the fact that no case was an outlier at more than one level of analysis, the 
eight outliers shared two commonalities. All eight demonstrated a robust, “industrial-
strength” focus on social mission. The four Bridgebuilders were deeply committed to 
their missions of helping marginalized populations by bringing together market and 
social mission actors despite the logic tensions they perceived and with which they 
wrestled. The two transitioning organizations “re-formulated” themselves from for-profit 
to nonprofit or hybrid so that they could maintain their wraparound service provision 
alongside job training and placement. The two outliers in the last article refused 
stakeholder pressures to focus on funding or compromise their missions. These eight 
social enterprises found a way to hold their social missions equal or primary to business 
strategy and market pressure. Second, alongside their intent focus on a robust social 
mission, all eight were also nonprofit organizations. The commonalities among these 
eight cases suggest that prioritizing a social mission logic makes a case stand out from 
the norm and requires special commitment, but that the easiest or most effective way of 
doing so is through the nonprofit legal form. 
 
Practical Implications 
Advice for Social Entrepreneurs 
While this dissertation investigated tensions between a social mission and a 
market logic, it is not necessarily better to perceive tensions. If it is possible to achieve 
social impact as a for-profit and operate without being distracted by tensions, this may be 
a viable path forward. The work may be easier to navigate if the path looks clear. 
Constant debate on how to move forward may just sidetrack practitioners. If practitioners 
do experience high levels of tensions, one question they might ask themselves is whether 
the social mission and legal form are aligned. This research demonstrated the importance 
of alignment between organizational form and function as one approach to reducing 
tensions and working toward goal achievement.  
However, there are challenges that will result regardless. For example, it can be 
difficult to maintain a robust mission as a for-profit. Market logic considerations may 
cause mission drift. This research suggested that those social entrepreneurs with the 
broadest missions who do best are nonprofits with the right funders. This is not to say 
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there is an abundance of nonprofit funding available. Several nonprofit social enterprises 
in this sample had set up or were in the process of setting up earned income streams of 
revenue with the hope of increasing the overall funding available to them given resource 
constraints. However, the evidence in this study showed that working to bridge logics 
correlated with the most robust demonstration of social entrepreneurship, in particular in 
the form of the Bridgebuilder archetype. Bridgebuilders bring the logics of social mission 
and money together, especially by engaging logic actors, not just ideas. Bridgebuilders 
focus on connecting to market actors as well as social mission actors.  
Yet, it was notable that none of the Bridgebuilders had founded a for-profit 
company. As well, the social entrepreneurs in “Legal Form and US WISEs” who 
established for-profits could not stay for-profit and survive if they wished to achieve 
robust social mission of job training and wraparound services. Therefore, the prescription 
that emerges from this research—which requires further research and testing given the 
limited sample—is to engage multiple logic stakeholders, not just multiple methods, on a 
social issue in nonprofit form. The most protected of all nonprofit forms is the nonprofit 
social enterprise program, in which the social entrepreneur has freedom to be innovative 
but the resources of a parent nonprofit as protection. 
 
Advice for Gatekeeper Organizations 
 This research suggests that there is a difference between social business, or 
“business-unusual,” and social enterprise. While social business is exciting in its 
promotion of ethical capitalism, it is different than social enterprise that addresses a 
social mission as significantly as it does revenue. However, one major fellowship funding 
organization had half of its applicants proposing or running for-profits in 2015 (Echoing 
Green, in Schatz 2016). A gatekeeper respondent noted that hiring trends at gatekeeping 
organizations are shifting from a preference for candidates with social sector 
backgrounds to those with MBAs. However, gatekeepers might benefit the social mission 
aims of the field more profoundly if they focused on nonprofit social entrepreneurs, 
bridgebuilding techniques, and educating nonprofit funders (rather than the seemingly 
market-oriented impact investor class) on the benefits of social enterprise.  
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Advice for Researchers: 
 If the definition of social entrepreneurship is creating pathways to positive social 
change using business methods, it may be worth consciously and consistently dividing 
the research on social enterprise into two broad themes: Innovative Nonprofits and Social 
Business. The answers to questions about how to be effective with regard to people, 
processes and inputs/outcomes in each of these two categories are consistently different 
depending on legal form. Nonprofit social entrepreneurs need to enhance their abilities to 
do more while resisting the constraints of donors. For-profit social entrepreneurs need to 
explore how they can continue to shift customer and investor mentality around bearing 
the cost of social value creation. There will be some overlap; for example, nonprofits that 
wish to establish earned income streams need to apply business tenets. However, overall 
it may be beneficial to distinguish between these two legal forms and create two streams 
of research that address separately the questions most relevant to each organizational 
configuration. 
Secondly, it is also worth approaching the field from an interdisciplinary 
perspective. While institutional theory unites sociological and management literatures, 
there are gaps in each discipline to which the other discipline speaks in relation to social 
entrepreneurship. Broadly speaking, in business and entrepreneurship literature, social 
entrepreneurship has generated great excitement and is approached with hope about its 
potential to create significant social change. In sociology literature, much less research 
exists, perhaps because social entrepreneurship is construed as an approach to social 
change co-opted by business interests. Admittedly, it was a challenge to work at the 
intersection of these two disciplines. On the one hand, there was little acceptance of 
critique within the business and entrepreneurship literature, and on the other, little 
curiosity from within sociology. At times it seemed as challenging to work at the 
intersection of literatures as social entrepreneurs experienced at the intersection of logics. 
However, each discipline has useful bodies of knowledge that shed light on important 
questions related to social entrepreneurship if the field continues to want to understand 
the convergence of “the social” and “the enterprise.” 
 
Advice to Self 
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So should I stay involved in the field of social entrepreneurship as a researcher, 
educator, or practitioner? I believe its main value is in the attractiveness of the term to 
socially conscious actors, especially young people. The youth at the two conferences 
mentioned in the dissertation’s introduction were excited to get going. The social 
entrepreneurs I interviewed want change from the status quo of business and the 
nonprofit industry, and the rapid growth of the social entrepreneurship field proves its 
appeal. It is terrific that social enterprise gets people excited about ethical trends. Even if 
I see social business as having constraints that other forms of social action do not, it is not 
inconsequential or unworthy. Making social justice of any breadth a viable career option, 
especially for business school students who are so compellingly recruited by consulting 
firms and banks, is a worthy pursuit.   
There are downsides to contributing to the growth of the field of social 
entrepreneurship. One is continued disunity around social change. Social 
entrepreneurship promotes the individualism of the entrepreneur, which fragments action 
toward social justice. One result is masses of individuals doing different things in 
isolation when together they might form a large social movement. Another is a lack of 
transformational impact. After researching this topic for several years it is not clear to me 
that social entrepreneurship truly questions the structures of injustice. This does not 
discount the steps of courage and compassion that social entrepreneurs take, and some 
social entrepreneurs do question oppressive systems, but social entrepreneurs often work 
within proven structures rather than confronting them. Because using business methods 
often requires attaining the resources of business and power elites through financial 
transactions, it is difficult to challenge the structures that privilege them.  
That said, as a launching point, a space that has gathered excitement and 
generates discussion around the “who” and “how” of social justice, as a place to start 
rather than to end, it is a topic worth study and engagement. 
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